Preliminary Assessment

PREVENTION OF **VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

IN LIBYA NOVEMBER 20**21**

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PREVENTION OF **VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

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INTRODUCTION

Violent extremism (VE) is a multifaceted phenomenon that refers to the attempt by some actors to shape the state and society according to a radical vision. VE actors act upon a core belief **"that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group"**.[1] With no universally agreed-upon definition, violent extremism is a broader problem than terrorism. VE actors have ideological, sociological and political motivations to use violence. Thus, VE is a complex phenomenon determined by a combination of structural, social and psychological factors that intertwine in different forms and combinations leading to violence.

Unfortunately, there is a lack of data and research methodology on violent extremism, compared to the abundance of literature on terrorism. Moreover, there are diverse conceptual framings and interventions, each connected to a particular context and institution. Concepts of violent extremism vary among major international organizations and donors who often leave the definition of essential concepts to the particular context. Moreover, the vast majority of VE research focuses primarily on attacks and threats against the "West". Only a fraction of the existing research on VE has focused on its local impact in other regions such as Africa, where indeed the damage has been greater. [2.]

In Libya, the post-2011 security vacuum led to a resurgence of violent extremist activity, both within the country's borders and within the region. Groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Ansar al-Sharia, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been able to use Libya to train recruits and plan operations in the entire region due in part to the country's weak state security apparatus and border controls. However, since 2011, Libya represents much more than a safe haven for VE groups. The large prevalence and severity of drivers of VE in Libya also offer a great opportunity for the radicalization of Libyans and for the development of VE in Libya.

Without a robust central administration, Libyans suffer from poor or absent basic services, a weak education system, and a generalized socio-economic struggle. All these factors lead to deteriorating living conditions. The political divisions that are plaguing Libya since 2011 and the weakness of the state institutions have led to an administrative atomization: local state and non-state authorities are left alone to govern the country at the local level without sufficient resources from the national government, and often with very little human and infrastructural capacity.3
In addition to Libya's domestic issues, the interference of foreign powers have greatly contributed to the atomization and militarization of society, and have deepen political division.

1. UNDP-RBAP, "Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia Entry and Exit Points" (2020), p.14.

2. A. Glazzard, M. Zeuthen, Violent Extremism, GSDRC, February (2016) see, https://gsdrc.org/professional-dev/violent-extr emism/
3. J.R. Allen, H. Amr, D.L. Byman, V. Felbab-Brown, et al., *"Empowered Decentralization: A City-based strategy for rebuilding Libya,"* The Brookings Institution (2019) Washington, DC.

Following the military intervention of the US, the UK, and France in 2011, numerous foreign powers have interfered more or less directly in Libya at the political, security, economic, and social levels. They include Turkey, Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Sudan, and to a lesser extent many other countries. Foreign interference has markedly increased both quantitatively and qualitatively from November 2019, with the signature of a security and an economic Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Libyan Government of National Accord and Turkey.

These MoUs provoked a chain reaction that has led to an increased deployment of foreign fighters and a further rise in the shipment of military equipment to Libya to both coalitions confronting each other. At the time of writing, the number of foreign fighters in Libya has probably surpassed 20,000, and include Turkish military, Russian private military contractors, and mercenaries from Syria (both Turkmen and pro-Assad, obviously fighting on opposing sides), Sudan, and Chad. [4]

The presence of foreign forces in Libya and the continued meddling of foreign powers directly fuels the “holy war” narrative of violent jihadism.[5]

Violent extremist groups exploit anti-imperialistic foreign interference, governmental failures, and the death and destruction, and disenfranchisement that result from continued national and localized conflicts to recruit members, control territory, and strengthen their anti-systemic narrative. In this context, there is a clear need to strengthen local governance – both state and non-state - in order to improve stability, cohesion, and quality of life, and eventually promote national unity and cohesion.

ON THE ROOT CAUSE OF VE IN LIBYA

The drivers and causal pathways of violent extremism are notoriously multiple. Numerous empirical studies have shown that the phenomenon suffers from both overdetermination and equifinality. It is overdetermined because multiple distinct factors alone can be sufficient drivers of VE. And it is characterized by equifinality because it can result from multiple causal pathways and from different initial conditions. These root causes, and the policies to prevent violent extremism are closely tied to intimate social, economic, and political values, structures, and functioning of a country’s nation and state. Hence, they are easily prone to political instrumentalization, especially in highly polarized contexts such as Libya’s. In practice, this translates into efforts of opposing sides to ascribe violent extremism in Libya to a single macro-cause. In Libya, the main narratives used by the two opposing blocks are that violent extremism in Libya results from the legacy of Gadhafi 42 years-long regime, or that it is the result of the political and social power that “Islamists” gained in the aftermaths of the 2011 Revolution. It is important to debunk the illusion that VE results from a single cause, and to caution against the teleological explanation of VE whereby its drivers are chosen for the instrumental purpose they serve rather than identified through a careful inquiry into the cause by which VE may arises in a time and place.

4. Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, “Come Russia e Turchia ipotecano il futuro della Libia e destabilizzano il Mediterraneo,” in Silvia Colombo (ed.), "Italia ed Europa di fronte alla crisi libica," Edizioni Nuova Cultura, novembre 2020.
https://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/italia-ed-europa-di-fronte-alla-crisi-libica

5. Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux “The Failure to End Libya’s Fragmentation: A Multi-Tiered Analysis”, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief No. 110: May 2017. Available from https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/200-101/meb110.pdf

There are few doubts that the 42 years-long Gadhafi regime endowed Libyans with weak and divided state and social institutions. However, Libya's deep roots of division, instability, and insecurity – all powerful VE drivers - extend well beyond the Gadhafi regime. [6]

Regarding the correlation between religion and terrorism, without ignoring the danger posed by radical interpretations of Islam and the instrumentalization of religion, empirical evidence from the region and beyond suggests that religiousness is negatively correlated with violent extremism.[7] As stressed in the first section of this report, individuals with deep knowledge of religion appear to be more resilient against violent extremist propaganda. [8] Furthermore, violent religious extremists constitute but a very small fraction of religious individuals. In Libya, Salafi jihadists[9] have very little in common with pragmatic politicians and businesspeople affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, religiously syncretic minority ethnic groups, and even with conservative Salafi Madkhali, although their detractors often lump them together in a single category they term "Islamists", which they regularly associate with terrorists. [10]

REPORT OBJECTIVES

This project, entitled "Assessment of Local Governance and Its Impact on Cross-border Prevention of Violent Extremism Assessment in Libya" seeks to provide a conceptual framing and an empirical assessment of the drivers and markers of violent extremism to improve both local governance and the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) at the local and national levels. Hence, this project pursues two main objectives:

Local governance assessment:

Assess local governance along all its components, beyond the mere delivery of services, as summarized in *Figure 1 below*. Provide insights on how municipalities can assess the quality of their governance, specifically through developing a self-assessment tool.

6. Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, "The deep roots of Libya's Security Fragmentation", Middle Eastern Studies, 55:2, January 2019, pp 224-200. Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/00263206.2018.1538970/10.1080
7. UNDP (2017), p. 49
8. UNDP (2017). p. 48
9. For more on this group and ideology, see Shiraz Maher. Salafi-Jihadism: The history of an idea. Oxford University Press, 2016.
10. Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, "Can there be a viable roadmap for Libya?", Geneva Center for Security Policy, Policy Paper 5/2015: May 2015. Available from: https://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/IASD/65sessioneordinaria/Documents/GCSPLibyaRoadma p2015.pdf

Components	Sub-Components	Description
Quality of Service Provision	Electricity Schooling Infrastructure Health Solid Waste Management Water & Sanitation	Gauges how well municipalities respond to citizens needs, broken down by type of service.
Corruption	Transparency Informal Networks	Gauges the relationship between citizens and state authorities, and the perceived level of corruption
Identity & Trust in the State	Elected Officials Institutional trust Accountability	
Local Security	MI Type of incidents Personal safety	Measures people's experience and perception of security in the municipality and in each neighborhood
Local Justice	Effectiveness & Efficiency Access to Justice Rule of Law Fairness	Measures people's experience with and perception of justice in the municipality and in each neighborhood
Social Cohesion, Religion, Participation & Engagement	Political Participation Freedom of Cult Association Discrimination	Gauges the level of religious openness, and the level of social cohesion and participation
Individual Trust, Tolerance, & Support for Gender Equality	Women's Rights/Inclusion Minority Rights/Inclusion Interpersonal Trust Immigration	Gauges a series of individual-level attitudes and perceptions such as trust, attitude towards gender equality and minorities rights, and the level of tolerance towards outgroups

Figure 1 : *Components and Subcomponents of Local Governance*

Conceptual Framing of PVE in Libya and Mapping of PVE Drivers and Markers:

Establish a conceptual and an operational framework for PVE in Libya and provide information and analysis on drivers of violent extremism that will help develop PVE programs in partnership with local and national authorities, targeting primarily border areas. To achieve this objective, this report begins by establishing a conceptual and operational framework of PVE in Libya. Drivers and markers of VE are defined and described in sections 1.2 and 1.3 of this report. Within this framework, the report presents the findings of a research on the presence and severity of drivers and markers of violent extremism in seven localities.

This analysis will inform both UNDP PVE programs in Libya, and a wider, regional-level evaluation of violent extremism in the borderlands of northern Niger, North Chad, North-West Sudan, and Nigeria borderland with Niger.
The research focuses on seven municipalities in the western and southern regions of Libya listed below and presented in Figure 2.

The research focuses on seven municipalities in the western and southern regions of Libya listed below and presented in ***Figure 2.***

- **Sebha**
- **Murzuq**
- **Bani Walid**
- **Kufra**
- **Misrata**
- **Ghat**
- **Zuwara**

Figure2 : *Map of Research Localities*

This report focuses entirely on the second objective:
Conceptual framing of PVE in Libya and mapping of PVE drivers and markers in seven key localities.

The report is divided into four sections:

Section 1	***Conceptual Framing of Violent Extremism:*** Definitions and conceptual framing of violent extremism; identification of the markers that define radicalized individuals; and classification of the structural, social and individual preconditions (drivers) that favor radicalization leading to violent extremism.
Section 2	***Contextual Framework for Violent Extremism (VE) in Libya:*** Overview of the available quantitative and qualitative data regarding violent extremism in Libya.
Section 3	***Analysis of VE Drivers in 7 Municipalities:*** Comparative analysis of the survey data collected in the 7 municipalities we analyzed. The section assesses the presence and severity of drivers of VE.
Section 4	***PVE Good Practices:*** This section details noteworthy foreign PVE programs that may be transferable to Libya.
Section 5	***Key Findings and Programmatic Avenues:*** This section presents key findings along the same VE and governance the matic areas that informed the research, and programmatic recommendations.

It is important to note that this report focuses on PVE, not on CVE or CT. In other words, it focuses on the macro-; meso-; and micro-level factors that may lead individuals to join or support VE groups, in order to minimize their prevalence and severity, and to prevent the emergence or development of violent extremism. This report does not focus on VE actors and dynamics, on their narratives, members, recruitment mechanisms, and operations. It does not focus on countering established groups or on suppressing them. Accordingly, the research that informs section 3 of this report is entirely based on surveys and interviews with the general population, not with current or former members of VE groups. This report is entirely devoted to supporting strategies that may prevent the development of violent extremism well before it may actually emerge.

Also, this report does not seek to identify a single root cause of violent extremism in Libya, nor does it have the ambition to conclusively pinpoint the drivers of VE in Libya and the programs that would prevent their development. The objective of this report is to provide a conceptual framing and a preliminary empirical assessment of the drivers and markers of violent extremism in selected Libyan municipalities. With all its limitations, this evidence is used to infer sensitive areas that could potentially drive individuals towards VE groups in Libya. In addition, this report draws from the pertinent literature to share best PVE practices and suggest programmatic avenues that could be useful and effective in Libya.

METHODOLOGY

This report draws from open-source research of literature on violent extremism and its drivers, on a decade of research and programmatic experience in Libya, and on field research that the North African Policy Initiative carried out in 2021.

The review of existing literature on VE drivers, on economy, society, politics, and security in Libya, and on PVE programs around the world informed the definitions and conceptual framing of violent extremism, the description of the contextual framework for VE in Libya, and the articulation of good PVE practices that should inform future PVE programs in Libya.

The field research conducted for this project relied on a mixed methodology approach, involving quantitative data (surveys) and qualitative data (semi-structured interviews). The data collection took place between late December 2020 and early June 2021.

It is part of a region wide PVE study that includes northern Chad, northern Niger, western Sudan, and north-western Nigeria. However, although the Libya country research team played a central role in initiating this PVE research project, in Libya, the PVE research was merged with a local governance research, both because of the large overlap between these two subjects of inquiry, and because local governance constituted an important programmatic objective for UNDP Libya. In fact, local governance constitutes an important area of investigation for PVE.

Therefore, the Libya research analysed this aspect in much greater depth than in all other research countries, where UNDP and Small Arms Survey (SAS) focused entirely on PVE. In Libya, to remain within the feasible bounds of a survey, non-local governance areas of research had to be drawn down from the master questionnaire jointly developed with SAS. In addition, the initial questionnaire included several specific questions on armed groups and violence. However, these questions were flagged by the Libyan researchers who indicated that they were too sensitive to ask in the general population survey, particularly in Southern Libya. Since the safety and security of both researchers and respondents is the first priority, and it is the responsibility of the research team, these questions were removed from the general population survey questionnaire.

As a result, the Libya team carried out two surveys:

a general population survey, and an extended survey with expanded sections on security, violence, and small arms.

FIELD RESEARCH

Key Informant Interviews

In Libya, each Field Research Team Leader carried out eight in-depth interviews with key individuals in her/his locality who have first-hand knowledge about local governance and stability. These individuals belong to the following categories:

- **Mayors;**
- **Municipal Council members;**
- **Shura members/Sheikh;**
- **Most active civil society activists and organizations cooperating with municipality;**
- **Members of security forces;**
- **Local journalists / radio hosts who focuses on local governance;**
- **Members of an international NGO working with the municipality on local**
- **Local university professors and businesspeople cooperating with the Municipal Council.**

These one-on-one, in-depth interviews were carried out in Arabic and face-to-face by local researchers. They included 45, mostly semi-structured questions.

GENERAL POPULATION SURVEY

In Libya, the local governance and PVE research was carried out on a sample of 2,367 respondents in 7 Libyan municipalities (340 per locality, except for Bani Walid, where they were 327), 1,360 of whom were in the southern cities of Ghat, Al Kufra, Murzuq, and Sebha. All interviews were carried out in Arabic and were conducted face-to-face. Interview answers were entered directly in digital format through a data collection application on each field researcher's smart phone.
The number and distribution of respondents was established through a non-probabilistic, multi-stage stratified sampling by neighbourhood, age, and gender. Given the lack of recent general population census in Libya (the last one was carried out in 2006), to estimate the population in each municipality and neighborhood, the research team triangulated existing population datasets with satellite images and remote sensing GIS techniques. In particular, the research team used the following sources of data:

- **2020 Libya Common Operational Dataset provided by the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and UN OCHA. These are population projections based on Libya's last census that was carried out in 2006;**
- **Neighbourhood maps for each municipality, and population breakdowns by neighbourhood provided by Libya's Central Commission of Municipal Council Elections (CCMCE);**
- **Population estimates inferred by the European Union and by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) from recent, high-resolution satellite images.**

In terms of sampling method and actual interviews, Libyan field researchers in Southern Libyan localities indicated that attempting to carry out survey interviews in households would have been both socially unacceptable in some localities (mostly in the South) due to local cultural norms and mores. Secondly, we assessed that household surveys would have had a high level of bias given the high level of refusal rate experienced by our local researchers in previous household surveys they had carried out. In other words, in some localities, field researchers reported that they had not been allowed to enter many households. Thirdly, when allowed to enter, heads of households had often refused to allow interviewers to speak with the respondent selected according to pre-established criteria alone. This lack of privacy would have also greatly compromised the validity of data.

On the other hand, phone interviews offer a somewhat reliable opportunity to select a probabilistic and representative sample of the total population. However, phone interviews in Libya also suffer from extremely high rates of non-responses and refusals to answer. Research carried out by other teams and organizations indicated non-response rates between 70% and 80%. Even worse, this approach does not allow for analysis of the types and extent of biases introduced by non-responses, since selected interviewees who do not pick up the phone or who refuse to participate in the interview do not explain their reasons, and the researchers do not have their socio-demographic profile that they would need to analyze potential selection biases.

Thus, as an alternative strategy, field researchers selected respondents through random direct contact in each neighborhood, using multiple parallel entry points for each researcher (e.g. schools, cafes, shops, universities, co-working spaces, and other public places). Multiple researchers were deployed simultaneously in a given neighbourhood, each with a diverse set of target interviewees to help ensure that neighborhood samples were acquired through multiple entry points. Although this sample selection method avoids some of the pitfalls of other strategies and minimizes some biases, it does not constitute a random selection method. Therefore, findings must be considered strong indications of trends and characteristics among target populations, rather than reliable statistical representations.

All interview locations were recorded together with the survey responses and plotted on a map of the city to check on the effective geographical distribution of surveys. The interview distribution plot is included in each municipal report. Table 1 provides a description of the sample distribution along age, gender, and working status.

Age distribution

14-18	14%
19-24	14%
25-30	13%
25-30	10%
35-39	10%
40-44	8%
45-49	18%
50-59	9%
60-69	3%
+70	1%

Working status

Full-time	20%
Part-time	31%
Not working but looking for work	11%
Retired	4%
Not working and not looking for it	3%
Student	20%
Homemaker	10%

Gender

Females	50%
Males	50%

NOTE: Values are rounded up to the nearest integer, therefore, the total may be different from 100%

EXTENDED SURVEY

Following consultations with UNDP, in an effort to collect data on violence, security, armed groups, and other sensitive topics whose questions could not be asked to the general population, it was agreed to carry out a separate survey on a limited and non-representative sample of 14 individuals in each locality. These respondents were chosen purposefully. They were all the members of the local research team (10) and other individuals chosen among local 'mediators' operating in the EU-UNDP National Reconciliation Project in Libya and other local notables.

The "long survey" questionnaire contained approximately 230 questions. The small size of this specific "Long survey" sample and the purposive method used to select them do not allow to use these findings as reliable statistics. The data from this small, more detailed survey should only be used as broad indications. Although they do not have statistical value, UNDP decided that the sensitivity and interest of these additional topics warranted an indicative inquiry in each locality.

FIELDWORK CHALLENGES AND REPORT LIMITATIONS

- ***Challenges encountered during field research***

Other limitations derive from numerous challenges that were encountered during field research. They are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Fieldwork challenges

POLITICS	• Spate of arrests among Mayors and leading officials at the ministry of local governance officials in late 2020 that increased suspicion and self-censorship among interviewees • The national level political transition following the war in Tripoli created uncertainty and made it more difficult to interview local authorities • An incident between UNSMIL and one of the target municipalities lead to lack of cooperation from local authorities
LOCAL RESEARCHERS	• Lack of experienced and skilled researchers in some of the municipalities • Bias and cooptation: we dismissed an entire team after we discovered that the Team Leader had chosen all his researchers from the same local sub-community in a highly divided municipality • Unprofessionalism: an entire team was dismissed after very low performance and lack of cohesion • Constant need for close oversight: on average, we discarded and asked local researchers to re-do 30 surveys out of 340 in each locality
LOGISTICS	• Systematic yet unpredictable power outages • Fuel shortages and very high fuel prices, especially in southern localities, which hampered mobility (some municipalities cover extensive territory, such as Ghat that stretches for over 120 km)
DATA COLLECTION	• Lack of official data on population • Some neighborhoods lacked public places to identify respondents and carry out interviews • In some localities, respondents were very suspicious about the research
COVID-19	• Lockdown and curfews limited the time available for research • Despite protective measures and precautions, there were Covid cases among researchers and interviewees

Report Limitations

Violent extremism is a complex, multi-factor, and rapidly evolving phenomenon. In addition to open-source research, this analysis rests on general population-based field research in 7 Libyan municipalities in the West and South of Libya. The data collection begun in December 2020, shortly after the end of the war in Tripoli (Apr 2019 – Oct 2020). Hence, although numerous key informant interviews were carried out in Benghazi to capture the perspective of knowledgeable individuals in Eastern Libya on local governance and stability, all municipalities selected for field research are in Fezzan (Southern Libya) and Tripolitania (Western Libya). Thus, not only data from Eastern Libya are missing, but all findings must clearly be understood as emanating from the specific municipalities in which the field research was carried out, and therefore strictly applicable only in these localities.

In addition, many specific questions on armed groups and violence were flagged by the Libyan researchers who indicated that they were too sensitive to ask in the general population survey, particularly in Southern Libya. Thus, to protect the safety and security of both researchers and respondents, these questions were removed from the general population survey questionnaire. In addition, within the framework of this research it was not possible to interview former members of VE groups and/or their friends or family members.

Lastly, an analysis of responses highlighted that certain questions had a high level of non-responses, either because the interviewees refused to answer, or because they did not know how to answer. These questions are listed in Tables 2 and 3 below.

Table 2: Questions to which 10% or more respondents refused to answer (general population survey)

CORRUPTION	in your contacts with municipal institutions have you or anyone living in your household had to pay a bribe in any form in the past 12 months?	**25**
DISCRIMINATION	Have you experienced discrimination because of your skin color, ethnic or tribal origin, religious opinion, city of origin, economic status, or gender over the last 12 months?	**16%**
CORRUPTION	What was the most common reason for paying bribes to municipal authorities?	**15%**
POLITICS	Do you regularly discuss (more than once per week) politics and administration (how the local or national government are doing to improve your life)?	**14%**

Table 3: Questions to which 15% or more respondents did not know how to answer

ARMS INFRASTRUCTURE	s far as you know, from which countries are firearms coming to this area? (Respondents were asked separately about each country)	**31-46%**
	Collective transportation is available by [frequency]	**36%**
SECURITY	Are people from your community well represented in the security organizations?	**25**
	Are women in your community holding positions as… [multiple options]	**7-20%**
WOMEN	Are there any women-led organizations in your community?	**19%**
CORRUPTION	To what extent do you see the following organizations in this country affected by corruption?	**7-19%**
ARMED GROUPS	Which is the most important [groups in the area that threaten this community with force] that is posing the greatest threat to this community?	**17%**

SECTION 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMING OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Violent extremism is a complex phenomenon determined by a combination of structural, social and psychological factors that can lead to different manifestations of violence. In Libya, the post-2011 security vacuum became the ideal context for the development of violent extremism. Not only Libya constituted a target country for VE groups, it also became a safe-haven for VE groups operating in the Sahel region. In fact, groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Ansar al-Sharia, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been able to use Libya to train recruits and plan operations in the entire region due in part to country's weak state security apparatus and border controls.

Violent extremist groups in Libya exploit the government's failure to provide public services, and the resulting popular hardship and discontent. These sentiments allow VE groups to actively recruit new members, and to strengthen their propaganda on the ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of governance structures and actors. Furthermore, the country has been mired in dozens of localized conflicts and has relapsed twice in a low-intensity national civil war since 2011. For a short period of time, these national divisions also allowed VE groups to take control of entire cities, such as Derna and Sirte.
Within this context, the prevention of VE largely depends on strengthening of local governance and the promotion of national unity and cohesion.

1.1 DEFINITIONS

VIOLENT EXTREMISM

USAID defines violent extremism as "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives", [11] while the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines it as "encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals". [12] However, neither the United Nations nor the European Union has an official definition of violent extremism. In this context, while they are broadly synonymous in use, some researchers point out that 'violent extremism' is usually considered to be a more inclusive term than 'terrorism'. [13]

Although USAID's definition is broad, in practice, 'violent extremism' is arguably applied much more narrowly to salafi-jihadist violence alone. To be sure, nowadays the Salafi-jihadist ideology and form of VE has broadly spread across Africa.[14] However, this should not lead to ignore the many other forms of ideologically motivated or justified violence, such as right-wing, left-wing, and ethno-nationalist terrorism. [115] For the purpose of this study, the following sub-sections will provide a discussion on the definitions of extremism, types of extremism, as well as its markers and drivers.

[11] Andrew Glazzard and Martine Zeuthen, Violent Extremism, GSDRC, February, (2016), see, https://gsdrc.org/professional-dev/violent-extremism/

[12] "Don't Be a Puppet," The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC (2021), see, https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/what-is-violent-extremism

[13] Allan, Harriet, Andrew Glazzard, Sasha Tumu Jesperson, and Emily Sneha Reddy Winterbotham. "Drivers of violent extremism: Hypotheses and literature review." (2015).
http://www.dmeforpeace.org/peacexchange/wp-content/uploads/08/2018/Drivers-of-VE-Hypotheses-and-Literature-Review. pdf

[14] Faleg, Giovanni, and Katariina Mustasilta. "Salafi-jihadism in Africa", European Union Institute for Security Studies. Brief 12 (2021), https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_2021_12.pdf

[15] Andrew Glazzard and Martine Zeuthen, Violent Extremism, GSDRC, February (2016) see, https://gsdrc.org/professional-dev/violent-extremism/

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM VERSUS PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategies focus on using non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from violence and to mitigate recruitment for, support of, or engagement in ideologically-motivated terrorism by non- state actors. On the other hand, Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) focuses on measures that address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism. PVE focuses on methods that simultaneously respect human rights for all and the rule of law as the basis of stopping violent extremism. In other words, PVE looks to prevent radicalization from ever happening in the first place, while CVE looks to see how radicalized individuals can be rehabilitated, integrated, and even utilized as change agents in the fight against extremism. To this end, PVE methods are more effective at recognizing cultural dynamics, tribal culture, and distinct human behavior, especially as PVE initiatives are often grassroots-led, unlike CVE initiatives.

PVE strategies focus on stakeholders in order to understand the root causes of violent extremism, address its key drivers, and adopt more of an upstream approach compared to CVE-programs. PVE programs are built upon a comprehensive approach, embracing not only essential security-based CVE measures but also systematic preventive steps to address factors that make individuals vulnerable to recruitment in violent extremist groups.

1.2 KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Over time, experience and lessons learned have improved the understanding of VE, shedding light on the importance of considering local dynamics along with regional and international ones. Indeed, effective and long-lasting PVE measures can only rest on the holistic understanding of all the drivers of VE and of their mutual interconnectedness. This section seeks to capture the key drivers of VE and to group them in coherent categories. To do so, it draws from scholarly analysis of VE drivers. The overview and categorization of VE drivers will help structure the analysis of the data collected through our field research, as presented in Section 4 of this report.

Along with the most famous and commonly adopted model for categorizing the preconditions of VE, such as James Aho's "push and pull factors" model, the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) emphasizes how it is "[...] useful to conceptualize these factors at three levels, with situational factors operating at the macro level (i.e., country or community level), social-cultural factors at the meso level (i.e., affecting smaller communities or identity groups), and individual factors at the micro level".

Figure 3 below illustrates the key drivers of VE, clearly recognizing the multifactorial and diverse nature of this phenomenon. The table draws from the study conducted by RUSI, and further expands the identification of VE drivers by drawing from the existing literature and current research.

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[16] Owen Frazer and Christian Nünlist, "Countering Violent Extremism," Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich (2015).

[17] Ben Saul "Defining Terrorism" in The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, edited by Erica Chenoweth, Richard English, et al., New York (2019) and Thomas Butko, "Terrorism Redefined," Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice (2006) 18: pp 151-145.

[18] Alex Schmid, "Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the same coin?" International Centre for Counter Terrorism-the Hague (ICCT) Research paper (2014): 29-1.

[19] M.M. Khan, "Understanding and Identifying Violent Extremism", ISSI Issue Brief, 2015, and W. McCants, C. Watts, "US Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment," Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012.

[20] S. Lakhani, "Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities." Howard Journal of Criminal Justice (2011) 51, no. 206–190 :2.

[21] F. Arendt, "Securing the society – a woman's risk to take? A field study on how women's perception of safety is impacted by engaging in prevention of violent extremism" Master's Thesis, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Spring 2019, p. 5.

[22] A. Boutellis, N.C. Fink, "Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism," New York: International Peace Institute, (2016).

Based on first-hand data on the recruitment of violent extremists, a large study carried out in Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Cameroon, and Niger by UNDP in 2017 identifies a series of steps that seem to lead subjects to the “tipping point”, from passive extremism to taking violent action. These steps encompass micro-, meso-, and macro-level drivers.

Figure 3 : *Drivers of Violent Extremism*

MACRO ("PUSH")	**Country or Community-wide Push Factors:** governance failures and political grievances	Poverty and deprivation Unemployment and underemployment Overall failure in providing basic services Failure to ensure security and justice Instability (conflicts and insecurity) Corruption Close space for non-violent participation in governance
MESO ("PULL")	**Community level** Factors of attractiveness	Group experience with violence/injustice from authorities Group marginalization and/or discrimination Disenfranchisement of specific groups Instrumentalization of religion and ethnicity Cognitive Factors Social ties, group dynamics, material incentives
MICRO	**Individual level** Vulnerabilities and individual experiences	ognitive vulnerability, identity crisis, uprooting Lack of parental guidance (father absence) Individual experience with violence/injustice fm authorities Socialization to violence / support for violence Failure in being the breadwinner (men) Mental health and drug addiction

MICRO-LEVEL DRIVERS

Individual-level drivers of VE include issues of personal identity, and various types of isolation and alienation, with intense separation from connections. Micro-level drivers include the lack of adequate parental involvement, a missing father or mother, or the complete lack of a guardian in the life of children. In particular, the loss of a father figure in the life an adolescent male makes him much more likely to be attracted to grandiose narratives of fighting corruption and creating a new society.[27] Adolescent men who have been "socialized" to violence, which can happen through protracted domestic violence, and/or through witnessing systematic violence around them are much more likely to condone the use of violence by VE groups and to believe that violence is a viable means to resolve structural problems. [28]

Thus, it is not surprising that the first stage along the path to violent extremism pertains to the environment of the subject during childhood and adolescence, including the family environment, school, and level of happiness during childhood. The level of happiness during childhood seems to be especially critical: Unhappy childhood seems to facilitate the path of radicalization to violence. [29] The social context in which the subject lives also plays an important role, especially if it has high levels of marginalization and/or discrimination (e.g. lack of services; lack of opportunities for civic and political engagement and participation; few opportunities for socio-economic mobility). In general, adolescents are particularly fragile and easy to influence. Thus, they are more easily seduced by extremist narratives, particularly if they are proposed by charismatic individuals among family members and friends.

Another individual-level driver focuses on how young men form their identity with masculinity, and how their identity may be transformed to meet the 'extremist ideal man'. The idea of the 'extremist ideal man' is drilled and programmed in adolescents as the model identity for Libyan men. Teachers impart this distorted male identity to young boys through physical violence, so that they learn how to endure pain, how to inflict it to others, and how to cope with witnessing acts of violence.[30] These teachings of masculinity promote the idea that the 'ideal man' should be able to fight for a new, equitable society, provide for one's family as a breadwinner, be an excellent candidate for marriage with adequate financial earnings, and adhere to conservative religious beliefs.[31]

[27] N., Sudhakar and K., Kuehnast, K., 'The Other Side of Gender: Including Masculinity Concerns in Conflict and Peacebuilding', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC (2011).

[28] C. Powell, "Gender, Masculinity, and Counterterrorism" Council of Foreign Relations (2019), see, https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism, and A. Jamal, M. Robbins et al, 'Youth in MENA: Findings from the Fifth Wave of the Arab 29Barometer', August 2020 ,19, see https://www.arabbarometer.org/publication/youth-in-mena-findings-from-the-fifth-wave-of-the-arab-barometer/

[29] "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and The Tipping Point for Recruitment" United Nation Development Program, (2017), p.36.

[30] Rainer Emig, "Terrorist Masculinities: Political Masculinity between Fiction, Facts, and Their Mediation," Journal of Men and Masculinities, June (2019): 3 ,22, pp.528-516.

[31] UNDP (2017), p. 522.

Notwithstanding the role that distorted masculinity and its instrumentalization play in the recruitment of men in VE groups, women are also susceptible to radicalization and to the recruitment in VE groups. These focus in particular on vulnerable women, such as those who struggle financially, widows, and divorced women. Vulnerable women are those most at risk of "spinsterhood" (i.e. women who remain unmarried), which is a very difficult condition in Libya. VE recruiters offer the prospect of marriage to women willing to join their group, something termed "Jihad al Nikah" (Jihad through Marriage). In addition, sisters, wives, and daughters can be easily recruited by virtue of subordination to their male relatives who belong to violent extremist groups. Lastly, even mothers can be recruited into VE groups via their sense of devotion and sacrifice to their sons or to avenge the death of a family member.

MESO-LEVEL DRIVERS

Meso-level drivers operate at the level of smaller communities and identity groups than nations. At this level, research indicates that identity is the key element, be it religious, ethnic, or else. [36] Among the elements forming an individual identity, the role of religion deserves a special attention, particularly in terms of religious ideologies and the weaponization of religion.

Unlike widespread belief, greater religious knowledge – often associated to greater religiousness - is negatively correlated with violent extremism. According to UNDP's 2017 empirical study, the likelihood of joining a violent extremist group of a religious nature decreases by as much as 32 percent if the subject has attended at least 6 years of religious education. [37] In other words, people with deep knowledge of religion are more resilient against violent extremist propaganda.

The 2017 UNDP study also emphasizes that religious figures enjoy high levels of trust. Some of them use dogmatic teachings and specific methods for indoctrination to recruit individuals in VE groups. Some researchers have argued that since Qur'anic studies use complex classical Arabic language, students with limited language skills must rely on intermediaries to learn interpretations of religious doctrine, which provides an entry for VE preachers.

The importance of these results becomes even greater in the current international and national context, where there is frequent conflation of Islam with violent Islamist extremism and misperceptions around Islam itself. For example, there is the erroneous, widespread belief that seminary schools (madrassas) are systematically associated with radicalization. Contrary to this belief, UNDP's empirical findings suggest that quality of religious education increases resilience to recruitment of the subjects examined, placing religion among the protective factors. [38]

[32] Monash University, "Gender Equality and Violent Extremism: A Research Agenda for Libya." (2019), p. 67.
[33] Ibid. p.98.
[34] Ibid. p.112.
[35] Ibid. p.119.
[36] Allan, Harriet, Andrew Glazzard, Sasha Tumu Jesperson, and Emily Sneha Reddy Winterbotham. "Drivers of violent extremism: Hypotheses and literature review." (2015), p. 11
[37] UNDP (2017), p. 49
[38] UNDP (2017). p. 48

MACRO-LEVEL DRIVERS

The macro-level drivers include fundamental issues at the national level, such as the failure to provide basic services, autocratic governance, the lack of economic opportunities, corruption, the inability of the government to provide security and justice, and a despondent environment with little or no hope for the future.

According to violent extremism studies, individuals have a specific cognitive state when they perceive their own society to lack normal ethical, social standards due to the failure of the rule of law to provide protection, or the lack trust in the justice system. [39] Under these circumstances, individuals can enter a mental state of worthlessness, frustration, intense despair, and experience a lack of purpose and a severe disconnection with national identity, known as anomie. Psychologist researchers of violent extremism believe that the cognitive state of anomie makes individuals especially vulnerable to violent extremism. [40]
Examining the educational factors, the 2017 UNDP report indicates that "[...] a good education is in and of itself not sufficient to prevent violent extremist recruitment, and that education-sector interventions are thus not to be conflated with PVE. Nonetheless, it recognizes that quality education can help build individuals' resilience to recruitment through provision of life alternatives". [41]

Economic hardship also seems to favor recruitment, but hardly ever as the only driver. While poverty is a driving factor of VE, poverty alone is not a sufficient explanation for VE in Africa. However, there is evidence of violent extremists' exploitation of perceived economic difficulties and sense of exclusion stemming from ethnic and religious identities. VE groups highlight the corrupt aspects of the government who are unable to generate growth, employment, and opportunities for the population. The 2017 UNDP study indicates that individuals working or studying were between 3 and 27 percent less likely to be members of extremist organizations.

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[39] Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole. 'State Fragility Index and Matrix', Center for Systemic Peace (Vienna, VA: Global Report, 2014). http://www.systemicpeace.org/ inscrdata.html. and also see Freedom House report, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores.

[40] Thomas Arciszewski, et al., "The Path to Political Violence: from Social Exclusion to Anomia" Aix-Marseille University (2018) see, https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/328769100_The_Path_to_Political_Violence_from_Social_Exclusion_to_Anomi a

[41] UNDP (2017), p. 39, referring to Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation and Hedayah (2013). 'The Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism', Meeting Note, December 2013. Available at http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/12/2013/Dec13_Education_Expert_Meeting_Note.pdf; and Ghosh, R., Mehdi Babaei, Wing Yu Alice chan, Maihemuti Dilimulati and Norma Tarrow (2016). Education and Security: A Global Literature Review of the Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism. Tony Blair Faith Foundation, London, UK.

[42] Ibid. p. 54

[43] Ibid. p. 57. Note that the study grounded its analysis on interviews with 718 people, 495 of whom were individuals who used to be, or in a handful of cases still were at the time of the interviews, members of extremist organizations, which they had voluntarily joined. 78 individuals reported being forced to join one of the organizations and are referred to as 'forced group'. Finally, 145 were individuals who were not, and never had been, members of similar organizations. The interviews were unevenly spread across Cameroon, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan, with a significantly larger share of interviews taking place in Somalia.

Among many tools used for recruitment, extremists repeatedly referred to their grievances against the corruption of government officials and loss of hope for positive opportunities. CVE researchers indicate that there is a correlation between a government's ability to effectively deliver services to the public and the deep-seated grievances of violent extremists. Those who were satisfied with the government's provision of education were between 16 and 26 percent less likely to be part of violent extremist groups.[44]

FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Recent research in Syria and Iraq indicate that the drivers of foreign fighters joining violent extremist groups may be largely moral and religious, more so than explicitly political. However, there is little separation between these matters in the minds of foreign fighters.[45] Interviews with radicalized subjects consistently indicate that the driver for fighting abroad was as much about rejecting the immoral nature of life in the West as it was about finding a cause to reclaim a new identity. Other reports assert that the process of socialization to violence of foreign fighters started in early adolescence. Often, they were heavily engaged in social media platforms and were vulnerable to guilt-provoking propaganda to "defend the honor of the oppressed". [46]

In conclusion, the pathway to violent extremism is complex and consists of several factors related to personality, environment, history, personal relationships, identity, personal achievements, and a desire to belong to broader just causes. In summary, the process of radicalization includes "[a] complex interplay of macro-, meso-, and micro- factors, including internal emotional responses and psychology, [that] motivate specific individuals to shift from generalized radicalization to a new status of violent extremists ready to perpetrate terrorist acts". [47]

Before delving into the Libyan context, this report identifies the traits that usually characterize violent extremists, which we refer to as "markers". In other words, how do we recognize a violent extremist when we see one?

1.3 MARKERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Governments combating domestic and cross border violent extremism need "markers" that can help identify extremist tendencies in individuals and groups. These markers help identify extremist trends of individuals and groups, specifically in regards to Islamist extremism". [48] Furthermore, because there are no universally accepted definitions of violent extremism, it is even more important to try and define what are the key trait of a violent extremists. [49]

The literature of CVE and PVE identify several markers of violent extremism and general behavior patterns of violent extremist actors, which are summarized in Figure 4 below. Researchers have identified specific markers of violent extremism in terms of individual traits, behaviors, and attitudes toward institutions, society, other individuals and groups. For example, VE actors tend to have negative judgment and attitudes towards state institutions that are based on liberal democratic

[44] Ibid. p. 64

[45] Richard Barrett 'Foreign Fighters in Syria; The Soufan Group (2014).

[46] Ibid. p. 67

[47] UNDP (2017) p. 72.

[48] Alan P. Schmid, "Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" The International Centre for Counter Terrorism-The Hague (2014). In particular, Schmid lists twenty indicators for monitoring extremism (p.21).

[49] C. Hendricks T. Omenma, "Violent Extremism and Militarization in the Sahel Region-Challenges and Prospect," Africa Insight (2019) Vol. 49 No. 3, p 91.

principles and the rule of law because these principles are secular in nature, embrace pluralism, and depend on democratic principles that include popular participation. VE actors often believe that institutions not based on local traditions allow societal principles to change with time according to political interests. [50] Researchers of P/CVE have noted that among violent extremists, certain attitudes, such as rejecting equal rights (especially for women and religious minorities), and freedoms for the community must out-weigh any individual freedoms. [51]

Figure 4 : Markers of Violent Extremism

Component	Level	description	Indicator
Makers of radicalization	***Macro***	***Attitude toward institutions***	Political disengagement
			Lack of trust in institutions
			Anger toward a group, or "the system" as a whole
	Meso	***Attitude toward society***	Social withdrawal, de-scholarization, willful unempl.
			Identity inversions (e.g. religious ID > other IDs)
			Intolerance
			Religious fundamentalism / conservatism
	Micro	***Attitude toward others***	Lack of trust toward others
			Lack of support for gender equality
			Condoning violence / like for violence
	Other	***Other***	Absence of the father figure
			Consumption of extremist propaganda

Figure 4 illustrates key macro-, meso-, micro- and other markers for violent extremists. Macro markers show attitudes towards institutions such as political disengagement, a deep lack of trust in institutions, and resentment of these institutions cooperating with Western powers. In response, violent extremists wish to subvert state power to advance their own ideal model of society in political, economic, and social terms. Their strategy involves violence against military and civilian targets, and other institutions, such as banking, media, social, and commercial institutions to assert their action plan of coopting state power. [52]

[50] M. Holmes, "Preventing Violent Extremism, Protecting Rights and Community Policing" (2017) and Monash University, "Gender Equality and Violent Extremism: A Research Agenda for Libya." (2019).

[51] C. Thiessen, "Preventing Violent Extremism While Promoting Human Rights: Towards a Clarified UN Approach, International Peace Institute, (2019).

[52] Mabroka al Wefalli, Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens' Political Attitude and Behaviour (2011) Reading, United Kingdom.

The worldview of violent extremists is Manichean, divided in white and black: right versus wrong, good versus evil, moral versus immoral. [53] This duality leads VE actors to have an attitude of superiority over the "weak", the "infidels". [54] Among violent extremists, there are often "inversions" among the elements that make up an individual identity, whereby religious identity becomes stronger than communal and national identities. Meso-level markers show a social withdrawal and lack of connection with social activities that result in a greater isolation from others. Micro markers include intolerance towards different opinions, a refusal to engage in dialogue with others, and a refusal to be a part of pluralistic societies writ large. Intolerance is visible through manifest anger, the use of dehumanizing language, the use of hate speech, outright prejudice, and an intimidation of perceived enemies. [55]

In general, the most typical trait of extremists is their absolutist mind frame, the notion that some things must be absolutely rejected and others must be absolutely implemented. Thus, extremists are typically characterized by the following attitudes and beliefs:

- ***Totalitarianism:*** *Extremists reject pluralism, they confer all decision-making authority to a dominant individual or group;*
- ***Absolutism:*** *Extremists do not pursue the common good of all people and refute the existence of universal values outside theirs. Therefore, different interests and worldviews are not taken into consideration;*
- ***Legalism:*** *Extremists refuse the principle of the rule of law, which imposes legal rules to which both rulers and citizens must adhere;*
- ***Subjection:*** *Extremists refuse the principle of self-determination by the majority of people, which they uphold against outside determination.* [56]

[53] L. Dillon, L. Neo, & M. Khader, The Psychology of Violent Extremism: What we know and what else we need to do. In H. C. (O.) Chan & S. M. Y. Ho (Eds.), Routledge Studies in Asian behavioural sciences. Psycho-criminological perspective of criminal justice in Asia: Research and Practices in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Beyond (2017) pp. 273–252. Routledge/Taylor, London. E. Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in which they Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study. (2006) The Hague, Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

[54] B Heidi Ellis, S. Decker, S. Abdi, "A Qualitative Examination of How Somali Young Adults Think About and Understand Violence in Their Communities" Journal of Interpersonal Violence (2020).

[55] RAN, "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Training for the First Line Practitioners (2019) and M. Segwick, "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism" Terrorism and Political Violence (2004): 814-795.

[56] Uwe Backes, Political Extremes: A Conceptual History from Antiquity (London: Routledge 2010), cited in Schmid (2014), p. 12

1.4 PARTICULAR MARKERS OF VIOLENT RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

The P/CVE literature notes that religious violent extremists differ from other radical actors, such as secular (i.e., rightwing) and ethno-nationalist extremists. Therefore, it is useful to identify the specific markers that help distinguish religious violent extremists, and violent Islamist extremists in particular, from other extremists.

Three key characteristics can help distinguish violent religious extremist individuals from other extremists. First, religious extremists believe that their activities are mandated by a divine entity, and these actions will create an ideal and sacred society. The second characteristic is the justification of current 'sinful acts' in order to create the ideal society.

There is an understanding that the end goal justifies any actions that are normally contrary to their religious principles, including violence. The third aspect is the framing of conflict in holy terms. Religious VE actors are inspired, driven, and intensely motivated by the belief that they are carrying out a supreme mission. They view their actions as holy acts that will purify the world. [57]

Another basic trait displayed by radicalized subjects is a withdrawal from society and from public life. This process might include the interruption of relationships with former friends and isolation from the community, changes in physical appearance or way of dressing,[58] and the sudden following of highly ritualized religious practices.[59] These changes may be accompanied by hostile and aggressive attitudes motivated through religious reasons. [60]

Radicalization can also be detected through the examination of writings, speeches, and online posts. In fact, subjects tend to repeat an assimilated stereotypical rhetoric and propaganda. However, it is worth noting that radicalized individuals can adopt techniques and strategies to hide their radical identities and missions. Radicalized individuals may keep their beliefs and practices discrete, or lie to their close network in order to hide their beliefs.

Other unusual behaviors that can be associated with extremists include changing phone SIM cards frequently, using multiple accounts on social media and internet sites, constantly using the phone, and the possession of maps and brochures of tourist trips or humanitarian projects in countries that are the target of violent extremism, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or some countries in North Africa. [61]

The following section will explore violent extremism in Libya, which became a strategic hub for both foreign fighters and domestic violent extremists shortly after the 2011 revolution.

[57] C. Kimball, "When Religion Becomes Evil: Five Warning Signs," New York: Harper Collins (2002) and P. Mandaville and M. Nozell, "Engaging in Religion and Religious Actors in Countering Violent Extremism," United States Institute of Peace Special Report (2017), No. 413.

[58] In this evaluation should be considered that such a change does not ensure that the subject will behave violently. Plus, the subject may choose not to change his appearance to dissimulate the metamorphosis that has occurred.

[59] Even in this case it is necessary to differentiate Muslim fundamentalism from adherence to a radicalized group.

[60] "Basics Indicators of Radicalization," adapted by the EU's Tolerance Project from a training kit elaborated by the French Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and radicalization, see, https://www.allo-tolerance.eu/files/resources/Basic%20indicators%20of%20radicalisation.pdf

[61] "Basics Indicators of Radicalization," adapted by the EU's Tolerance Project from a training kit elaborated by the French Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and radicalization, see, https://www.allo-tolerance.eu/files/resources/Basic%20indicators%20of%20radicalisation.pdf

SECTION 2

CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR VE IN LIBYA

This section seeks to describe the contextual framework for VE in Libya in light of the main VE drivers described in the previous section. Together with Section 3 that presents the data from targeted field research in seven Libyan municipalities, it provides the specific contextual background in which VE must be understood in Libya, and to which PVE programs must be tailored. Although VE groups are mentioned, this section focuses on contextual predispositions for VE drivers; it does not focus on VE actors.

After the fall of Gadhafi in late 2011, Libya witnessed a dramatic rise of violent extremist groups armed and supported by internal and external groups. By late 2011, several VE actors, including the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), established their presence in Libya with the support of local partners. In late 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and affiliated groups also officially established their presence, notably in Derna and Sirte, notably following the return of Libyan veterans who had fought in Syria and Iraq within the Battar Brigade.[62]

Libya offered a particularly favorable environment for the development of VE groups due to the lack of a central government, weak political institutions, porous borders, multiple direct military interventions, and indirect meddling by regional and global powers.[63] There was a weak and at times totally absent judicial system, widespread availability of weapons, a flourishing illicit economy, and increasing hardship for the local population.[64] According to a report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, by December 2013, Libya was among the top five countries sending foreign fighters to Syria.[65] Post-revolution Libya became the site of the "fourth largest mobilization of foreign fighters in modern jihadist history", with the highest number of foreign fighter recruits coming from Tunisia.[66] In addition, the Islamic State increased its recruitment efforts by targeting Sub-Saharan African migrants in Libya. [67] Different factors influence violent extremism at each level of state and society in Libya: macro-, meso-, and micro-.

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[62] See Wehrey, Frederic, and A. Alrababa'h. "Rising out of chaos: the Islamic State in Libya." Syria in Crisis. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015) 5.

[63] Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, 'State Fragility Index and Matrix', Center for Systemic Peace (Vienna, VA: Global Report, 2014). http://www.systemicpeace.org/ inscrdata.html.

[64] M. Cherif Bassiouni (eds.), Libya: From Repression to Revolution: A Record of Armed Conflict and International Law Violations, (2013) ,2013-2011 Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

[65] Aaron Y. Zelin, "ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise among Western Europeans," International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College London, December 2013 ,17,
http://icsr.info/12/2013/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/.

[66] Aaron Zelin, "The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2018), see, www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/PolicyNote45-Zelin.pdf

[67] Multiple author's interviews of migrants in Libya, 2020-2018; Inga Kristina Trauthig, "The current situation in Libya and its implications for the terrorism threat in Europe," Paper presented at the 3rd conference of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) Advisory Network on Terrorism and Propaganda. Europol's headquarters in The Hague. (2019), April 10-9; Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, "Human trafficking, smuggling and governance in Libya : implications for stability and programming," USAID and NORC at the University of Chicago, May 2020.
https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail_Presto.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=NTcyNzUx&inr=VHJ1ZQ%3d%3d&dc=YWRk&rrtc=VHJ1ZQ%3d%3d&bckToL

2.1 MACRO: COUNTRY-LEVEL DRIVERS

Taken as a whole, Libya consistently ranks among the worst countries on key worldwide indices:

- 173rd / 179 on the Corruption Perception Index 2020;
- 165th / 179 on Freedom of the Press 2021;
- 157th / 163 on the Global Peace Index 2020, indicating the level of peacefulness, both in terms of conflict and in terms of the level of harmony or discord within a nation.

The accumulation of these factors, such as corruption, lack of transparency and information about governance, peace, and security generate 'push' factors for individuals to lose trust in political institutions and leadership, at local and national levels. With little ability to influence change through political participation and the lack of space for non-governmental and civil society organizations, individuals seek out alternative options to change their circumstances. [72]

With the disintegration of the state security apparatus, the weak rule of law system, and the almost exclusive security-driven response to VE, foreign and domestic violent extremists managed to gain support among part of the Libyan population and coopted some security services. Unfortunately, this resulted in ad hoc law enforcement practices, ad hoc judicial prosecutions, and the inhumane treatment of inmates in prisons and undisclosed jails. Libya's prisons are now recruitment sites for violent extremist groups. In addition, violent extremist groups and organized criminal groups take advantage of Libya's porous border, particularly in southern Libya, to engage in human trafficking and smuggle weapons, narcotics, and illicit materials for the black market. [74]

However, it is important to distinguish between VE groups and organized crime. These are distinct actors who are ultimately driven by different interests, and who pursue different objectives. Their level of proximity and cooperation can increase under high state repression. In general, their relationship is largely transactional, buying or selling services from each other, unless VE groups manage to assert their control of a territory. When that happens, VE groups can impose taxes for safe passage and for protection, and/or extort money from local inhabitants. VE groups can go as far as taking control of criminal activities all-together in the territories under their control, such as human trafficking and drug smuggling. [75] However, VE groups have not been able to regularly control territory in Libya since the fall of IS in Sirte in late 2016. Hence, this scenario is not currently pertinent in Libya.

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[68] Transparency International (2020) https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl

[69] Reporters Without Borders (2020), https://rsf.org/en/ranking

[70] Institute for Economics & Peace (2020) Global Peace Index 2020: Measuring Peace in a Complex World. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/. Peacefullness is measured through 23 indicators, such as low crime rates, minimal incidences of terrorist acts and violent demonstrations, harmonious relations with neighbouring countries, a stable political scene, and a small proportion of the population being internally displaced or refugees.

[71] Cristina Mattei, 'The CVE Cycle: The Individual Trajectory', (2019) Hedayah, United Arab Emirates, see, https://www.hedayahcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/11/2019/File-171201910950.pdf.

[72] Mercy Corps and the Governance Network. 'Beyond Gaddafi: Libya's governance context' (2011), p.7 and Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, 'The Deep Roots of Libya's Security Fragmentation' Middle Eastern Studies (2019) 55:22, pp. 224-200.

[73] Wolfgang Putsztai, 'The End of a Country – Break-Up of Libya?, ISPI, Analysis No. (2016) 315.

[74] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Fact Sheet, "The Current Situation in Libya," December 2 020.

[75] For more, see Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, "Human trafficking, smuggling and governance in Libya : implications for stability and programming," USAID and NORC at the University of Chicago, May 2020, pp 36-34.

Conflict is another potent driver of VE. As I explained in a 2020 report, “Fighting produces death, destruction, and disenfranchisement that are a fertile ground for the development of violent extremism. Also, foreign patrons, whose aims may be frustrated through conventional warfare could see an interest in funding terrorist groups to wage an asymmetric fight against their opponent, as observed in Syria.” The resumption of conflict, be it national or localized, would certainly help the development of violent extremism in Libya.

In a nutshell, Libyans suffer from a very low quality of public services, from weak state and traditional institutions, from the absence of a private sector, and from the lack of employment opportunities outside of the public sector, and from widespread lawlessness and insecurity. Understandably, the majority of Libyans have deeply rooted political, educational, and economic grievances.

2.2 MESO: COMMUNITY-LEVEL DRIVERS

Since 2011, in addition to the national-level conflict, there are dozens of ethnic, tribal, and/or geographic conflicts pitting communities against one another. Figure 5 below provides an overview of most localized conflicts in Libya. Although some of these conflicts are dormant, and most are low-intensity, they regularly flare-up, claiming victims that include civilians, destroying homes and public infrastructure, and increasing hardship. These are all elements that produce a favorable environment for the recruitment of vulnerable individuals by VE groups.

1. Kufra: Tobu vs Zway
2. Zuwara: Zuwara vs. Rigdalin & Jmeil
3. Derna: LAAF vs "Islamists"
4. Sebha: • Tubu vs. Awlad Suliman • Qadhadhfa vs. Awlad Suliman & Warfallah vs Hassawna & Mahamid vs Qadhadhfa S. Benghazi: LAAF vs "Islamists"
6. Obari: Touaregs vs Tubu
7. Zintan vs Meshashya, Reyayna, and Zuwara
8. Ghadames: Arab tribes vs Touaregs
9. Tajoura vs Souq al Jumaa
10. Tarhouna vs Souq al Jumaa, Abu Slim, & TRB
11. Mizdah: Mashashia vs Qantrar tribes
12. Misarata vs. Tawerga; Zintan; Tarhouna, Zliten; Sirte; and Abu Slim
13. Murzuq: Tebu vs Ahali
14. Bani Walid vs Souq al Juma & Misrata
15. Zawya: Abu Humaira, vs Awlad Abusager; Zawya & Jenzour vs. Worshafana & Zintan
16. Shwerif: Megarha vs Mashashia (Mizdah)
17. Ajdabia: Magharba vs Zway

Figure 5 : *Local Conflicts in Libya*

Source: author’s own mapping

As a result of multiple ongoing conflicts and of the weakness and division of state institutions, the estimated number of current or former combatants range between 200,000 and 300,000, several times more than the official members of the Libyan armed forces. This is an incredibly large number, considering that there are about 950,000 Libyan men between the age of 19 and 45. [77] Finding a present and future role for these young men is one of Libya's greatest stability and development challenges, and represents a key issue for the prevention of violent extremism. [78]

In Libya, authorities first launched a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program in 2012 under the helm of the Warriors Affairs Commission (WAC), later named the Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development (LPRD). In 2015, after four years of activities, LPRD had registered 162,000 former fighters. To this day, none of these programs have succeeded, even in part. Studies on DDR programs show that former fighters who are not disarmed, demobilized, rehabilitated, and reintegrated into society are prone to take up arms again and turn to crime, or join other anti-systemic organizations such as VE groups.

At the community level, violent extremist groups recruit members by 'pulling' individuals who have a history of disenfranchisement, and a sentiment of despondency. In Libya, there are very large disparities among the socio-economic condition of communities and groups. Some Libyan communities are experiencing disenfranchisement and marginalization from a variety of causes, including a weak sense of belonging and identification to the nation, the fragmentation of local identity, and marginalization due to tribe, ethnicity, or geography. Hence, many Libyans feel a great sense of alienation towards local and national elites. Gadhafi loyalists represent a glaring example of a community that has been marginalized and discriminated since the 2011 revolution. The desire for vengeance has probably contributed to drive some Gadhafi loyalists towards VE groups, which may be one of the reasons why ISIL managed to take control of the notoriously pro-Gadhafi city of Sirte in May 2015.

Libyan violent extremists and foreign fighters also work at the community level through the weaponization of religious tradition and religious institutions. Violent extremist groups utilize radio stations and they sponsor television programs on religion. Moreover, they have a network of sympathetic Libyan religious scholars and preachers to advocate on their behalf. Libyan religious schools, which were once heavily controlled and monitored by the state, have fragmented and many have fallen under the influence of violent extremist organizations. Neither the Libyan central government nor municipalities have adequate data on how religious schools are governed and on the content of school curricula.

[77] 2020 Libya Common Operational Dataset, Libyan Bureau of Statistics and UN OCHA. Population projections based on the 2006 national census.

[78] For a study of the convergence between DDR and CVE, see Cockayne, James, and Siobhan O'Neil. "UN DDR in an era of violent extremism: Is it fit for purpose." United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (2015), available from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un_ddr_in_an_era_of_violent_extremism.pdf; Schumicky-Logan, Lilla. "Addressing Violent Extremism with a Different Approach: The Empirical Case of At-Risk and Vulnerable Youth in Somalia." Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 12, no. 79-66 :(2017) 2; and Hedayah and Global Center on Cooperative Security, "Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Challenges and Opportunities for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)," 23 September 2014, available from http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/ddr-meeting-summary.pdf.

[79] https://www.libyaherald.com/09/2020/ministry-of-interior-decrees-to-categorize-and-ddr-militias/

[80] Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonah, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs: An assessment." Folke Bernadotte Academy Research Report (2010), p.1, https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2980193/view

[81] Bank 1993:72; Collier 1994; Kingma 1997:12).

[82] Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, 'Libya's Untold Story: Civil Society Amid Chaos', Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief No.(2015) 93.

[83] C. Lister. 'Competition among Violent Islamist Extremists: Combating an Unprecedented Threat', The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. (2016) (1)668: pp.70-53.

[84] Douglas Zietz, Joshua House, and Rhys A. Young, "ISIL in Libya: A Bayesian Approach to Mapping At-Risk Regions." University of Maryland, START (2016). https://www.start.umd.edu/news/isil-libya-bayesian-approach-mapping-risk-regions

[85] S. Orbian, "Terrorism and Education in Libya, (2018) Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, United Kingdom, see, https://itct.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/06/2020/Terrorism-and-Education-in-Libya.pdf

Without a state infrastructure to supervise and monitor schools, and without local community input, violent extremists can easily influence education through conservative religious schools. For instance, these schools enforce a strict separation between male and female students and faculty. The spread of conservative religious schools in southern Libya has resulted in an increasing dominance of narrow interpretations of Islam. [87] The weaponization of religion serving the voice and propaganda of violent extremists is impacting gender roles, altering intergenerational religious praxis, redefining religious meaning for self-identity, and mistaking violent and aggressive behavior as synonymous with the 'new Libyan masculine identity'. [88]
VE propaganda not only sympathizes with common grievances, but it also offers individuals a pathway to address them. VE propaganda messages are thus very appealing amid widespread hardship, discrimination, marginalization, and disillusionment. [89]

2.3 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DRIVERS

The large number of national and localized conflicts that have been affecting Libya since 2011 have caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals. In April 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) accounted for 160,000 IDPs in Libya, and over 680,000 returnees since 2016. [90] Together, they make up close to 840,000 displaced Libyans in six years, which is almost 14% of the Libyan population.

In light of these numbers, it is logical to speculate that a large share of the Libyan population has been repeatedly exposed to violence over the course of ten years. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that many men in arms are also fathers who had to neglect their families to fight.
Another side-effect of widespread conflict and of lawlessness and insecurity is the dramatic spread in the use of psychotropic drugs. [91] Drug use and abuse also results from the large prevalence of mental health issues – particularly post-traumatic stress disorder – among Libyans, which are largely unaddressed. [92]

[86] International Crisis Group, 'Addressing the Rise of Libya's Madkhali Salafis', April (2020), see, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/addressing-rise-libyas-madkhali-salafis

[87] Ibid., p. 158.

[88] Paul Ammar, 'Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of Men in Crisis Industries and Gender in Revolution', Journal of Middle East Women Studies (2011): Vol.7, No. 3, pp. 70-36.

[89] A.A. Nayed, 'ISIS In Libya: Winning the Propaganda War,' (2015), Kalaam Research, see, https://www.kalamresearch.com/pdf/CVE-web[1].pdf

[90] IOM Libya IDP and returnee report round 41 February - April 2022. Available from https://displacement.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/DTM_LBY_R41_IDP_Returnee_Report_Final.pdf

[91] For more on the use of drugs in Libya, see Elamouri, F. M., Musumari, P. M., Techasrivichien, T., Farjallah, A., Elfandi, S., Alsharif, O. F., … Kihara, M. (2018). "Now drugs in Libya are much cheaper than food": A qualitative study on substance use among young Libyans in post-revolution Tripoli, Libya. International Journal of Drug Policy, 31–23 ,53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.11.026

[92] Author interviews with multiple INGO and IO program managers focusing on youth in Libya, 2022-2018.

RECENT VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

Inga Trauthig, a researcher who tracks violent extremist activities in Libya, collected data on terrorist attacks in Libya between March 1, 2018 and October 31, 2019. She counted 87 terrorist attacks during this period. The attacks were spread evenly between the eastern, western, and southern regions of Libya as displayed in Figure 6 below. [93]



Figure6: *Terrorist attacks in Libya per region (1 March 31 – 2018 October 2019)*

The U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism 2019 Annual Country Report on Counterterrorism reported that there were six terrorist attacks in the first half of the year against the Libyan National Army. In the town of al-Fuqaha in the Jufra province, central Libya, ISIS fighter killed LNA security officials and burned several houses in the town. Between May 4th and 9th of 2019 ISIS fighters attacked LNA officials, killed a former Libyan diplomat, Mr. Ali al-Kaboush, burnt homes and property in the town of Ghadduwa (45 miles south of Sebha city), and beheaded security officials from the 160th Brigade. [94] In the summer of 2019, unknown attackers detonated a car bomb near a shopping mall in the Hawari neighborhood in Benghazi, targeting the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) convoy. This single attack killed two UNSMIL guards and wounded three dozen civilians.[95]

In July 2020, the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaida (AQ), noted that the number of ISIS fighters may be as high as 1,400 in Libya. The Security Council Committee noted that ISIL continues to represent a threat to the stability and security of Libya.[96] ISIL-Libya resumed actions in the southern, specifically targeting military checkpoints, police stations, small businesses belonging to individuals aligned with local authorities, and the Libyan National Army. The group remains focused in Fezzan, south of the Sabha-Awbari road and in the central region of Haruj. It maintains sleeper cells in the coastal cities, including Tripoli".

93 United States Department of State 2019 Annual Country Report on Counterterrroism, see, https://www.state.gov/country-reports-on-terrorism-2/

94 Ibid., p. 131.

95 UN Security Council Committee Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaida, (2020), see https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N47/161/20/PDF/N2016147.pdf?OpenElement

96 Ibid., p. 19

ISIL-Libya seems to leverage tensions between Tuareg, Tubu and Arab tribes to feed its recruitment. It maintains a cold peace with foreign militants from Chad, Niger and Sudan who are present in the south of Libya, and has raised funds by extorting small businesses and by kidnapping key local figures for ransom.[98] Even when it is relatively weak, ISIL- Libya exploits the ungoverned area where Chad, Sudan and Libya's border intersect and where illegal trade of weapons and human beings take place. [99]

It can simply trade with local smugglers and militias, establish flash checkpoints to extort money in exchange for passage, and/or ask for money to guarantee their protection in specific areas.

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) also continues to maintain a presence in southwest Libya, near Uwaynat, where it occasionally establishes checkpoints along the arms smuggling and human trafficking routes, thereby generating income. The group does not directly undertake smuggling, but it collects fees from criminal organizations in exchange for protection.

98 'Touareg, Libya's Quiet War: The Tuareg of South Libya', Vice News, 17 February 2016, see, https://news.vice.com/ article/in-a-southern-libya-oasis-a-proxy-war-engulfs-two-tribes.

99 Abdulrahman Al-Arabi, "Local Specificities of Migration in Libya: Challenges and Solutions', European University Institute, March 2018 and Rebecca Murray, 'Tribal War Simmers in Libya's Desert', IPS News, 11 October 2011, see, http:www.ipsnews.net/10/2012/tribal-war-simmers-in-libyas-desert/.

SECTION 3

ANALYSIS OF VE DRIVERS IN 7 MUNICIPALITIES

DETAILED CONTENT

3.1. **Overview of key VE drivers and markers: Meta-indicator tables**

3.2. **Governance**

Access to basic services
(Solid Waste; Electricity; Water; Health; Education; Infrastructure)
Safety and Security
Justice
Corruption

3.3. **Attitude towards state and society**

Identity
Trust in institutions
Tolerance
Gender equality
Religious Knowledge and openness

3.4. **Discrimination and marginalization**

Marginalization
Discrimination
National ID card

3.5. **Social cohesion, anger, empowerment, and engagement**

Social cohesion
Life satisfaction versus anger
Empowerment
Participation and Engagement

3.6. **Socio-economic conditions and hardship**

Socio-economic condition
Childhood
Marriage
Employment
Hardship

3.7. **Firearms, armed Groups, and Violence**

Armed groups and main threats
Recruitment
Violence
Condoning violence

3.1 OVERVIEW OF KEY VE DRIVERS AND MARKERS: META-INDICATOR TABLES

This sub-section presents key findings on VE drivers and markers in the 7 municipalities, grouped along the VE and governance thematic areas that informed the research.

GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC SERVICES

Public services

The cities with the lowest quality and availability of public services appear to be Sebha, Zuwara, Bani Walid, and Ghat. However, the quality and availability of services vary greatly across Libyan municipalities, and also among neighbourhoods within them

In terms of specific services, solid waste management seems an issue in Bani Walid, Ghat, Murzuq and Sebha, but not in Misrata, Kufa, and Zuwara. Electricity provision is a major problem in all cities, except Kufra. Access to water is problematic in Zuwara, Bani Walid, and Sebha, but not in the others.

Among the 7 municipalities, healthcare provision appears to be very problematic only in Zuwara, and to a lesser extent in Sebha. The quality of Infrastructure seems very poor in all localities, except Misrata.

Security

Sebha, Bani Walid, and Kufra appear to be the localities most affected by insecurity, although data indicate that the security situation in Kufra has greatly improved in the last year.

Justice

In order to redress injustices and to seek help in case of aggressions, individuals across the 7 municipalities rely primarily on the police, but also to a large extent on family and tribal leaders.

Corruption

Overall, respondents believe that corruption primarily affects utilities departments, the registry and permit services, the media, and businesses/private sector. Among the 7 localities Sebha is where inhabitants perceive the highest level of corruption.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS STATE AND SOCIETY

Trust in institutions

Libyans grant little trust to their state's governing bodies, although municipal councils enjoy a slightly higher level of trust that the government and the parliament.

Inhabitants of Southern Libyan municipalities tend to have higher level of trust in institutions, with the exception of Sebha, where trust in institutions is the lowest among all 7 municipalities.

Religious authorities, such as the main imam of the community, are trusted more than tribal or ethnic leaders in Misrata, Bani Walid, Ghat, and Murzuq. In these locations, religious authorities are often trusted more than any state and non-state body.

Tolerance

Tolerance appears to be lowest in Bani Walid and Kufra, which is also where most of the respondents from the bottom 10 percentile are. Women appear to be more intolerant toward other religions, compared to of men.

Support for gender equality

Bani Walid, Murzuq, and Kufra rank lowest in terms of support for gender equality. However, Kufra, Zuwara and Murzuq have the highest share of respondents who indicate that women in their community hold positions as legal scholars (83 ,%86%, and79%, respectively, compared to 66% among all localities).

DISCRIMINATION AND MARGINALIZATION

Marginalization

Inhabitants of Sebha, and to a lesser extent those of Murzuq and Bani Walid seem to suffer from the highest level of marginalization. Sebha and Murzuq also host the largest share of respondents who appear to be most marginalized in the entire sample.

Discrimination

Community discrimination is most salient in the 4 southern localities, albeit less so in Ghat. Among these four localities, discrimination appears to be most profound and pervasive among inhabitants of Kufra.

Ethnic or tribal origin is the most prevalent reason for discrimination across municipalities, followed by skin color.

The issue of denied citizenship, and the associated inability to possess a Libyan National Number is a major source of discrimination that affects thousands of Libyans in the South, mostly Tebu and Touareg.

SOCIAL COHESION, PARTICIPATION, AND ENGAGEMENT

Social Cohesion

Sebha has a much lower level of social cohesion than all other localities researched. Surprisingly, Zuwara also appears to have a lower level of social cohesion compared to the other cities.

Satisfaction versus Anger

On average male respondents have a lower level of life satisfaction about their current life than female respondents. Individuals living in Sebha and Kufra appear significantly less satisfied than those living in the other 5 research localities.

Inhabitants of Sebha are the angriest / most disgruntled among all localities, whereas Inhabitants of Kufra seem to be the least angry and disgruntled

The prevailing source of anger and discontent among the Libyans interviewed is the “system” as a whole, which may indicate that respondents feel an overall sense of frustration with current circumstances but are unable to identify a single cause for it.

Participation and engagement

In general, participation and engagement are lowest in Bani Walid and Sebha. Women appear to be much less engaged than men, while youth between 19 and 29 years old seem to be more active than older respondents.

Local elections appear to mobilize more people than national elections. Inhabitants of Kufra and Ghat appear to be the most assiduous voters in both national and local elections, while inhabitants of Bani Walid and Sebha seem those who vote the least.

Empowerment

Counter-intuitively, inhabitants of Zuwara are those who feel least empowered among all municipalities, which is surprising in light of the high level of stability, economic well-being, and security that they enjoy compared to other Libyan cities. This may be explained by the change in attitudes and behaviors that accompany the shift from survival to self-expression values.

Media

Media do not enjoy much trust compared to other institutions. Foreign media are usually more trusted than Libyan ones, except in Kufra and Ghat, although, even there, the difference between national and foreign media is small.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HARDSHIP

Socio-economic Level

On average, inhabitants of Kufra and Murzuq seem to have the lowest socioeconomic level among the 7 localities. Sebha, Kufra, and Murzuq also host a much larger share of the individuals who are in the most difficult socioeconomic conditions in the entire research sample.

Unemployment is more prevalent among respondents between 19 and 39, and it is most severe in Ghat and Murzuq, where it affects 28% and 35% of the active population, respectively.

Hardship

Inhabitants of southern localities (Ghat, Murzuq, Sebha, and Kufra) clearly face a markedly higher level of hardship (i.e. food, water for domestic use, money, and shelter) compared to the other localities researched. Women appear to face a higher level of hardship than men. The age category that reports the highest level of hardship are those aged 70 years and older.

Firearms

Although firearms are broadly available in Libya and the level of security is quite low in most localities, most Libyans disagree with the need to carry firearms.

Firearms trade is widespread in Libya, and from Libya to the region. The majority of respondents in Misrata, Sebha, and Bani Walid believe that weapons come primarily from Turkey, Russia, and the UAE, whereas in Murzuq, and Ghat, the majority of respondents believe that weapons come mainly from other cities in Libya.

Armed groups, Threats, and Violence

Overall, more than one third of respondents indicated that armed groups in their area threaten their community with force. The types of threats vary greatly from a city to another. Sebha is clearly the community most threatened by armed groups.

Armed robbers/bandits are the most cited type of group that poses a security threat across all municipalities, followed by drug traffickers, and terrorist groups. However, responses vary greatly among municipalities. In particular, inhabitants of Zuwara, Murzuq, and Misrata believe that armed groups from other cities pose the greatest threat to their community.

Many more respondents among youth between 14 and 18 years old believe that drug traffickers are the group posing the greatest threat to their community, compared to older age groups. This may suggest that the issue of drugs is particularly salient among youth.

The vast majority of respondents across the 7 localities think that violence against civilians is never justified. Inhabitants of Sebha and Kufra respondents are, on average, more prone to condoning violence by security forces, and to a slightly lesser degree, by individuals or groups.

				Southern municipalities					
Meta-indicator*	**Zuwara**	**Bani Walid**	**Misrata**	**Ghat**	**Murzuq**	**Sebha**	**Kufrah**	**Median (South)**	**Median (All)**
Hardship	0.85	0.79	0.90	0.74	0.72	0.65	0.55	0.67	**0.83**
Socio-economic condition	0.68	0.64	0.69	0.64	0.51	0.54	0.50	0.57	**0.62**
Overall quality of service provision**	0.36	0.36	0.49	0.38	0.41	0.33	0.50	0.40	**0.40**
Local Security	0.86	0.60	0.67	0.77	0.69	0.41	0.65	0.66	**0.69**
Justice	0.80	0.57	0.54	0.59	0.55	0.38	0.63	0.56	**0.67**
Social Cohesion	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.80	0.68	0.62	0.75	0.78	**0.67**
Participation and Engagement	0.26	0.21	0.25	0.33	0.34	0.24	0.43	0.25	**0.25**
National Identity	0.63	0.72	0.68	0.70	0.70	0.67	0.69	0.75	**0.75**
Trust in Institutions	0.42	0.44	0.49	0.52	0.58	0.32	0.67	0.53	**0.50**
Corruption	0.36	0.41	0.35	0.39	0.50	0.27	0.49	0.42	**0.40**
Marginalization	0.79	0.70	0.73	0.73	0.62	0.57	0.76	0.68	**0.73**
Community Discrimination	0.81	0.74	0.86	0.72	0.62	0.63	0.53	0.67	**0.75**
Gender Equality and Women	0.74	0.47	0.61	0.68	0.55	0.61	0.55	0.67	**0.67**
Trust	0.45	0.39	0.47	0.45	0.45	0.49	0.45	0.42	**0.42**
Tolerance	0.70	0.53	0.67	0.70	0.65	0.67	0.62	0.73	**0.73**
Religious Openness	0.70	0.58	0.60	0.69	0.52	0.69	0.49	0.67	**0.67**
Condoning Violence	0.89	0.83	0.74	0.79	0.74	0.67	0.69	0.78	**0.83**
Trend (from -1 to 1)	0.06	-0.06	0.08	0.06	0.26	-0.09	0.41	0.13	**0.00**

* The description of each meta-indicator is available in Annex A. All answers are re-scaled from 0: least desirable, to 1: most desirable, except for the "trend" meta-indicator, scaled from -1 to 1. Values reported are the average among all individual answers for that geographical group

** This meta-indicator aggregates the overall values for six types of services (Solid Waste, Electricity, Water, Health, Education, and Infrastructure), all weighted equally.

Note: Values are color-coded: **green** when above the median value among respondents across all 7 municipalities, **black** when equal to it, and **red** when below it.

Meta-indicator**	Zuwara	Bani Walid	Misrata	Southern municipalities: Ghat	Murzuq	Sebha	Kufrah	% of respondents in bottom 10 percentile
Hardship	0.4%	0.7%	0.1%	1.8%	1.6%	2.7%	4.4%	12%
Socio-economic condition	0.2%	0.5%	0.6%	0.3%	2.7%	2.9%	2.7%	10%
Overall quality of service provision***	2.5%	1.8%	0.3%	1.6%	0.8%	2.9%	0.1%	10%
Local Security	0.1%	2.6%	1.3%	0.5%	1.2%	3.6%	0.6%	10%
Justice	0.3%	1.7%	2.1%	1.5%	1.8%	5.2%	0.3%	13%
Social Cohesion	2.0%	1.1%	1.4%	0.5%	1.7%	3.3%	1.0%	11%
Participation and Engagement	4.6%	7.7%	4.9%	4.2%	3.6%	6.3%	3.9%	35%
National Identity	2.5%	0.6%	1.4%	1.7%	1.0%	2.3%	1.6%	11%
Trust in Institutions	1.8%	1.9%	0.8%	1.4%	0.6%	4.3%	0.2%	11%
Corruption	1.9%	0.7%	1.3%	0.9%	0.3%	3.5%	1.3%	10%
Marginalization	0.1%	1.4%	0.6%	1.2%	2.2%	3.7%	0.9%	10%
Community Discrimination	1.2%	1.4%	0.6%	1.1%	2.3%	2.7%	4.8%	14%
Gender Equality and Women	0.6%	3.4%	1.8%	1.2%	2.0%	1.9%	1.8%	13%
Trust	1.6%	1.8%	2.0%	1.6%	1.5%	0.9%	2.2%	12%
Tolerance	0.2%	3.0%	1.2%	0.8%	1.4%	1.3%	2.2%	10%
Religious Openness	1.3%	1.9%	0.9%	1.7%	4.0%	1.3%	3.0%	14%
Condoning Violence	0.4%	1.0%	1.7%	2.2%	1.9%	3.6%	2.9%	14%
Trend (from -1 to 1)	2.4%	4.3%	2.0%	1.8%	1.7%	5.0%	1.1%	18%

* The bottom 10 percentile are the individuals whose answers ranked among the worst 10% among all respondents. Since more than 10% of respondents may have provided equally negative answers, the last column indicates the actual share of respondents who fall into the bottom 10 percentile. For participation and engagement, since that share is 35%, we do not find the data useful for the scope of our research.

** The description of each meta-indicator is available in Annex A

*** This meta-indicator aggregates the overall values for six types of services (Solid Waste, Electricity, Water, Health, Education, and Infrastructure), all weighted equally.

Note: Values are color-coded in **red** when 2,0% or more of the total respondents fall in the lowest 10 percentile in that locality..

3.2 GOVERNANCE

ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES

Access to basic services, such as water and electricity, healthcare, education, solid waste collection services, and infrastructure, are key to providing local inhabitants with a decent life. When these services are not provided by the state, or when their quality is very low, individuals naturally seek alternate service providers. This gap opens a dangerous space for criminal and terrorist groups to gain the allegiance of local inhabitants, or at least to "buy" their silence and support through dependence. A typical example is how some ideologically-driven charities with links to VE groups often provide services in depressed areas. [100]

Overall, the quality of service provision varies greatly across Libyan municipalities, and also among neighborhoods within them. When looking at the overall level of service provision by aggregating multiple indicators for each type of service, and then all services into a single meta-indicator, the cities with the lowest level of services appear to be Sebha, Zuwara, Bani Walid, and Ghat (Table 3 above).

There are no substantive differences between northern and southern municipalities in our sample when looking at all services combined. Breaking down services by type, we can observe how some types of services are problematic in some localities but not in others. For instance, solid waste management is an issue almost everywhere, but not in Misrata, Kufra, and Zuwara. Also, while Kufra solved its problems with electricity provision (by buying generators two years ago), this is a serious problem in all other cities. Zuwara, Bani Walid, and Sebha all continue to struggle with water access, which has been an issue for many years. Among the 7 municipalities, healthcare provision appears to be very problematic only in Zuwara, and to a lesser extent in Sebha.

100 El Sayed Lilah; Barnes Jamal, "Contemporary P/CVE: Research and Practice", Hedayah and Edith Cowan University (2017). https://www.cvereferenceguide.org/en/resource/contemporary-pcve-research-and-practice, and "The Strong Cities Networks' Local Prevention Networks in Lebanon and Jordan", author's conversation with the program evaluator, July 2019

Figure 7: Overall quality of public service provision



Based on the distribution of respondents belonging to the bottom 10 percentile (Table 3 above), it is clear that Sebha and Zuwara host a much larger share of individuals who lament the worst level of public services among all respondents (2.9% and 2.5% of total number of respondents respectively), followed by Bani Walid (1.8%) and Ghat (1.6%). This information should push local authorities to investigate more closely the location and type of inhabitants who suffer the most from a low level of service provision.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

Safety and security are two very closely related concepts, and respondents may often confuse one with the other or just group them together into a single concept when answering questions. However, we distinguish between safety, which refers to the actual or perceived protection against accidents that are unintentional, and security, which is the actual or perceived protection against threats that are deliberate and intentional. In unstable settings prone to conflict, such as Libya, this distinction is important, because human life and well-being is often threatened by both structural and environmental hazards (i.e. bad infrastructure, effects of extreme weather) and by intentional harmful acts (i.e. crime, conflict). In addition, we use “overall safety” in reference to the sense of safety and security as a whole.

Not surprisingly, when the Arab Barometer measured the perceived level of safety and security across countries in 2018, Libyans, taken as a whole, felt the least secure among North African countries, on par with Tunisians (see Table 4). The latter may be explained by the relative temporal proximity to the terrorist attacks that affected Tunisia in 2015 and 2016. Three years later, and after another civil war (20-2019), the outlook of Libyans on their safety and security has likely worsened.

	Algeria	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Regional Average
Surveyed population (N)	2331	1962	2396	2400	2394	–
Safety and security* (mean)	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.7	2.0	**1.8**

*Question: "To what extent do you feel that your own personal as well as your fa mily's safety and security are currently ensured?" Scale from 1 (not at all ensured) to 4 (fully ensured)

Table 4 : *Personal and family safety and security (Arab Barometer, 2018)*

OVERALL SAFETY

The sense of safety among the population is an important indicator for PVE, as the failure to provide security deeply undermines the legitimacy of the state. Based on questions asking respondents how security has changed this past year, the situation seems to have worsened only in Bani Walid and Sebha (Table 5).

When asked about the extent to which respondents feel safe walking alone at night in their neighborhood, the municipalities where respondents felt least safe are Bani Walid, Misrata, and Sebha (Table 5). Interestingly, these are also the municipalities with the highest standard deviation among responses, meaning that individual responses were the most diverse within these cities. It may indicate that the level of security is very different from one neighborhood to another in these municipalities. Each municipal report analyzes this in greater detail. Lastly, none of the municipalities indicate an overall pessimistic forecast about the security situation for the upcoming year. Respondents in Ghat and Bani Walid were the least hopeful, whereas respondents of Kufra were the most hopeful about security situation in one year being better than the current situation (Table 5).

	Kufra	Bani Walid	Ghat	Misrata	Murzuq	Sebha	Zuwara	Average
Security compared to one year ago (1)	0.66	- 0.03	0.05	0.17	0.45	- 0.1	0.20	**0.20**
Feeling safe walking alone at night (2)	2.12	1.64	2.19	1.55	1.78	0.99	2.27	**1.80**
Forecast about safety in one year (3)	0.64	0.23	0.16	0.37	0.41	0.31	0.27	**0.34**

(1) Question: "How is the security in your neighborhood now, compared to twelve months ago?" Scale from -1 (less safe than it was) to 1 (more safe than it was).
(2) Question: "I will read a series of statements on safety, security, and well-being. Please tell me how much you agree and disagree with them: I feel safe walking alone at night in my neighborhood" Scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
(3) Question: "Compared to the security situation in this town and neighborhood nowadays, do you think that the situation in one year will be more safe, less safe, or the same as today?" Scale from -1 (less safe than today) to 1 (more safe than today). Note: Values are color-coded: green when above the median value among respondents across all 7 municipalities, black when equal to it, and red when below it.

Table 5: Safety trends

SECURITY

Security is the actual or perceived protection against threats that are deliberate and intentional. The two available types of measures are the extent to which respondents feel secure and their perception about how common various types of crimes are in their area. The survey asked about the following types of crime: Murder; Armed Robbery; Burglary; Fighting between armed groups; Kidnapping; Car theft and carjacking; Street aggression / Assault; Smuggling of people, drugs, or weapons; and sexual assault. Another measure is the frequency of security incidents they report.

Overall, the level of safety and security varies substantially among the 7 localities. The survey included one question on security drawn directly from the World Values Survey questionnaire that was administered across Libya in 2014. Thus, the question allows us to compare how the feeling of security has evolved between 2014 and 2021. Overall, it seems that the feeling of security worsened across Libya. However, it improved in Kufra, where it had been among the worst, and it remained the same in Murzuq and Zuwara (see Table 6). Currently, it appears that inhabitants have the greatest sense of insecurity in Sebha, and to a lesser extent, in Bani Walid. When considering nine distinct indicators of security (see Table 2: Meta-Indicators), Sebha, Bani Walid, and Kufra are the localities most affected by insecurity, although the situation in Kufra appears to have greatly improved in the last year. Incidentally, all three are key nodes in the network of smuggling and human trafficking that crosses from southern to northern Libya. The hypothesis that this type of crime may play a role in the level of perceived insecurity is supported by the fact that these are the only three localities in which local respondents noted that the smuggling of people, drugs, or weapons is happening more than “very rarely”.

	Kufra	Bani Walid	Ghat	Misrata	Murzuq	Sebha	Zuwara	Average
Feeling secure (WVS 2014)* (1)	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.9	1.8	1.4	**1.6**
Feeling secure (UNDP 2021) (1)	1.7	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.9	2.4	1.4	**1.9**
Crime perception (2)	2.3	1.9	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.8	1.2	**1.8**
Victims of a crime (3)	60%	35%	25%	23%	40%	51%	8%	**35%**
Fighting between armed groups (UNDP 2021) (3)	2.2	1.7	1.1	1.7	1.6	2.7	1.1	**1.7**

*The WVS stratified the survey by province ("Shabiya", a geographical subdivision of Libya used for operational purposes, but no longer corresponding to an administrative division). There are 22 in Libya. Bani Walid and Misrata fall under the same province, hence, the values are the same. Also, the Zuwara district includes all surrounding towns (e.g. Riqda lin, Jmail). Lastly, the WVS was carried out all across Libya, therefore, the average is for all Libya

(1) Question: "Could you tell me how secure you feel these days in your neighborhood?" Scale from 1 (Very secure) to 4 (absolutely not secure)
(2) Question: "How frequently do the following incidents happen in your neighborhood? (Murder; Armed Robbery; Burglary; Fighting between armed groups; Kidnapping; Car theft and carjacking; Street aggression/Assault; Smuggling of people, drugs, or weapons; Sexual assault). Scale from 1 (Never) to 5 (Very frequently) .
(3) Question: "Have you or a member of your family been the victim of the following incident in your neighborhood in the last year? (Same options provided in the previous question). Values represent the % of respondents who responded yes to at least one of these crimes.
(4) Question: "How frequently do the following incidents happen in your neighborhood: Fighting between armed groups?'. Scale from 1 (never) to 4 very frequently)
Note: Values are color-coded: green when above the median value among respondents across all 7 municipalities, black when equal to it, and red when below it.

Table 6 : Security, perceived and experienced

In terms of the perceived frequency of crimes (all types of crimes combined), inhabitants in Sebha and to a lesser extent Kufra, reported markedly higher levels of crime compared to all other localities (see “Frequency of crimes by type” in Table 7 below). The three most common crimes reported by all our respondents are burglary, car theft and carjacking, and smuggling of people, drugs, or weapons. Unlike all other localities, armed robbery ranks as the most frequent incident in Sebha. In addition, kidnapping appears to be a perceived issue only in Sebha and Kufra.

	Kufra	Bani Walic	Ghat	Misrata	Murzuq	Sebha	Zuwara	Average
Murder	11%	2%	2%	1%	15%	8%	0%	**5%**
Armed Robbery	26%	5%	1%	2%	17%	26%	1%	**11%**
Burglary	28%	15%	15%	8%	17%	30%	4%	**17%**
Fighting between armed groups	20%	1%	1%	4%	21%	13%	2%	**9%**
Kidnapping	27%	2%	2%	1%	11%	8%	0%	**7%**
Car theft and carjacking	39%	5%	5%	9%	24%	26%	2%	**15%**
Street aggression / Assault	26%	14%	7%	7%	10%	15%	3%	**12%**
Smuggling of people, drugs, or weapons	21%	1%	2%	1%	3%	2%	0%	**4%**
Sexual Assault	7%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	**1%**
Average level of reporting (all crimes)	60%	35%	25%	23%	40%	51%	8%	**35%**
Percentage of respondents reporting at least one crime	23%	5%	4%	4%	13%	14%	1%	**9%**

*** Question:** "Have you or a member of your family been the victim of the following incident in your neighborhood in the last year?" Value is the percentage of respondents who answered "Yes" to that option.
Note: Values are color-coded: green when above the median value among respondents across all 7 municipalities, blackwhen equal to it, and red when below it.

Table 8 : Crimes reported in the last year*

Data on respondents belonging to the lowest 10 percentile confirm many of the findings presented thus far: of the respondents who fall in the bottom 10% of the entire sample across all 7 municipalities on the local security meta-indicator, 3.6% are in Sebha, and 2.6% are in Bani Walid (Table 3 above).

JUSTICE

Injustice is a potent VE driver as it undermines the implicit “social contract” that binds individuals together to form a society under the authority of a state. In order for individuals to relinquish their absolute freedom and submit to the authority of a sovereign (i.e. the state), they must believe that this “social contract” will ensure a more just society than it would be otherwise.

Hence, if individuals believe that a state and society are profoundly unjust, they are more likely to try and undermine the functioning of the state and society. Supporting this assertion, empirical research has found that perceived collective injustice is a strong predictor of anti-social collective action[101]. Thus, a sense of injustice and the desire to blame others is found to be a key driver of violent extremism.[102]

To understand specific approaches to justice, we asked where respondents would go to seek help solving a dispute or an injustice (which individual, group, or institution). We provided ten different options broadly belonging to *three categories:*

NON-STATE / FAMILY:
Non-state armed group, family members

SOCIETY:
Religious leader, tribal sheikh, civil society organization

STATE:
Municipal Council, prosecutor or judge In a nearby city court, prosecutor or judge In the city court, army, or police

Respondents were asked to choose only three options. The results, presented in Figure 8 below, indicate that overall, individuals seek assistance primarily from state institutions (most notably, the police). However, respondents also frequently rely on family and tribal leaders, except in Zuwara, which is almost entirely populated of Amazigh who do not divide in tribes. Unlike other localities, more than half of the inhabitants of Kufra and about one third of those in Ghat also seek help from the army. Municipal authorities appear to play a role only in Bani Walid and Murzuq.



Figure 8 : Who would you go to get help with solving a dispute or an injustice?

The survey also asked respondents where they would go to seek help regarding a more serious offense (assault/aggression). Results were similar to those regarding the resolution of a dispute, with but some notable differences. Tribal leaders (i.e. sheikh) and municipal councils appear to be less solicited, while family members continue to play an important role in dealing with these more serious incidents.

Figure 9: If you or a member of your family were the victim of an assault / aggression in the street, who would you go to ask for help? (three responses allowed)

A follow-up question focused on understanding why some respondents who would not go to state authorities if they were the victim of an aggression. Almost all respondents (94%) provided a response, and the reasons they cited most were: Authorities would be very slow (34%); Authorities would not be able to provide any solution (26%); and Authorities would not care (19%). All three reasons indicate the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the justice system.

Ineffectiveness (Authorities would not be able to provide any solution) appears to be most acute in Sebha, with 40% of respondents choosing this option, followed by Bani Walid (38%) and Ghat (30%). Inefficiency (Authorities would be very slow) instead appears to be most serious in Ghat (44%), Misrata (40%), Murzuq (39%), and Kufra (36%).

However, other, more worrisome reasons were available to explain why respondents did not go to state authorities to report an aggression, such as a belief that authorities would not treat them impartially, or that they would not treat them correctly. These are signs of discrimination, which is discussed in the dedicated sub-section of this report.

CORRUPTION

Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain: “Corruption erodes trust, weakens democracy, hampers economic development and further exacerbates inequality, poverty, social division and the environmental crisis”. This phenomenon is multifaceted, ranging from petty bribery, to nepotism and embezzlement. Since these practices are often carried out in illicitly, research often measures perceived corruption.

Based on our meta-indicator for corruption that includes four different measures, Sebha[103] appears to be the most corrupt by far compared to the other six localities. In general, 70% of respondents

across the entire sample indicated that personal contacts are either important (25%) or very important (45%) when dealing with the municipal public sector. Values are fairly similar for men and women, and consistent across all age groups. The cities where the share of respondents who said “very important” were the highest are Sebha (65%), Zuwara (61%), Ghat (55%), and Misrata (46%).

Overall, 58% of respondents believe the utilities departments are affected by corruption “quite a bit” or “entirely”, followed by registry and permit services (57%), media (56%), and businesses/Private sector (56%). These proportions vary by locality. Here too, Sebha inhabitants perceive the highest level of corruption compared to respondents in other localities. For them, the most corrupt entities are utilities department (74% chose either “quite a bit” or “entirely”). Respondents indicate registry and permit services to be the most corrupt entity in Kufra (63%), the media in Bani Walid (71%), the utilities department in Ghat (61%), and education and medical and health services in Misrata (57%). Similarly, in Murzuq, education rank ex aequo with the military (47%), but overall, corruption appears to be lowest among all 7 localities. Lastly, in Zuwara it is again the utilities department that ranks as the most corrupt (64%).

[103] These are: the perceived importance of personal contacts when dealing with the municipal public sector, the extent to which municipal authorities work to crackdown on corruption, and the extent to which respondents believe that a series of

key institutions (i.e. judiciary, police, military; medical and health services, private sector, education, registry and permit services, and utilities department) are affected by corruption.

3.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS STATE AND SOCIETY

IDENTITY

Identity is an individual's conception of self in relation to others derived from the perceived membership in a relevant social group: tribe; neighborhood, city; region; country; etc. This individual socio-psychological attitude is important for two main reasons. First, the strength of one's identification with a group of people affects the likelihood and ability to engage with other members for mutual support or to pursue common interests. Second, one's sense of social identity defines the boundary that separates the in-group and out-group. While individuals have multiple overlapping group identities that make up their social identity, they order them in a situational and dynamic hierarchy of importance that determines the primary group in the interest of which they may act. In other words, the definition of identity contributes to drive individual and collective action.

For the purpose of PVE, this indicator should be used to recognize individuals who have detached from their community and nation, who no longer identify with fellow community members. While not all individuals who do not identify with their community are members of VE groups, but members of VE groups almost always lack a sense of identity with their community.

When asked how strongly respondents agreed with the following statement: "I consider myself part of my local community", 8 total respondents (across all 7 municipalities) selected "disagree completely": 4 in Zuwara, 2 in Sebha, and 2 in Bani Walid. Similarly, when asked how strongly they agree with the following statement: "I consider myself part of the Libyan nation", seven individuals chose "strongly disagree": 4 in Zuwara, 2 in Ghat, and 1 in Sebha. For this last question, it is worth also considering the average degree of identification with the Libyan nation by locality. Across all municipalities, 92% of respondents either "strongly agree" or "agree" that they consider being Libyan important to their identity. Surprisingly, inhabitants of Murzuq (97%), Bani Walid (96%), and Sebha (93%) are those who mostly identify with the Libyan nation, compared to other localities. This is surprising for Sebha and Murzuq, which are southern localities that regularly lament neglect and marginalization from the state and national politics. The lowest is Kufra (86%), although the difference is not large with the other localities. It may be worth noting that Kufra is home to a large population of Tubu who do not possess a national ID card, and who are often considered to not by Libyan by fellow inhabitants of Kufra and many others across Libya.

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

The level of trust that citizens have in state institutions is an important indicator of the strength of the social contract that binds them. When citizens do not trust the state, they may seek alternative entities to provide for their needs, including justice and security.

Based on the meta-indicator on trust in institutions (Table 2 above), southern Libyan municipalities display a higher level of trust overall, with the exception of Sebha, where trust in state institutions is the absolute lowest among all 7 municipalities.

In terms of individuals' trust in specific political bodies, Municipal Councils (MC), enjoy the highest level of trust among people, well ahead of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA, since it was replaced by the Government of National Unity), and the Tobruk-based parliament called the House of Representatives (HoR). The only exception is Zuwara. It should be kept in mind that in Zuwara, the mayor changed twice within the last year, and the municipal council was replaced with the previous one following the death of the mayor in March 2021. In Sebha, although the MC enjoys more trust than the HoR and the GNA, it is trusted by less than 25% of respondents, less than half compared to all other municipalities except Zuwara. This finding may result from the long history of division and tensions between some communities and the municipal council, which is largely dominated by a single tribe.

The detailed municipal reports that accompany this report explain these findings and other local dynamics in detail. The GNA enjoys the second highest level of trust by inhabitants of all cities except Sebha. Lastly, the HoR enjoys a high level of trust (approximately half of the population) only in Murzuq and Kufra (Figure 10).

Figure 10 : Trust in political bodies: To what extent do you trust the following institution or group? (percentage of respondents who trust somewhat or completely)

Besides state political, security, and justice bodies, the inhabitants of the 7 municipalities we researched have varying degrees of trust in non-profit organizations (international organizations and national NGOs), traditional authorities (religious, tribal, or ethnic), the media (national and foreign), and key service providers (healthcare and education), as depicted in Figure 11 below.

Traditional authorities are trusted by the majority of respondents in all localities except in Zuwara, where there are no tribes, and where the relationship with religion is different from other places in Libya. This is an important element to keep in mind when designing PVE strategies in cooperation with local authorities. Religious authorities, such as the main imam of the community, are trusted more than tribal or ethnic leaders, and often more than any state and non-state body in Misrata, Bani Walid, Ghat, and Murzuq.

International organizations and civil society organizations enjoy a similar level of trust that varies between approximately 50% and 75% of the population, indicating that respondents either trust them completely or trust them somewhat. Sebha is the only locality where the share of population trusting these organizations is somewhat lower.

Media do not enjoy much trust compared to other entities. Foreign media are usually more trusted than Libyan ones, except in Kufra and Ghat, although the difference between national and foreign is small even there.

Lastly, healthcare and education institutions are trusted by more than half of the population in all localities, except in Sebha and Zuwara. This finding is consistent with earlier findings on the level of service provision, for which Sebha and Zuwara rank lowest among the seven municipalities researched.



Figure 11 : Trust in non-political institutions or bodies: To what extent do you trust the following institution or group? (percentage of respondents who trust somewhat or completely)

TOLERANCE

Tolerance is the willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests that are different from one's own. It is an important attitude for the development and sustenance of democratic governance, which is based on free and fair competition between movements that do not share the same vision of society. Intolerance is a key marker of violent extremists, who seek to impose their vision of the world on others. Thus, the level of tolerance is important for the success of both local governance and PVE.

Compared to the other localities, and looking at the aggregated value of several indicators, tolerance appears to be lowest in Bani Walid and Kufra, which is also where most of the respondents from the bottom 10 percentile are (respectively 3% and 2.2% (see Table 3 above). This means that not only on average inhabitants of Bani Walid and Kufra are less tolerant than inhabitants of other municipalities, among all respondents, these two cities also host the largest share of the most intolerant individuals among all respondents. In terms of religious tolerance, 56% of agree completely with the statement "the only acceptable religion is my religion", and another 26% somewhat agree. Women appear to be more intolerant toward other religions, with 65% who agree completely with this statement, compared to 48% of men. The most intolerant appears to be inhabitants of Bani Walid (89% agree somewhat or completely), whereas the most tolerant towards other religions are inhabitants of Zuwara (76%). Youth between 14 and 18 years and elders appear to be the least tolerant age groups.

The question on whether respondents agree with the right of religious minorities to practice their religion freely produced more tolerant results, with 74% who agree (75% among males, 73% among females). Not surprisingly, Zuwara inhabitants are on average more tolerant towards the right of minorities to practice their religion freely (90% agree), whereas inhabitants of Bani Walid are the most intolerant (43%).

When it comes to people of a different race, 16% of respondents would NOT wish to have them as neighbors, and disparities are great among municipalities: 26% in Bani Walid, which is consistently the most intolerant among the 7 municipalities, 25% in Kufra, where tensions between the Tubu (black Libyans) and the Zway (Arab tribe) are always latent, 18% in Murzuq, 16% in Misrata, 10% in Sebha and Ghat, and 6% in Zuwara. Results are similar, although slightly more tolerant towards people who speak a different language.

Intolerance is highest towards immigrants/foreign workers, that 37% of respondents would not wish to have as neighbors. This time, Zuwara has an almost equal level of intolerance towards this group to inhabitants of Bani Walid (44% and 46%, respectively). It should be noted that both cities are major hubs along the migration routes that cross Libya. Inhabitants of Ghat are most tolerant towards migrants (23%).

GENDER EQUALITY

In practice, support for gender equality translates in supporting equal access to education at all levels; supporting women's access to employment and for equality in wages; and supporting women's access to public life and to decision-making roles. [104] UN Women defines gender equality as: *"the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys"*. [105]

The empowerment of women and their active participation and engagement in social, economic, and political life are crucial for democratic governance, economic growth, conflict prevention, and PVE. Religious VE groups typically envision a conservative society, which is not based on gender equality.

Here too, Bani Walid and Kufra rank lowest in terms of support for gender equality, along with Murzuq (see Table 2 above). Murzuq and Bani Walid are also the municipalities that host the greatest share of individuals who are least supportive of gender equality (Table 3 above).

Overall, 45% of respondents agree with the statement: *"If the wife earns more money than her husband most likely this will create problems"*, with identical proportions among male and female respondents. Zuwara inhabitants are by far more supportive of women's economic empowerment, with only 18% of respondents who agree with this statement. They are followed by Ghat (40%), Misrata (43%, Sebha (45%), Murzuq (52%), Bani Walid (58%), and Kufra (61%).

Results are similar regarding the statement: "Housewife chores are just as fulfilling as a paid job", although less females agree (34%) than males (48%).

Findings on the presence of women-led organizations differ somewhat from findings on support for gender equality. Zuwara still ranks first, with 91% of respondents asserting that these organizations exist, but they are followed by inhabitants of Ghat (85%), Misrata (82%), Kufra (80%), Sebha (78%), and Murzuq (68%). Bani Walid is an outlier, with only 40% of respondents indicating that there are women-led organizations in their city.

[104] See "Sustainable Development Goals - Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls," United Nations. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/, and OECD. "Recommendation of the council on gender equality in education, employment, and entrepreneurship adopted on 29 May (2013) ".2013.

[105]UN Women website, accessed on Aug 2016 ,18. Available from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm

Another finding may indicate an interesting area for further investigation. Kufra has the highest share of respondents who indicate that women in their community hold positions as legal scholars (86%, compared to 66% among all localities). They are followed by inhabitants of Zuwara (83%), and of Murzuq (79%). All other localities yielded results between 41% and 43%. On average, 65% of respondents indicated that there are women civil society leaders. They seem to be most present in Ghat, Murzuq, Zuwara, Kufra, and Sebha, and least present in Bani Walid and Misrata.

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND OPENNESS

Although religion is often invoked among the reasons for joining a VE group in this area of the world,[106] empirical studies show that religious knowledge is negatively correlated with violent extremism. In other words, individuals who are more knowledgeable about religion appear to be less inclined to join VE groups. [107] As Mark Sedgwick notes, the problem is not with religion, but with radicalism.[108] Moreover, religion and religious institutions are important actors in the prevention of violent extremism.[109]

We asked respondents to rate their knowledge regarding the interpretation (tafsir) of the Holy Quran, using a scale from zero (no knowledge at all) to ten (extremely high knowledge). On average, respondents report being most knowledgeable in Kufra (8.0), Murzuq (7.2), and Bani Walid (6.9), whereas those who think they are least knowledgeable are inhabitants of Zuwara (5.2), and Sebha (6.2).

Another important aspect of the religious attitude of individuals is the degree of openness with which they approach religion. Religious openness captures an individual's inclination towards refusing or accommodating other views and practices within and outside one's own religion. On one end of the religious openness spectrum there is extremism, and on the other there is a tolerant and syncretic approach.[110]

Religious openness is a very difficult attitude to measure. We gauged it through a novel question that we designed collaboratively for this purpose: "Talking about religion, would you mind telling me which of the following most applies to you?" Responses are ranked along increasing levels of autonomy in the search for religious guidance. The rationale is that more religious autonomy and openness to multiple sources of religious guidance is conducive to greater tolerance towards different religious beliefs and practices, and more broadly towards different social behaviors

On a scale from 0 (least open = "I take my guidance from a specific religious sheikh") to 1 (most open = "I follow my own mind / reason"), inhabitants of Zuwara are on average the most open (0.70), closely followed by Ghat (0.69) and Sebha (0.69). Misrata (0.6) and Bani Walid (0.58) appear to be less open, while Murzuq (0.53) and Kufra (0.49) are the least open among all seven localities. These two last localities are also those hosting the largest share of respondents who are least open in their approach to religion (4% in Murzuq, and 3% in Kufra, see Table 3 above).

[106] "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and The Tipping Point for Recruitment" United Nation Development Program, (2017), p.45.
[107] Ibid. pp 49 ,5
[108] Sedgwick, Mark. "Al-Qaeda and the nature of religious terrorism." Terrorism and Policical Violence 16, no. :(2004) 4 814-795.
[109] Austin, Beatrix, and Hans-Joachim Giessmann, eds. Transformative Approaches to Violent Extremism. Berghof Foundation, 2018. vi
[110] Syncretism is an approach to religion that combines different belief systems and schools of thought into a new system. This approach is characterized by inclusiveness and tolerance.

3.4 DISCRIMINATION AND MARGINALIZATION

MARGINALIZATION

Marginalization is the structural and systemic deprivation of certain individuals of various rights, opportunities, and resources that are normally available to others. It can be entirely passive (also referred to as structural violence). A thorough review of the existing research on the drivers of VE stresses the role often played by discrimination and marginalization in the recruitment by VE groups: “socio-economic discrimination and marginalization do appear to partly explain why extremist groups are able to recruit support in large numbers.”

The National Number issue is very important and problematic in Libya, therefore it deserves a specific analysis that we provide at the end of this section. Looking at all indicators combined, the populations that seem to suffer from the highest level of marginalization are those in Sebha (0.57 on a from 0 (least desirable) to 1 (most desirable), compared to a median of 0.73 among all respondents), Murzuq (0.62), and to a lesser extent Bani Walid (0.70) (Table 2 above). However, if we focus on individuals, the largest share of those who appear to be most marginalized are in Sebha (3.7%), and Murzuq (2.2%) (Table 3 above).

Access to services is an important factor for the quality of life. We used an indicator on how long it takes children to go to school to gauge one aspect of structural violence that they may regularly endure. Based on the responses of those who have children (just over half of the respondents), it takes the longest for children to travel to their public primary school in Murzuq (21 minutes) and in Zuwara (20 minutes).

Although the difference is not very far from the overall average across municipalities (17 minutes), averages mask the reality of specific groups within a municipality. In fact, while there are only 1 or 2 respondents who indicate that it takes one hour or more for their children to travel to their public primary school in almost all localities, there are 11 in Murzuq, and 5 in Ghat.
Another element that can drive a sense of marginalization from public affairs is the lack of representation in state institutions, particularly among security forces. In Sebha, 44% of respondents believe that people from their community are not well represented in the security organizations. In Sebha and Bani Walid, this proportion is 32%, whereas it is 22% in Misrata, 1% in Kufra, 7% in Ghat, and 3% in Zuwara.

More broadly, we asked respondents to indicate how much they believe that they are able to have a real say on issues that are important to them in their neighborhood, which is an indication of how much they believe that they are included in local governance. In Bani Walid, 25% of respondents either disagree or strongly disagree – indicating a lower level of perceived inclusion, compared to 21% in Sebha, 19% in Misrata, 12% in Ghat and Kufra, 11% in Murzuq, and 6% in Zuwara. Overall, women tend to disagree with this statement a little more than men (17% compared to 14%), indicating a slightly more prevalent sentiment of exclusion from local governance.

[111] Harriet Allan et al. "Drivers of violent extremism: Hypotheses and literature review." Royal United Services Institute (2015), p.33-31.

Lastly, to capture a broader and impersonal sense of frustration and injustice, we asked respondents to rate the extent to which they believe that the world around them is just or unjust. In all communities but two, between 8% and 13% of respondents chose “totally unjust” or “very unjust”. Conversely, 62% of respondents in Sebha, and 21% in Bani Walid had this strong sense of injustice, which is several times higher than in any of the other six localities. In general, the sense of injustice is most acute among individuals between 25 and 34 years old, while it is equally strong among men and women.

DISCRIMINATION

While marginalization can be entirely passive, discrimination is the active and deliberate unjust treatment of a group. Both marginalization and discrimination are very powerful meso-level drivers of violent extremism, because they generate a collective grievance among members of a group towards those who exercise power, either in society or within the state. Discrimination is probably a more potent driver than marginalization, because individuals who may suffer the same level of hardship and injustice may not be able to identify an active culprit in the case of marginalization, whereas they know who is discriminating them. It is also much easier to mobilize and take action against a specific group or in response to actively imposed injustice and hardship, as opposed to taking issue with the “system” as a whole in response to hardship and deprivation that passively results from the long-standing state of affairs. Empirical evidence found that “[…] attitudes towards in-group defense (i.e., aggressive, retributive collective action) were a function of perceived relative deprivation of an individual’s in-group, compared to the out-group […]”[112]. More broadly, human rights violations and discrimination clearly correlate with violent extremism.[113]

In broad terms, our meta-indicator on community discrimination (Table 2) shows that this is a most salient issue in the 4 southern localities, which are those who rank lowest among the seven localities researched. The most serious level of community discrimination appears to be in Kufra (where the city average is 0.53 on a scale from 0 (least desirable) to 1 (most desirable), compared to a median of 0.75 among all respondents), followed by Murzuq (0.62), and Sebha (0.63) (Table 2 above). The overall value of the meta-indicator in Ghat (0.72) is not too different from the value in Bani Walid (0.74). Discrimination does not seem to be a widespread and serious issue among inhabitants of Zuwara (0.81) and Misrata (0.86). The analysis of the bottom 10 percentile (Table 3) confirms these findings, with Kufra, Sebha, and Murzuq hosting the largest share of respondents who rank the lowest on community discrimination (2.7 ,%4.8%, and 2.3%, respectively).

[112] Diana Van Bergen, et al. "Collective identity factors and the attitude toward violence in defense of ethnicity or religion among Muslim youth of Turkish and Moroccan Descent." International Journal of Intercultural Relations 47 100-89 :(2015). http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2015.03.026, cited in El Sayed Lilah; Barnes Jamal, “Contemporary P/CVE: Research and Practice”, Hedayah and Edith Cowan University (2017), p.28

[113] UN General Assembly, “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism - Report of the Secretary-General, A/”674/70 (2015); and Chuck Thiessen, “Preventing Violent Extremism While Promoting Human Rights: Toward a Clarified UN Approach”, International Peace Institute. (2019), p. 5

ANALYSIS OF VE DRIVERS IN 7 MUNICIPALITIES

One of the more specific indicators we used to measure discrimination is whether or not, in the last 12 months, respondents believe that they were treated worse by health care providers for any reason associated to their nature or condition. Overall, only a small share of respondents indicated a form of discrimination, but this is an indicator that should be assessed at the individual and small group level, rather than at the level of entire municipalities.

These were the findings per type of option provided:

Gender	**1%**
Age	**1%**
Lack of money	**10%, but 28% in Kufra, and 13% in Bani Walid**
Type of illness	**4.5%, but 14% in Kufra, 4% in Zuwara, and 3.5% in Misrata**
Tribal affiliation	**6%, but 16% in Kufra, and 8% in Sebha**
Color	**3%, but 7% in Kufra, and 4.5% in Murzuq and Sebha**
Ethnicity	**1.5%, but 3% in Sebha, and 2.5% in Ghat and Kufra**
Political opinions	**1%**
Religious opinions	**0.4%, but 1.5% in Kufra**

[112] Diana Van Bergen, et al. "Collective identity factors and the attitude toward violence in defense of ethnicity or religion among Muslim youth of Turkish and Moroccan Descent." International Journal of Intercultural Relations 47 100-89 :(2015). http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2015.03.026, cited in El Sayed Lilah; Barnes Jamal, “Contemporary P/CVE: Research and Practice”, Hedayah and Edith Cowan University (2017), p.28

[113] UN General Assembly, “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism - Report of the Secretary-General, A/”674/70 (2015); and Chuck Thiessen, “Preventing Violent Extremism While Promoting Human Rights: Toward a Clarified UN Approach”, International Peace Institute. (2019), p.

These categories are very diverse. Overall, money is linked to socio-economic conditions, and may simply result from an inability to pay for services, rather than indicating an active discrimination. However, the high share of respondents who chose this option in Kufra and Bani Walid may indicate a serious issue with public healthcare provision. Discrimination based on the type of illness may be linked to active discrimination towards individuals affected by HIV/AIDS for instance, but it may also simply be the result of a lack of specialized healthcare capacity in a specific locality, notably in Kufra.

Tribal affiliation appears to be a fairly prevalent driver of discrimination across all localities, although it is far more acute in Kufra (16%), and Sebha (8%). Skin color does not seem a prevalent source of discrimination, although this could only be assessed by asking this question to a solid sample of people of color. At any rate, incidentally, it seems to be a greater source of discrimination in Kufra, Murzuq, and Sebha, where there are more black Libyans than in other localities, such as Misrata, Zuwara, and Bani Walid. Ethnicity does not seem to be a main driver of discrimination in receiving healthcare assistance. However, here too, the southern localities of Sebha, Ghat, and Kufra have the largest share of respondents who choose this option.

Discrimination based on age, gender, political opinion, and religion do not seem to affect more than a handful of respondents across all localities, except for the latter. In Kufra, 5 respondents felt that they were treated worse by health care providers due to their religious opinion, whereas no more than 2 respondents reported this type of discrimination anywhere else.

In a follow-up question, we asked if respondents had experienced discrimination due to their skin color, ethnic or tribal origin, religious opinion, city of origin, economic status, or gender within the last 12 months. Although none of the respondents replied affirmatively, when asked how often discrimination occurred over the last 12 months, 3% indicated daily/all the time, 5% once or twice a week, and 8% once or twice a month.

Following this question, we asked respondents to indicate the main reasons for this discrimination, allowing for multiple choices.

Ethnic or tribal origin was indicated by 26% of respondents, although only 65% of all respondents actually answered this question. The localities where the share of respondents indicated that they had experienced discrimination due to their ethnic or tribal origin are Murzuq (40%), Ghat (31%, although only 125 interviewees provided an answer, compared to more than 300 in other localities), Sebha (28%), Kufra (27%), and Zuwara (23%, although only 124 interviewees provided an answer).

Skin color was chosen by 18% of respondents. Among those who answered, skin color was chosen by 26% of respondents in Kufra and Murzuq, by 22% in Ghat, and by 18% in Sebha. In all other localities, the share was below 5%.

The city of origin was cited as a reason for discrimination by 10% of those who responded, 16% in Sebha, 14% in Ghat, 13% in Misrata, and 12% in Murzuq.

Only 9% felt discriminated for their economic status, mostly in Kufra, Sebha, Bani Walid, and Ghat. Gender-based discrimination was reported only by 4% of respondents, 17% in Zuwara, 8% in Misrata, and 4% in Sebha. This finding deserves more in-depth analysis and explanation, because individuals who report gender-based discrimination are typically those who believe in gender equality, and who may feel empowered to denounce gender-based discrimination. Therefore, findings can often be counter intuitive. Lastly, religious opinion affected less than 3% of respondents, mostly located in Kufra, Misrata, Bani Walid, and Sebha.

Discrimination is particularly visible and damaging in the provision of justice. Respondents were asked to indicate the reason of their choice if they had been the victim of an aggression and they did not go to state authorities. Overall, 15% of respondents across all municipalities indicated that authorities would not be impartial, but this problem is most acute in Sebha, where 24% of respondents chose this option.

In addition, 6% of all respondents indicated that they feared that they would not be treated correctly if they went to authorities to report an aggression. Again, this issue was most salient in Kufra (10%), Bani Walid (9%), and Sebha (9%). This last finding deserves a closer investigation, because it indicates that some individuals in certain localities do not believe that authorities in charge of ensuring justice would treat them correctly. In other words, justice authorities would not be just. Disaggregating the data by ethnicity and socio-economic level (income), we find that while income does not play a role, ethnic group is strongly correlated to respondents fearing they would not receive just treatment.

In Murzuq, 18% of Ahali respondents indicated that authorities would not treat them correctly, compared to only 3% among non-Ahali. It must be noted that among the 318 respondents to this question in Murzuq, only 11 were Ahali. Ahali are a local minority group that was displaced from the main city neighborhoods in 2019, following clashes with the Tebu population. Currently, this displaced population lives either in small outer inhabited areas that belong to the municipality of Murzuq (which extends over several dozens of kilometers) or in neighboring cities. This finding must serve as a clear warning about the extent of discontent of this population, and the difficult relation it has with local state authorities.
In Bani Walid, this difference is even more stark between non-Arab respondents, 60% of whom chose this option compared to only 8% among Arabs.

In Kufra, the population is broadly divided between Arabs (notably from the Zway tribe) who are the majority, and Tebu (a black Libyan minority). 24% of Tebu respondents (24 respondents) indicated that the reason why they would not go to state authorities if they were victims of an aggression is that they believe that authorities would not treat them correctly, compared to 10% among non-Tebu respondents (314 respondents). Some Tebu also live in Sebha, where they also appear to fear more often that authorities would not treat them correctly if they reported an aggression. Half of the 16 Tebu who answered this question fear that they would not be treated correctly, compared to only 6% among non-Tebu respondents. [114]
In a last question on discrimination, we asked respondents: “Would you say that your community is oppressed in this city?” Out of the 76% of the total number of respondents who provided an answer to this question, 50% said yes. The localities in which the largest share of respondents felt that their community was discriminated were Sebha (71%, Murzuq (65%), Kufra (53%), while all others had less than 40% of respondents responding affirmatively.

[114] All these statistics have a minimum level of significance of 5%.

NATIONAL ID CARD

The National ID card, or National Number as it is called in Libya, is necessary to access employment, travel, and benefit from free services such as education and medical care. In short, possessing a National Number is a prerequisite to having citizenship rights, and more broadly, to being recognized as a Libyan. Thousands of Libyans are denied a National Number, particularly in Southern Libya. To complicate matters, obtaining a National Number is particularly difficult in Libya. The 1954 citizenship law requires individuals to demonstrate that their parents or grandparents were born in Libya, which is particularly difficult for semi-nomadic populations, such as the Tubu and Touareg, and in a country where administrative archives are largely unavailable.

The problem of denied citizenship is most acute among Tubu. In the 1980s,[115] Gadhafi had promised thousands of Tubu citizenship during the occupation of the Aouzou strip and the subsequent conflict with Chad, but subsequently he revoked their citizenship (Decision No. 1998 ,13). Similarly, Libyan officials made citizenship promises to Tubu individuals during the 2011 revolution, but these were not fulfilled after Gadhafi's death.[116] Other non-Arab minorities, such as Touareg, Ahali, and Libyans from the town of Tawergha also suffer from the denial of national ID cards. Some estimates claim that more than 10,000 Libyan Touareg do not possess a National Number. [117]

In addition to the lack of ID card, most of the Libyans who struggle with these issues are subgroups of Tubu and Touareg who came to Libya from Mali, Niger, and Chad in the last 50 years, and settled in makeshift houses in the suburbs of some Southern cities, such as Sebha and Obari. Over time, these became second-class neighborhoods, where inhabitants suffer from lower levels of services and higher levels of criminality. These are privileged recruitment areas for VE groups. In Obari, these neighborhoods are Tilakken, El Campo, Ashareb, and Baladiya, almost entirely populated of "Tamacheq" Touareg (i.e. those who speak Tamacheq, the language spoken by Touareg in Mali, whereas Libyan Touareg speak Amazigh). Similarly, in Sebha, Touareg and Tebu returnees from Mali and Niger live in the Tayouri neighborhood that evolved from a camp that formed in the early 1980s, and in a nearby area called Indian Company (Alsharekah Alhindeya).

Grievances from these particular groups have been further exacerbated in the last few years by the portrayal of specific non-Arab minorities – particularly the Tubu – as non-Libyan, slaves, mercenaries, immigrants, and colonizers, as noticeable on social media during the 2018[116] conflict between the Arab tribe Awlad Suleiman, and the Tubu in Sebha. Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces also fueled this narrative, calling for "foreign mercenaries" and Africans writ large to "immediately leave Libyan territory and return to their countries".[118]

[115] Tubiana, Jérôme; Gramizzi, Claudio, Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad–Sudan–Libya Triangle, the Small Arms Survey, June 2017

[116] Wehrey, Frederic, Insecurity and Governance Challenges in Southern Libya, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2017

[117] "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Tuareg". Minority Rights Group International. https://minorityrights.org/minorities/tuareg-3/

[118] Middle East Monitor, Haftar gives African mercenaries 9 days to leave southern Libya, 9 March 2018. Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180309-haftar-gives-african-mercenaries-9-days-to-leave-southern-libya/

The denial of citizenship rights and the resulting exclusion from governance and denial of access to basic services is acutely suffered as an injustice by those without a National Number. mentioned earlier in this report, discrimination, marginalization, and disenfranchisement are potent VE drivers.

Among 2,360 interviewees across our 7 research localities who answered the question: "Do you currently have a valid passport or ID card?" 23% responded negatively, particularly among youth below 30 years old. The results also vary greatly across localities: Respondents who do not possess a valid ID card are 54% in Murzuq, 34% in Ghat, 24% in Sebha, and 19% in Kufra – all southern localities, where ethnic minorities live. This is dramatically different from northern localities, particularly from Zuwara, where only 1% or respondents do not have a valid national ID card or passport.

To be clear, the lack of a currently valid passport or ID card does not necessarily imply that respondents were all denied citizenship, but it does not change the core of the problem. More certainly, it indicates that local registry services, which are responsible for issuing national IDs as well as family booklets, marriage and divorce documents, and birth and death certificates are less efficient and accessible in the south compared to the rest of Libya.

The number of attacks on the Civil Registry Authority's headquarters in Tripoli and to its local offices all across the country attest to how sensitive the issue of national IDs is in Libya. Most worrisome to this complex issue is the number of staff members from the civil registry who have been assaulted and kidnapped [119] by armed groups who seek to obtain Libyan ID numbers and passports. [120] These passports can allow foreign fighters to travel abroad and enjoy the benefits of a national citizen.

3.5 SOCIAL COHESION, ANGER, EMPOWERMENT, AND ENGAGEMENT

SOCIAL COHESION

Social cohesion is the level of solidarity among members of a social group, and their level of connectedness. Social cohesion directly influences the sense of belonging of individuals and their definition of identity. A high level of social cohesion is a strong antidote to conflict and atomization. Communities where social cohesion is low are more vulnerable to VE narratives and groups that provide a sense of identity and in-group solidarity despite their extreme ideology and methods.

[119] "Civil Registry Authority head released", Libya Herald, 15 April 2017. https://www.libyaherald.com/15/04/2017/civil-registry-authority-head-released/, and Sami Zaptia, "Civil Registry Authority to strike in protest at kidnap of employees", Libya Herald, 23 September 2016, https://www.libyaherald.com/23/09/2016/civil-registry-authority-to-strike-in-protest-at-kidnap-of-employees/
[220] Sami Zaptia, "Militias and Ansar Sharia attempt to control Libyan Civil Registry to create fake passports: UN report", Libya Herald, 10 June 2017. https://www.libyaherald.com/11/06/2017/militias-and-ansar-sharia-attempt-to-control-libyan-civil-registry-to-create-fake-passports-un-report/

The meta-indicator on social cohesion (Table 2 above) clearly indicates that Sebha has a much lower level of social cohesion than all other localities researched. This is not surprising considering the different ethnic and tribal make-up of Sebha's population, and its profound divisions and history of conflict. More surprisingly, Zuwara appears to have a slightly lower level of social cohesion compared to the other cities. Sebha and Zuwara are also the localities where most of those who rank in the bottom 10 percentile for this meta-indicator reside.

Looking at specific questions, 94% of respondents agree with the statement: "People in my neighborhood are willing to help their neighbors". The cities with the lowest rates of agreement are Ghat (87%) and Sebha (88%). The following question broadens the social circle by asking how much respondents agree with the statement: "My neighborhood is a place where people from different tribal, religious, ethnic, or national backgrounds get along well". This question is closer to a measure of tolerance, and to whether respondents think that their neighborhood is capable of accepting diversity. Murzuq ranked the lowest, with 55% of respondents who agree, followed by Misrata (61%), Zuwara (71%), and Bani Walid (74%).

The last question we used to gauge social cohesion is asking how much pride respondents take in the way of life and culture of their city. Women show less pride than men. Inhabitants of Ghat appear to be most proud of the way of life and culture of their city, with 54% of respondents agreeing to a great extent.

LIFE SATISFACTION VERSUS ANGER

LIFE SATISFACTION

In 2014, taken as a whole, the average level of life satisfaction among Libyans was markedly higher than in all other North African countries, as measured by the World Values Survey (see Table 9 below). However, after two civil wars (16-2015, and 20-2019), multiple localized conflicts, and protracted hardship, it is easy to predict that the level of overall satisfaction of Libyans is currently much lower than in 2014, and probably lower than neighboring countries. Unfortunately, the2020 WVS survey did not include Libya.

	Algeria	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Regional Average
Surveyed population (N)	1.166	2.117	1.173	1.198	1.523	--
Satisfaction with life* (mean)	6.3	7.3	5.9	5.6	4.9	**6.1**
Standard Deviation**	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.8	**2.7**

- **Question**: "Taking everything into consideration, what is the degree of your overall life satisfaction nowadays? By using this card in which the number 1means that you are "totally unsatisfied" and the number 10means that you are "totally satisfied", where do you rate the degree of your overall life satisfaction?"
- The standard deviation is a measure of the amount of variation of a set of values. In other words, it indicates how spread out and diverse are individual responses

Table 9 : Level of overall satisfaction across North Africa (WVS wave 6, 2014)

Looking at our 2021 research data, men are on average less satisfied than women (6.4 compared to 6.8), and on average, people living in Sebha and Kufra are noticeably less satisfied than those living in the other 5 research localities (5.8 and 6.1 respectively, compared to 6.6 average across all seven municipalities).

Despite the high level of hardship that most Libyans endured since 2011, their average level of satisfaction with life is positive (6.5 on a scale from 0 (worst possible life) to 10 (best possible life)). Since the question asked in our survey is different from the one asked by the World Values Survey (WVS) across Libya in 2014, it is impossible to compare these measures. However, it is possible to compare the relative responses among Libyan localities then and now, and consider the changes as potential indications on the relative outlook on life of local inhabitants.

Ghat and Murzuq show a markedly positive increase compared to other localities (see Table 10 below). As a preliminary remark, these two exceptions may be linked to their remote location and their proximity to Libya's southern borders, which have become much more permeable since 2011, allowing cross-border trade to flourish. However, this change in the outlook on life of local inhabitants of Ghat and Murzuq deserves a closer analysis that is beyond the scope of this research.

The three localities where the level of satisfaction appears to have degraded the most are Kufra, Sebha, and Zuwara. However, the WVS data for Zuwara includes responses from inhabitants of other more populous towns near Zuwara, such as Sebrata, Agilat, and Jmail. Overall, the Zuwara province counts around 360,000 inhabitants. Hence, it is not possible to consider the value as reflective of the outlook of inhabitants in Zuwara. Sebha and Kufra inhabitants seem to be much less satisfied with life in comparison to inhabitants of other localities, both in the absolute value of their answers, and in terms of the trend that emerges from the comparison with a similar question in 2014.

	Kufra	Bani Walid[1]	Ghat	Misrata*	Murzuq	Sebha	Zuwara	Average / Total
(N) WVS 2014**	11	194	5	194	26	48	110	**2131**
Mean, WVS 2014	6.8	7.4	6.7	7.4	3.9	6.7	7.6	**7.3**
(N) UNDP 2021***	339	340	332	340	338	340	332	**2361**
Mean, UNDP 2021	6.1	7.0	6.9	7.0	6.4	5.8	6.7	**6.6**

- The WVS stratified the survey by province ("Shabiya"). There are 22 in Libya. Bani Walid and Misrata fall under the same province, hence, the values are the same. The WVS was carried out all across Libya. Hence, the average is for all Libya ** Question: "Taking everything into consideration, what is the degree of your overall life satisfaction nowadays? By using this card in which the number 1 means that you are "totally unsatisfied" and the number 10 means that you are "totally satisfied", where do you rate the degreE of your overall life satisfaction?"
- **Question:** "How do you feel about your life now, on a scale from 0 (worst possible life) to 10 (best possible life)?"

Table 10 : Level of satisfaction with life in each locality (WVS Wave 6, 2014)*

ANGER

Anger is a strong sense of irritation and hostility that can be generalized or directed at a specific target. In both instances, anger provides a fertile ground for the escalation of violence and conflict. Respondents were asked the extent to which they were angry / disgruntled / disaffectionate with the following institutions and groups:

- **This community as a whole**
- **The leaders and most powerful figures of this community**
- **Regional or central government**
- **A rival community or tribe within Libya**
- **A rival community or tribe across the border**
- **The military**
- **The whole "system"**
- **The United States of America**
- **The European Union**
- **International organizations**
- **The police**

The response was on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The response that ranked with the highest level of anger (3.7) is the “system” as a whole, which may indicate that respondents feel an overall sense of frustration with current circumstances but are unable to identify a single cause for it.

The second highest level of anger is elicited by the regional or central government, and by the leaders and most powerful figures of their community. This is a worrisome sign that should give way to a deeper inquiry on state-society relations, and on how authority is exercised at both the central and the local level.

Figure 12 below presents the results for each locality. The size of the grey inner polygon provides a visual indication of the overall anger, all options considered. Inhabitants of Sebha are clearly the angriest/most disgruntled of all, followed by inhabitants of Bani Walid, Ghat, and Misrata. Inhabitants of Kufra seem to be the least angry or disgruntled.
The leaders and most powerful figures in the community and central government are most disliked in Sebha and Bani Walid, which are also those who are the most disaffectionate with their community as a whole.

Anger also seems to be directed at a rival community or tribe within Libya in Sebha and Murzuq, and to a lesser extent in Kufra, which is understandable in light of the years of tensions that have put different local ethnic and tribal communities in conflict. Inhabitants in Sebha also seem to harbor disaffection towards groups from across the border, which is probably referring to Tebu from Chad. In fact, since 2011, the south-west of Libya has been used as a rear base for rebel groups from Chad who have often destabilized the region.
Police and military only elicit anger in Sebha, whereas the US and the EU (to a slightly lower extent) are almost equally disliked in all localities but Kufra and Zuwara. Lastly, international organizations seem to elicit anger or disaffection only in Sebha, Misrata, Bani Walid, and Ghat.

*Figure 12 : Level of anger and disaffection towards groups and institutions**



** Question: "Please tell me, are you particularly angry / disgruntled / disaffectionate with any of the following…"*

Another, more specific question was asked to gauge the extent to which respondents may harbor anger or dislike towards foreign countries. When asked the extent to which the attacks against the foreign embassies in Libya had been justified, 76% of respondents indicated that they were absolutely not justified. A little less than 2% thought that they were absolutely justified, particularly among inhabitants of Sebha (3.1% compared to an average of 1.6% among all localities). Similarly, while an average of 12% thought that they were "probably justified", 25% thought so in Sebha, and 15% in Murzuq. Overall, the level of support for these attacks is markedly higher among inhabitants of southern localities, which may indicate a greater general dislike and anger towards foreign countries in southern Libya. This may be explained by a stronger impression of damaging foreign interference in southern Libya.

EMPOWERMENT

Empowerment derives from an individual's belief that they can make autonomous decisions and have control over their personal life. The belief that individuals are able to control themselves and their surrounding environment is an important driver of civic engagement, social organization, and change. Therefore, communities of individuals that are more empowered are more likely to contribute to the quality of local governance.

We asked respondents if they thought that a person alone can have an impact on society and provided only yes and no options. On average, answers were perfectly balanced between yes and no, with men feeling slightly more often empowered than women (54% compared to 46%). However, results vary greatly among cities. Inhabitants of Zuwara felt most disempowered (73%), which is surprising in light of the high level of stability, economic well-being, and security that they enjoy compared to other Libyan cities. However, this finding may be explained by the change in attitudes and behaviors that accompany the shift from survival to self-expression values that has been described and empirically supported by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel.[121] In short, when individuals no longer need to focus primarily on ensuring their economic and physical security, they increasingly turn their focus toward "self-expression" values, such as demanding a greater participation in decision-making in economic and political life, as well as environmental protection and protecting rights and freedoms.

Conversely, although inhabitants of Kufra endure the highest level of hardship among all 7 localities, the lowest socio-economic level, and among the lowest levels of security, 66% of respondents think that a person alone can have an impact on society, compared to an average of 50% among all localities. Lastly, the most empowered age group is 18-14 years

PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT

Participation and engagement are expressed through a series of peaceful behaviors, such as voting; showing interest in politics; signing petitions and conducting demonstrations. Individual agency can be expressed and channeled through these actions in order to influence collective political outcomes. Participation and engagement are key for the good functioning of democratic governance, and they are the key drivers of a vibrant civil society. In turn, civil society is crucial in countering extremism.

While political participation can be limited to an interest in politics, consumption of information about governance and politics, and discussion, political engagement refers to voluntary behaviors that aim at affecting the nature and actions of government.

[121] Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge university press (2005).

Political engagement is an important alternative to violent confrontation and apathy. Thus, levels of participation and engagement are good indicators of the health of participatory governance. For the purpose of our research, we measured them by asking whether respondents ever tried to contact an administration official, whether or not they had participated in any public demonstration, march or sit-in in the last 6 months, and if they always, usually, or never vote in local, and in national elections.

In general, participation and engagement appear to be the lowest in Bani Walid and Sebha (Table 2 above). More specifically, while 31% of respondents across all 7 municipalities have tried contacting an administration official (e.g. phone call, written petition, email), only 21% did so in Bani Walid, and 25% in Misrata. Although these numbers substantially different from other localities, it may indicate a problematic relation between local inhabitants and local state administration. Women are much less likely to contact an administration official (21%) than men (41%). This is problematic for gender equality, which is expressed through political participation, in addition to education and employment. [122]

Respondents were also asked if they had participated in any public demonstration, public march, or sit-in in the last 6 months. Overall, 21% responded affirmatively, and mostly because they believed in the objective of the public demonstration (11%), rather than because they wanted to express their anger, independently from the objective of the public demonstration (5%), or because some friends were involved in it (5%). Here too, women appear to be much less engaged, with only 13% who had participated in any public demonstration, march or sit-in in the last 6 months, compared to 29% among men. Youth between 19 and 29 years old appear to be more active in these forms of engagement (27%). Public demonstration, march or sit-in are least popular in Zuwara (8%), Misrata (11%), Sebha (15%), and Bani Walid (19%), whereas they are much more popular in Kufra (47%).

Political participation and engagement are also expressed through voting in national and local elections. Local elections appear to mobilize more people (23% always vote, and another 36% vote ”usually”) than national elections (19% always and 25% usually).
Looking at each municipality individually, inhabitants of Kufra and Ghat appear to be the most assiduous voters in both national and local elections, followed by Murzuq and Zuwara, although the latter is only terms of local elections (Figures 13 and 14). Those who vote the least often are inhabitants of Bani Walid and Sebha.



Figure 13: Vote in local elections

[122] Kabeer, Naila. 2005. Gender equality and women's empowerment: A critical analysis of the third millennium development goal. Gender & Development 13, no. 24-13 :1.



Observations:
AlKufrah = 287
Bani Walid = 280
Ghat = 284
Misrata = 294
Murzuq = 289
Sebha = 264
Zuwara = 289

Figure 14: Vote in national elections

3.6 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HARDSHIP

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITION

The socio-economic condition is an individual's position in society, and her/his capacity to address her/his needs. It is measured through an individual's level of education, income, and occupation. The lack of socioeconomic opportunities makes individuals vulnerable and can push them to migrate or join the illicit economy, or even join or support violent extremism. However, it is important to note that PVE research has increasingly highlighted that there is often an undue emphasis on socioeconomic condition as a driver of VE.[123]

What seems to play a more decisive role is inequality, which is the breadth and depth of differences in the socioeconomic condition of individuals and groups.[124] Our meta-indicator for socioeconomic condition includes the number of years of education, the average household income per month, and the self-reported condition compared to that of the majority in a community. In general, the socioeconomic level is markedly lower among inhabitants of southern localities, except in Ghat, where it is similar to northern localities (Table 2: Overall meta-indicators per locality). Inhabitants of Kufra and Murzuq seem to have the lowest socioeconomic level among the 7 localities. While this is a good indication of the prevailing socioeconomic conditions of the entire population of a city, it does indicate the socioeconomic distribution among local inhabitants

[123] Zeiger, Sara, and Anne Aly. "Expanding Research on Countering Violent Extremism." Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 20 :(2013) 4, and Blair, G., Fair, C., Malhotra, N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2013). Poverty and support for militant politics: Evidence from Pakistan. American Journal of Political Science, 48-30 ,(1) 57

[124] Allan, Harriet, Andrew Glazzard, Sasha Tumu Jesperson, and Emily Sneha Reddy Winterbotham. "Drivers of violent extremism: Hypotheses and literature review." (2015), 43

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	Male	Female	Overall	N
Kufra	11	10	10	277
Bani Walid	16	16	16	138
Ghat	13	n/a	14	2
Misrata	15	15	15	155
Murzuq	14	14	14	293
Sebha	16	14	15	263
Zuwara	16	15	16	62

Table 11 : Average number of years of full time education

CHILDHOOD

As explained in the conceptual framing section, an unhappy childhood and the absence of a father or an unstable home can be potent VE drivers. Overall, the average rating of the level of happiness in childhood is fairly high across all localities. Those who rank lowest are Murzuq and Kufra, which are both remote locations in the south. However, for individual-level drivers such as this one, what matters is not the average level of happiness, but the prevalence of outliers, that is the number of individuals who rate their childhood as being much less happy in comparison to everyone else.

Interviewees were asked the following question: "Thinking back, how happy was your childhood on a scale from 0 (worst possible life) to 10 (best possible life)?" Although the average answer is 39 ,6.6 individuals out of 2,329 chose 0, which means that they consider their childhood as being the worst possible. These answers are far from being equally distributes among Libyan localities. There were 25 such answers in Kufra (7.4% of respondents), a much larger number than in any other locality (next being 5 in Sebha, and 4 in Bani Walid). Even looking at the percentage of respondents who answered below 5, thereby indicating an unhappy childhood, there are 14% in Sebha, and 10% in Kufra and Ghat, noticeably higher than in all other municipalities.

Individuals who have an absolute negative outlook on their childhood deserve a closer look, by analyzing the extent to which their answers to other key questions are also markedly negative. In fact, individuals who rated their childhood as the worst possible, also indicate a much lower presence of their father during their childhood (6.2 on a scale from 0 to 10, compared to an average of 8.1 for the rest of respondents). These individuals also have a much more negative outlook on life (4.2 compared to 6.6 for the other respondents, on a scale ranging from 0: worst possible life, to 10: best possible life). These correlations stress both the importance of a happy childhood, and the presence of the father on the outlook on life.

In addition, these individuals also report higher levels of hardship across all four types (i.e. food, shelter, money, and water). All these correlations (except hardship related to access to water) have a level of confidence greater than 99%, which indicates a very high degree of reliability of these findings.

MARRIAGE

As in most societies, in Libya marriage is an important achievement, and one that can usher relatively more freedom and authority to both men and women. In traditional societies such as Libya's, marriage imposes a high economic threshold for men. Aspiring bridegrooms must have a home where the couple will live after the marriage, and enough money to give a dowry to the future wife in the event that she should become widowed or in case of divorce.

The inability to marry can be exploited by VE recruiters who can offer easy money and/or the opportunity to marry women who support the VE ideology, as largely observed through the "jihadi brides" phenomenon in Syria.[125]

The difficult economic conditions in Libya affect all Libyans, but when it comes to their impact on marriage, they weigh more on men. In the midst of prolonged economic hardship faced by Libyans, many men struggle to meet the economic threshold that marriage imposes. This emerges through our general population survey in which we asked "Can you tell me if any of the following applies to you?" The option "My partner and/or I do not have the money to get married" was chosen by 16% of male respondents who are unmarried, whereas it was chosen by only 7% of unmarried female respondents. Conversely, 23% of female respondents indicate that there are no qualified partners available, compared to 16% among men.
Geographically, money is most cited as a reason preventing marriage in Ghat (19.5%), Kufra (17%), and Bani Walid (16%). Kufra also presents an unusually high percentage of respondents who indicate that their family and/or their partner's family do not agree with their choice of partner (15%, compared to an average below 5% among all other localities). This latter issue may be tied to the very high communal divisions in Kufra.

EMPLOYMENT

While unemployment alone, just like poverty, cannot be considered a driving factor of violent extremism, it is certainly a source of vulnerability. Individuals who have reliable employment are more difficult to recruit. Although it is not conclusive, some empirical studies found evidence that VE groups recruit more easily among unemployed and underemployed individuals. [126]

[125] Nabeelah Jaffer, The secret world of Isis brides: 'U dnt hav 2 pay 4 ANYTHING if u r wife of a martyr', The Guardian, 24 Jun 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/isis-brides-secret-world-jihad-western-women-syria; Montgomery, Katarina. "ISIS Recruits Brides to Solve Middle East 'Marriage Crisis'." Syria Deeply. May 2015 ,8; and William Watkinson, Hundreds of Isis jihadi brides sent for combat training in Libya after promotion from 'wifely' duties, International Business Times, April 2016 ,19, https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hundreds-isis-jihadi-brides-sent-combat-training-libya-after-promotion-wifely-duties-1555691

[126] Harriet Allan et al. "Drivers of violent extremism: Hypotheses and literature review." Royal United Services Institute (2015), p.45.

HARDSHIP

Hardship is a condition of suffering and privation; it is the extent to which everyday life is hard. Hardship can be linked to poverty, which can be visible through the lack of money and/or the lack of shelter.

However, there are other factors that can make life difficult, even for those who have a good socio-economic level, such as the widespread lack of public water distribution, or the lack of main food staples. This is an important factor to consider because it creates the grounds of despair and difficulty on which VE groups can build their presence and appeal, by providing aid, sources of livelihood, and a narrative that links hardship to the failure of state, society, and "the system" more broadly.

Overall, assessing four sources of hardship together (i.e. food, water for domestic use, money, and shelter), women report facing a higher level of hardship than men (0.81 compared to 0.73 on a scale from 0: never, to 3: often). Sadly, the age category that reports the highest level of hardship are those aged 70 years and older (1.06 compared to an average of 0.73).

There are major differences in the level of hardship faced by inhabitants of our seven research localities, as visually depicted by the shaded areas in Figure 15.



Figure 15 : Self-reported level of hardship

	Kufra	Bani Walid	Ghat	Misrata	Murzuq	Sebha	Zuwara	Average
Aggregated hardship	1.4	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.8	1.1	0.4	**0.8**
Not enough food to eat	1.2	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.7	0.1	**0.5**
No more money	1.8	1.1	1.4	0.6	1.4	1.8	0.9	**1.3**
No place to live	0.8	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	**0.3**
Not enough clean water for home use	1.6	0.8	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.3	0.7	**1.0**

***Scale ranges from 0**: never experienced this hardship, to 3: often experienced this hardship.

Table 12 : Self-reported level of hardship

3.7 FIREARMS, ARMED GROUPS AND VIOLENCE

FIREARMS

The availability of firearms is not a direct driver of violent extremism; however, it is certainly an enabler. Widely accessible weapons make it easier for VE individuals and groups to translate their violent intent into action, and it greatly increases their ability to do harm. Firearms trade is widespread in Libya, and from Libya to the region. Southern Libyan respondents to the in-depth survey (sample size 56) believe that traders deliver firearms mainly to Chad, Niger, and Sudan. Among these, Chad appears the country where Libyan traders channel the most firearms, especially according Sebha and Kufra respondents. It is worth noting that Libya has traditionally hosted armed opposition groups from Chad and Sudan, particularly since 2011 (Tubiana and Gramizzi, 2018).



Figure 16: Need for firearms: "Some people think that having firearms in this area is a necessity, others disagree. How about you?"

Similarly, the prevalence of civilians openly carrying firearms varies greatly among the 7 municipalities. Here too, Sebha and Zuwara are the two outliers. Civilians who do not belong to the state security forces are most often seen openly carry firearms in Sebha, much more than in any other locality. It is least common in Zuwara (Figure 17).



Question: "How often do you see civilians, that is people who do not belong to the state security forces (police or military) openly carrying a firearm in this area?"

Figure 17: Frequency of civilians carrying firearms*

Respondents were also asked if they carry a firearm at work. Overall, 92% of respondents said no (93% among women). Among those who carry a firearm at work, less than 3% indicated that they always do so. As for other security and firearms related questions, Sebha and Kufra respondents are distinct from all other localities. In Sebha, 9% of respondents always carry a firearm at work, and another 5% does sometimes, while in Kufra these shares are 3% and 14%, respectively.

Based on when they reported that a firearm was last used by a civilian to protect against another individual or group, we can infer the frequency of firearm use. Responses clearly indicate that firearms are more frequently used by civilians in Sebha, and to a lesser extent in Bani Walid and Kufra. Zuwara and Ghat seem to experience a much less frequent use of firearms compared to all other localities (Figure 18).



* Question: “When was the last time you are aware that a civilian in this community had to use a firearm to protect against another individual or group?”

Figure 18 : Frequency of use of firearms*

In terms of origin, most respondents in Misrata, Sebha, and Bani Walid believe that weapons come from Turkey, Russia, and the UAE, Whereas in Murzuq, and Ghat, these countries are cited less than Libya itself. Besides these four countries, which consistently rank highest, respondents believe tht firearms also come from Egypt and Sudan (Figure 19).



***Question: "As far as you know, from which countries are firearms coming from to this area?"**

Figure 19: Origin of firearms*

ARMED GROUPS AND MAIN THREATS

More than one third of respondents (39%) indicated that armed groups in their area threaten their community with force. It is worth noting that 21% of respondents in Zuwara and 16% in Kufra and Ghat did not respond to this question. The issue is most noted by men (42% compared to 37% among women), and by individuals between 25 and 30 years old.

Sebha is clearly the community most threatened by armed groups, with 86% of respondents answering positively. This is a very strong indication that armed groups threaten the safety and security of Sebha inhabitants, which is also confirmed by earlier findings on safety and security. While 23% of respondents declined to answer the question on which group poses the greatest threat to their community, 19% of those who did indicate armed robbers/bandits (particularly among male respondents), 15% chose drug traffickers (particularly among male respondents), another 15% chose terrorist groups, 12% indicated armed groups from other cities (particularly among female respondents), 11% pointed to human traffickers, 10% indicated armed groups from their city, 7% cross-border smugglers, 6% kidnapping groups, and 4% mercenaries.

However, these threats vary greatly from a city to another. Inhabitants of Zuwara (31%), Murzuq (31%), and Misrata (23%) believe that armed groups from other cities pose the greatest threat to their community. Sebha is the only city in which the relative majority of respondents (31%) believe that the greatest threat is posed by armed groups from their city. Armed robberies are clearly not a problem in Zuwara (0% of respondents). Drug traffickers instead are perceived as the main threat by a large number of residents in Misrata (23%) and Bani Walid (21%). Kidnappers seem to be a problem mostly in Kufra (13%) and in Sebha (11%).

Mercenaries appear to be perceived as the main threat by 9% of inhabitants of Bani Walid, while in all other localities, they are chosen by only 5% or less. Lastly, terrorist groups are considered as the main threat by 22% of respondents in both Bani Walid and Ghat, by 16% of respondents in Misrata, and by 13% of respondents in Kufra.

Lastly, many more respondents among youth between 14 and 18 years old (20%) believe that drug traffickers are the group posing the greatest threat to their community, compared to older age groups (except those older than 60 years who have equally high percentages). This may indicate that the issue of drugs is particularly salient among youth, which is an important element to consider in the design of youth focused PVE strategies.

A more specific question on the role of local non-state armed groups was posed to the non-random sample of 98 respondents. Only one or two per locality answered, except in Sebha, where all respondents but one answered, and in Murzuq, where 5 answered, totaling 23. Most of them (15) agreed with the hypothesis that local non-state armed groups economically exploit the community by asking illegal taxes, through kidnappings or by extorting money from businesses. To a lesser extent, those who answered agreed that local non-state armed groups own businesses or have direct links with business leaders in the community in joint profit-seeking schemes. Almost all those who responded (16 out of 23) disagreed with the hypothesis that local non-state armed groups provide cash income for a lot of people in the community. Similarly, those who responded largely disagreed with the assertion that local non-state armed groups help the local economy and livelihoods by providing protection from rival armed groups or from the state (19 out of 23).

Lastly, the small sample of respondents were asked multiple questions about their attitude towards groups like Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Daesh/ISIS or Al-Shabaab, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). On average only respondents in Misrata (4.5), and to a lesser extent those in Ghat (3.6) found these groups powerful. Ghat respondents were also the only ones who believe that these groups are rich (4.4, compared to an average of 3.2 among all localities). Only some respondents in Ghat found them courageous (overall score of 3.14). Respondents in all localities found them violent, except Kufra respondents (2.2, compared to an average of 4.3 among all localities). Similarly, respondents in all localities strongly believe that these groups are dangerous and evil, except in Kufra (3.1 and 3.4, respectively, compared to an average of 4.5 and 4.4, respectively among all localities). None of the localities found these groups to enjoy a high regard in their community, to advance the cause of Islam, to be manly, righteous / true believers, or to be just. However, respondents in all localities except Zuwara believed that these groups could be somewhat tempting for the youth, particularly in Ghat and Sebha. All respondents but one (in Ghat) believed that it would be better if these groups did not exist.
All these findings based on the small, purposive sample should be taken only as broad indications due to the small sample size and the purposive method of respondent selection.

RECRUITMENT

Questions on recruitment by VE groups could not be asked to the general population. However, we can draw some indication from the smaller, non-random sample of 98 respondents to which these questions were asked.

Only one respondent (from Kufra) indicated that he was personally aware of a person from his area who joined an extremist armed group in the last five years. However, there is a very high likelihood that respondents may not have felt comfortable indicating that they knew someone who was recruited by an extremist armed group. Supporting this inference, more respondents answered the following question about the country in which Libyan individuals had joined an extremist armed group. 11 indicated Libya, and 5 indicated Syria. Only 2 indicated Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen, whereas Mali, Niger, and Somalia were each mentioned once.

Even among this selected sample, one third declined to answer the question: "Are you aware of any local or foreign armed group trying to recruit people from this community?". Among those who did, only 2 indicated recruitment by foreign groups, and 1 indicated both local and foreign groups. All 12 respondents who indicated that armed group had tried to recruit people from their community were from southern localities.

Only 6 respondents indicated that these groups tried to recruit them or someone from their household, and they were 5 from Kufra and 1 from Ghat. All indicated that the target of recruitment were adult men. Another respondent from Misrata indicated that they tried to recruit him. However, no respondent from Misrata had responded positively to the broader question about any local or foreign armed group trying to recruit people from their community.

15 respondents (out of 98) provided an answer about the recruitment strategies adopted by foreign armed groups, all from southern localities, and particularly from Kufra (7) and Ghat (4). Most point towards the offer of economic advantages (11), close friends and personal networks (9), and internet (7). Other strategies are less cited: tribal links (5), influential leaders (3), prospect of marriage (3) or adventure (3), coercion (1), and abduction (1). This is an important finding that highlights the importance of economic opportunities in preventing the recruitment in VE groups. It also supports the findings on the important role that social ties and individual networks play in the recruitment of individuals in VE groups. [127]

All respondents refused to answer the question on the gender of extreme armed groups' recruits. However, some respondents answered subsequent questions on the role of women in these groups. 7 respondents in Sebha (out of 14) and 2 in Kufra indicated that women could be fighters, whereas no one indicated this potential role for women in the other localities. Interestingly, 6 of these 9 respondents were women. Another 11 respondents asserted that women could be commanders, 7 in Sebha and 4 in Kufra. A larger share of respondents (29) indicated that women could provide logistic support, mostly in Sebha (12), Kufra (6), and Misrata (5), and 28 indicated that they could collect intelligence from the community, with the same kind of distribution among Sebha, Kufra, and Misrata. Slightly less respondents (22) indicated that women could collect financial support for VE groups, recruit on behalf of VE groups (18), or provide training (13) – again, mostly in Sebha, Kufra, and Misrata.

[127] "'recruitment' and 'radicalisation' tend to follow existing social networks, so chance — in effect — becomes a major factor. Those who have violent extremists among their kinship or peer groups are [...] the most likely to become violent extremists themselves [...]" Harriet Allan et al. "Drivers of violent extremism: Hypotheses and literature review." Royal United Services Institute (2015).p. 20. See also "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and The Tipping Point for Recruitment" United Nation Development Program, (2017), p. 80.

VIOLENCE

The violent component in violent extremism regularly receives less attention and has been much less investigated in the study of this phenomenon. However, the inclination towards violence is equally important to the disposition towards extremist ideas in making up a violent extremist. Criminologists have investigated in great detail human inclination towards violence and have highlighted the impact of experiencing violence in the process of condoning violence or perpetrating it.

Criminologist Lonnie Athens described in great detail this process of socialization to violence, which often starts by being brutalized by the members of one's own community. This traumatic experience teaches individuals that they will not be protected by the social system in which they live, and it constitutes an important step in their socialization to violence. Individuals who realize that they will have to use violence or be victims of it are more likely to brutalize others. As a final step, individuals who are successful in their violent performance are likely to become recurrent violent perpetrators themselves. [128]
In light of these premises, assessing the level of violence present in a community, and the degree to which individuals condone violence are two important indicators of the extent to which the first and the second steps of socialization to violence are present.

Across the 7 Libyan localities, 20% of respondents indicated that they or someone from their immediate family was affected by violence perpetrated by armed groups (not counting national or foreign governments), for a total of 456 individuals out of 2243 actual answers (not considering "don't know" and "refuse to answer"). More women (23%) then men (18%) reported this type of violence. Among all options provided (abduction, light injury, severe injury, and other) abductions are the most chosen option (32% among those who reported a violence).
Kufra Murzuq, and Sebha are by far the most affected by violence perpetrated by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG), with 28 ,%43%, and 26% of local respondents reporting a violence. The highest level of reported incidents in which a person was killed is in Murzuq (8%) and Sebha (6%). Abductions by NSAG appear to be a very serious issue in Kufra, where 24.4% of respondents reported that they, or someone from their immediate family was abducted by a NSAG. Murzuq and Sebha also seem to suffer from abductions, but to a much smaller degree, with 7.5% and 6.2% of respondents reporting it, respectively (Figure 20).

[127] "Lonnie Athens, Violent criminal acts and actors revisited, University of Illinois Press, Chicago (1997). As Athens notes "communities are more or less violent on the basis of the nature of a community's predominant individual types and the resulting prevailing wisdom for handling interpersonal conflicts", p.148.



Question: "Were you or someone in your immediate family personally affected by violence perpetrated by armed groups (not counting national or foreign governments) that attacked civilians in this community?"

*Figure 20: Violence by Non-State Armed Groups**

More specific questions on violence could not be safely asked to the general population. But local researchers asked them to 14 selected respondents per locality. Based on these answers, violence by NSAG appears to target primarily adult men. The main driver of conflict appears to be inter- and intra-tribal conflicts.

CONDONING VIOLENCE

Violent extremism seeks to justify the use of violence in order to impose a vision of society. VE groups consider violence as a legitimate and desirable means of action. Thus, condoning violence is a potent marker of violent extremism, although not all those who condone violence are part of a VE group. In a broader perspective, condoning violence is another milestone in the process of socialization to violence described above, which undermines social cohesion and stability.

The vast majority of respondents think that violence against civilians is never justified. Among those who condone violence against civilians, we must distinguish between violence perpetrated by security forces and that committed by non-state groups. Respondents in all localities are more lenient towards violence committed by security forces: 10% believe that it is sometimes justified, and another 12% believe that it depends. In the case of violence against civilians carried out by individuals or groups, 9% believe that it is sometimes justified, and 6% believe that it depends.

These responses vary among the municipalities researched. Sebha and Kufra respondents are on average, more prone to condoning violence by security forces, and to a slightly lesser degree, by individuals or groups. However, although inhabitants of Misrata are those who least believe that violence by individuals or groups can be justified, they condone violence from security forces to an even higher degree than inhabitants of Sebha and Kufra (Figure 21).



Question on security forces: "Some people think that for the security forces to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that this kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?"
Question on individuals:."Some people think that for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?"

Figure 21: Condoning violence perpetrated by security forces / perpetrated by individuals or small groups*

Lastly, besides city and national averages, it is worth looking at where the 10% of respondents most open to condoning violence are. Overall, 14% of respondents fell in this 10 percentile, 3.6% in Sebha, 2.9% in Kufra, 2.2% in Ghat, and 1.9% in Murzuq (Table 32 above). All these are southern localities.

SECTION 4

PVE GOOD PRACTICES

The United States 11/9 Commission famously argued that counterterrorism and homeland security must be coupled with "a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military". Preventing violent extremism means addressing root causes with the aim of finding peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable solutions. It requires strengthening state authority and good governance at local levels and ensuring that the public are involved in a process of representation. Without a transparent and inclusive state authority, power vacuums enable violence, insecurity, and organized crime to flourish. [130]

PVE-programs vary significantly. To prevent radicalization at the individual- level, PVE programs often aim to improve education, cultural outreach, and counter-messaging. Other community-specific PVE strategies focus on the socioeconomic development of marginalized groups. [131]

As mentioned earlier, in November 2020, the Government of National Accord (GNA) adopted the country's first national counter-terrorism strategy. Although this strategy mentions prevention, at the time of writing the country lacks a national strategy on preventing violent extremism. Meanwhile, local administrators are left with the responsibility of addressing both drivers of violent extremism and managing the presence of VE groups.
This section is composed of two parts. The first draws from the pertinent literature to briefly describe a few successful PVE programs that have been carried out in other countries, which may be transferable to Libya. However, as a 2009 USAID guide stresses "[VE groups or movements] often are influenced by the same regional or global forces as well. Nonetheless, they also are shaped by local grievances and problems, and by idiosyncratic historical legacies and cultural attributes. Programming must reflect that situation, and avoid "off-the-shelf" or "cookie-cutter" approaches." [132]

Hence, the second part of this section builds on the field research accomplished by UNDP between 2020 and 2021 and other available data to infer the areas that may be most sensitive in Libya for the prevention of violent extremism. Lastly, the third part suggests some programmatic avenues for the prevention of violent extremism in Libya.

The design of a national PVE program must consider the needs of local administrations and the specificities of local contexts. Current successful PVE national and local programs include the collaboration of trained psychologists, sociologists, social workers, education experts, communications specialists, and other experts in gender, youth, media, bureaucracy, and experts who know how to re-integrate broken communities and individuals. PVE programs focus on several areas: improving disaffected identity, the sense of belonging and social and emotional learning; easing embittered relations with authority, and improving safe methods of expression of grievances, actual deliverables in educational and social services, improving digital literacy, raising awareness of ways to intervene with persons of concern (e.g., students, peers, or family members who might be on a path toward violent extremism), and concrete practical pathways for opportunities for youth. [133]

[129] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, (2004) Washington, DC p. 364.
[130] A. Okai, U. Modeer, "New Approaches to Preventing violent Extremism", UNDP, (2019). https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2019/new-approaches-to-preventing-violent-extremism.html
[131] K. Christmann, "Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A systematic review of the research evidence," Youth Justice Board, 2012.
[132] Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, 'Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming', USAID, October 2009, p.1.
[133] Lynn Davies, "Security, Extremism and Education: Safeguarding or Surveillance?," British Journal of Educational Studies (2016): 64, no. 19–1 ,1.

PVE studies suggest that social and emotional learning techniques are one of the most useful components in working with youth and children in detention centers. In addition, programs that focus on de-radicalization, disarmament, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconciliation processes greatly contribute to the success of national PVE strategies. [134] For instance, in Nigeria, the government and civil society organizations oversaw PVE programs focused on de-radicalization, reintegration and rehabilitation. Notably, in the Nigerian governmental efforts, PVE programs addressed resentful attitudes toward hierarchy, acrimonious feelings toward government corruption, and ways to manage learned hopelessness in communities. [135]

In addition to national and regional strategies, local CSOs implemented innovative ways to reintegrate former fighters by working with religious and tribal leaders, and respected teachers of the community. When former fighters were not accepted back into the community, they were granted amnesty from the National Office of Amnesty, and both CSOs and local government officials collaborated in healing meetings, transitional justice discussions, and reconciliation sessions.[137]

In tandem with PVE, amnesty, and transitional justice elements, preventative approaches targeted youth gangs and criminals to raise awareness on the impact certain choices will have on young people's lives, as well as practical information on how the grooming and recruitment process works to help individuals identify it.
National and local policies related to preventing and countering violent extremism need to be articulated by and coordinated among multiple national-level actors, such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the General Attorney's office, and with local-level actors such as Municipal Councils.

One key issue in PVE education programs is their long-term sustainability, both in terms of funding and of local ownership. Foreign funded PVE education programs tend to fund one-off projects or just a two-year program and fail to ensure that they are appropriated by local education stakeholders. As a result, studies illustrate that school administrators rarely incorporate P/CVE modules and principles into formal teaching curricula. In the best cases, P/CVE modules and principles end up merely informing ad hoc after-school activities. And even in these cases, after-school activities are rarely monitored or evaluated. Effective PVE educational programs worked with families and teachers early in the development of the program to ensure sustainability and stakeholder ownership. However, even with collaboration with the Ministry of Education, there were problems in implementing formal curriculum changes, and unfortunately, this created a tension between requirements for teachers and their desire to carry out P/CVE activities. [138]

[134] Jiayi Zhou, Katherine A. Sullivan & Gary J. Milante, "Towards Pathways for Peacebuilding and Development to Reduce Violent Extremism," Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, (2017): 2 ,12, pp. 121-114.
[135] T., Ekpon, "The Role of Young People in Preventing Violent Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin" The Progress Study of Youth, Peace and Security, (2015)
[136] Logan Macnair and Richard Frank, "Voices Against Extremism: A Case Study of a Community-Based CVE Counter-Narrative Campaign," Journal for Deradicalization 174–147 :(2017) 10.
[137] Allard R. Feddes, Liesbeth Mann, and Bertjan Doosje, "Increasing Self-Esteem and Empathy to Prevent Violent Radicalization: A Longitudinal Quantitative Evaluation of a Resilience Training Focused on Adolescents with a Dual Identity," Journal of Applied Social Psychology (2015): 6.
[138] Stijn Sieckelinck, Femke Kaulingfreks, and Micha de Winter, "Neither Villains Nor Victims: Towards an Educational Perspective on Radicalisation," British Journal of Educational Studies (2015): 63, no. 3,pp. 343–329 and D.G.Davydov, "The

In developing, designing, and implementing PVE programs in the Libyan context, it is important to analyze different extremist narratives in order to understand broader trends. This is beyond the scope of this research, which does not focus on VE groups and their activities. In general terms, current PVE typologies can be categorized in ethnic, cultural, racial threats; homophobic/gendered threats; victimhood; populist anti-globalization; eco-fascism; anti-secular; anti-liberalism; pro-authoritarianism, and ultra-nationalist.[139] PVE research stresses the importance of analyzing not only the messages, but also the targeted audiences. Examples of simple every-day life changes could be leveraged by movements in order to attract possible "empathizers," who may have grievances in common with the movement, but are not committed to it through action. PVE studies in Australia examined far-right groups demonstrating that they are highly adaptable, with narratives shifting over time to strategically leverage the political environment. Analysis illustrated that narratives by violent extremists often diverge heavily from what their followers want to hear, to sift out true empathizers versus 'fashionable observers' within the group. [140]

National PVE strategies must also consider how gender influences violent extremism and by extension, successful P/CVE programs. Gender has different functions in the recruitment and radicalization processes of violent extremism. For example, ISIS employs five key archetypes to attract potential followers: (1) Supporters, who perform the "hijrah" to join the community of fighters (i.e. the "journey", borrowing the term commonly used by Muslims to refer to the journey of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in the year 622); (2) Relatives (mothers, sisters, wives); (3) Fighters who physically fight in combat for ISIS; (4) Recruiters of ISIS; and (5) Victims who are worthy of being saved. Before 2016, ISIS emphasized more the relatives' role (mother, sister, wife) for female participants, but after 2016, there was a heavier emphasis on the role of a female fighter in battle. VE groups capitalize on perceived male-centric attitudes towards violence as a tool for recruitment.[141] Reinforcing pre-modern patriarchal structures is critical to violent extremism, and groups often use myths and folklore stories to place male figures at the center of violent extremist propaganda. Thus, PVE strategies need to incorporate the variety of ways in which gender is exploited, romanticized, misappropriated, and corrupted for violent extremism movements. [142]

National and Local PVE programs aim to encourage dialogue between state authorities and citizens, ensuring active popular participation in local governance and signaling that citizens' input is valued by authorities. PVE programs try to identify ways to decrease sympathy and support for violent extremism by establishing alternative venues to voice grievances and to address them in a manner that would demonstrate openness of government towards citizens, and responsiveness to their needs.[143] To do so, PVE programs must simultaneously cooperate with ministries of education, economy or finance, youth, and interior.

Causes of Youth Extremism and Ways to Prevent It in the Educational Environment" Russian Education and Society (2015):57, no. 3, pp.162–146.

[139] D. G. Davydov, "The Causes of Youth Extremism and Ways to Prevent It in the Educational Environment," Russian Education and Society (2015):57, no. 3, pp.162–146.

[140] Adrian Cherney and Kristina Murphy, "Police and Community Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Evidence and Insights from Australia," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2017): 40, no. 12, pp. 1037–1023

[141] Sophie Giscard d'Estaing, "Engaging Women in Countering Violent Extremism: Avoiding Instrumentalisation and Furthering Agency." Gender & Development (2017): 1 ,25, pp. 118–103.

[142] Laura Zahra Mcdonald, "Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its Implications," Security, Religion, State and Society (2016):39, pp.189-177, and Floris Vermeulen, "Suspect Communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London," Terrorism and Political Violence (2014): 26, no. 2, pp.306–286.

[143] Anne Aly, Elisabeth Taylor, and Saul Karnovsky, "Moral Disengagement and Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Education Intervention," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2014): 37, no. 4, pp. 385–369,

Some PVE programs tend to focus solely on removing VE narratives on social media networks (SMN), without providing effective counter-narratives where that content is located. It is important to monitor and collect data on PVE communication interventions so that they develop and adapt accordingly. PVE national strategies should find innovative ways to use current technologies or create new ones to overcome violent extremist propaganda, disinformation, and other methods that can inspire and mobilize violence. Alongside these efforts, it is critical to regularly educate the public about how various entities spread disinformation and propaganda.[144]

4.1 ON NATIONAL STRATEGIES

Libya is still in the development stages of a national action plan, and it will need to depend on thorough research on drivers of radicalization in Libya to develop a more effective state response.[145] In addition to addressing key drivers of radicalization, national strategies need to learn the best methods and tools to respond to radicalization beyond security and intelligence. The success of a national PVE action plan depends on the synergy and cooperation between multiple government bureaucracies and a broad spectrum of civil society actors. This is pertinent, not only to the desired objectives of a national PVE strategy, but to its very development: entailing cross-ministerial/cross-sectoral engagement and inputs, to increase those stakeholders' support of the policies and initiatives that stem from the strategy. The diversity of stakeholders allows for a wider and extensive reach into various parts of the society, especially where the state has limited access. [146]

PVE strategies need to be nimble and tailored to each specific reality, adapting programs to the changing context. A useful approach is to identify shortcomings in the role played by governance actors and existing gaps in information sharing mechanisms among governance actors and between them and citizens. Typical challenges that are often identified during the drafting process include the difficulty to coordinate between ministries and government bodies, especially as some ministries refuse to use the term "Violent Extremism" or refuse aspects of the national plan147. Best practices on dialogue and coordination can be drawn from experience in other countries in the region, notably f rom Tunisia and Morocco.

Similarly, national counter-messaging strategies should be context specific: affording counter-messages to be tailored to the local drivers of violent extremism, including recruitment to VE groups. This entails training local leaders and their organizations (religious and secular, adults and youth), to deliver counter-VE messages. Likewise, this entails ensuring that such partners have the necessary skills, including audience identification, segmentation, and analytics—across a range of multimedia tools—to spread well-targeted counter-messages, in high volume, across a wide array of platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram, etc.). The ultimate aim is to promote consistency between (a) public policy, (b) public diplomacy/strategic communications, and (c) targeted campaign per se.

[144] Caitlin Ambrozik, "To change or not to change?: The effect of terminology on public support of countering violent extremism efforts," Democracy and Security (20188):14:1, pp. 67-45.
[145] William Stephens & Stijn Sieckelinck, "Being resilient to radicalisation in PVE policy: a critical examination," Critical Studies on Terrorism (2020):13:1,pp. 165-142.
[146] Alex P. Schmid, "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review," ICCT Research Paper (2013): 97.
[147] R. Dzhekova, N., Stoynova, A., Kojouharov et al., "Understanding Radicalisation. Review of literature." (2016) Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

Furthermore, PVE policy makers need to design thoughtful monitoring, measurement, and evaluation mechanisms to assess national action plans and strategies, and share successes, challenges, and lessons learned. To this end, the Libyan Counter Terrorism Office would benefit from having a dedicated unit for research and analysis responsible for examining lessons learned, challenges, successes, and failures in Libya and other countries (e.g. Tunisia, Iraq, Morocco, Lebanon) and ensuring that they translate into policy thinking and policy making.

PVE policymakers and implementers need to cultivate multi-stakeholder partnerships and collaborations to develop capacity-building programs for civil society organizations and government agencies. The PVE national plan must be able to provide government entities with guidance for its execution. The national plan also needs to use integrated third-party reporting systems and data sharing mechanisms to establish a feedback loop between all relevant actors.

4.2 ON DISENGAGEMENT, DERADICALIZATION, AND REHABILITATION

PVE policies that deal with disengagement, deradicalization and rehabilitation of former militants must ensure that these programs meet the basic needs of target individuals and provide them with safe and dignified conditions. For example, former fighters need to feel that their living quarters are a safe shelter, with sufficient food, and basic education, rather than a place of punishment or retribution. Safe and secure facilities enable former militants to find closure from VE and disengage with dignity. In collaboration of civil society organizations, PVE policies must prepare communities to accept former militants who have been through disengagement or de-radicalization programs in a structured facility.

Community acceptance is critical to ensuring the reintegration of former violent extremists. Thus, it is important to involve the community (i.e., religious and tribal leaders, local municipal leaders from the city council, and CSOs dedicated to improving the lives of former fighters) in rehabilitation and reintegration programs, particularly through trained religious and tribal leaders. De-radicalization programs need to effectively address trauma that individuals have faced during their experiences, as well as existing mental disorders. Programs should rely on recent research on effective rehabilitation for children and youth specifically, and understand the nuances between rehabilitation strategies for children, men, and women. Although contextual VE drivers vary greatly from one country to another, Libyan programs can greatly benefit from the valuable experience with both successes and failures from countries where PVE strategies and programs have been implemented for years, such as Morocco.[148]

[148] See inter alia, Arthur Boutellis, Aïssata Athie, Delphine Mechoulan and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara:: Second Regional Conversation, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17515.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9052ee25fa7704b630707cdb7d75fe30&ab_segments=&origin=; and Muro, Diego and Moussa Bourekba (2019). “Best Practices on PVE across the Euro-Mediterranean Region”, NOVACT, Briefing-Paper 2019 :06, https://novact.org/wp-content/uploads/01/2020/BEST-PRACTICES-ON-PVE-ACROSS-THE-EUROMEDITERRANEAN-REGION-Briefing-Paper_1-06.pdf; and Elsayed, Lilah. "Counter-Messaging for Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa: Using a Gender Lens." In Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), pp. 104-95. IOS Press, 2019.

4.3 ON EDUCATION POLICIES

PVE education policies need to consider how to develop students' resilience to violent extremism propaganda by developing critical thinking. One strategy to develop this mental attitude is to teach courses in humanities, social sciences, and history. Constructing educational policies to address challenges related to P/CVE at different ages builds resilience skills, which are perhaps more effective at a younger age. Older students can engage in more structured conversations on radicalization, political grievances, acceptance of differences, and peer pressure.[149] It is important to ensure that educational programs are sustainable, both in terms of long-term funding as well as local buy-in. In considering the curriculum and after-school activities, educational programs need to include diverse religions – whenever possible - incorporate diverse cultures, worldviews, and global philosophies to improve social cohesion and inter-religious and inter-cultural understanding among diverse individuals and groups. PVE policies also need to build the capacity of teachers to address radicalization in schools.[150] Building teachers' knowledge, skills, capacity, and confidence, as well as providing resources through semi-structured curriculum can be effective approaches. This requires programs that include all stakeholders from the beginning, such as education ministries, administrators, teachers, families and students, tribal leaders, religious leaders, youth groups, and clubs.

4.4 ON GENDER POLICIES

Due to cultural and religious beliefs, local communities could perceive programs focused on women or gender issues as problematic, leading to further mistrust. PVE communications about gender may be sensitive, depending on who is speaking and receiving the information.

PVE programs must target women with a platform and method that takes cultural and social norms into consideration. For example, in some cultures, women are less likely to speak in public or non-private forums and are more likely to speak to their trusted networks. [151] This has implications for both how they are being recruited online, as well as how PVE interventions online might take shape. Including mothers of former fighters, women professionals, religious leaders, female security officers, women opinion-makers, influencers, rural and urban women leaders in PVE programs highlight inclusion and a diversity of voices in national PVE efforts, which helps strengthening them.

[149] Javid Akram and Robin Richardson, "Citizenship Education for All or Preventing Violent Extremism for Some?—Choices and Challenges for Schools," Race Equality Teaching (2009): 27, no. 55–49 ,3.

[150] Ratna Ghosh et al., "Can Education Counter Violent Religious Extremism?," Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (2017): 23, no. 2, pp.133–117.

[151] Sophie Giscard d'Estaing, "Engaging women in countering violent extremism: avoiding instrumentalisation and furthering agency," Gender & Development (2017): 25:1,pp. 118-103.

SECTION 5

KEY FINDINGS AND PROGRAMMATIC AVENUES

Violent extremism is highly context specific. Therefore, PVE programs must build on a timely and detailed assessment of VE drivers in the specific context under focus. This field research and ongoing monitoring and update allows to identify sensitive areas (a.k.a. vulnerabilities), opportunities, and constraints around which PVE programs must be tailored.

This section draws from the field research that the North African Policy Initiative carried out in 2021, on open-source research of available literature on Libya's society, politics, economy, and security, and on a decade of research and programmatic experience in Libya. It identifies key social, economic, political, and cultural aspects that may represent vulnerabilities for the development of VE. They are referred to as sensitive areas.

Although the vulnerabilities described in this section are presented as national sensitive areas, we must stress again that besides open-source research and prior experience in Libya, the primary data that informed this report was collected through a field research in only 7 Libyan municipalities in Fezzan (Southern Libya) and Tripolitania (Western Libya). This section is organized along the same VE and governance thematic areas that informed the research. The key findings are followed by corresponding programmatic avenues. In addition, where pertinent, this section includes highlighted boxes that focus on specific recommendations and provide a more detailed description of their rationale and recommended actions.

5.1 GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES

The quality of public service provision appears to be a problem in Libya. Libyans indicate utilities departments as the most corrupt institution in the country, ahead of the registry and permit services, the media, and businesses. However, the quality of public services varies among cities, and different cities often struggle with a different type of service. For instance, Sebha and Bani Walid have more issues with water and sewage, and Zuwara has a problem with healthcare provision. While all cities seem to have bad public infrastructure, the most serious challenge is electricity provision, which is problematic almost everywhere in Libya. This problem becomes most acute in the summer, when heat is almost unbearable, and power cuts increase to averages of 8-6 hours per day because of the surge in demand to power air conditioners.

Power cuts have worsened year after year since 2011, and in the eyes of Libyans, they have become the symbol of government corruption and ineffectiveness. Such a protracted grievance with the provision of a basic service undermines the trust of Libyans in their government and has sparked popular protests throughout Libya, which have turned into a violent attack against the parliament in Tobruk. [152] By undermining the trust that citizens have in the government, weaknesses in the quality of the state's provision of public services – particularly electricity – fuels discontent, compromises state-society relations, and provides arguments for narratives that seek to delegitimize the state and its governance architecture.

[152] Ahmed Elumami and Ayman Al-Warfali, "Libya's power cuts enrage citizens, spurring protest", Reuters, 4 July 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/libyas-power-cuts-enrage-citizens-spurring-protest-04-07-2022/

With support from national and international development partners, Libya's state authorities should develop a clear service delivery model that is equally accessible and responsive to all Libyans. State authorities should strengthen oversight and accountability mechanisms and institutions as well as integrated management systems. Better and more accessible services to all Libyans will improve the trust between state and citizens and will improve resilience against anti-systemic VE narratives. Better public services will also help economic development.

NORTH-SOUTH INEQUALITY

Localities in Fezzan (Libya's Southern region) appear to have a markedly lower quality and availability of public services compared to localities in the North. On average, inhabitants of southern Libyan localities also have a lower socioeconomic level and a higher rate of unemployment compared to other Libyans. Our field research clearly shows that inhabitants of Southern localities (Ghat, Murzuq, Sebha, and Kufra) face a markedly higher level of hardship (i.e. food, water for domestic use, money, and shelter) compared to the other localities researched.

In line with these inequalities, inhabitants of Libya's South face the most challenging socioeconomic conditions. At the same time, southern Libya is also the most exposed to transnational organized crime and VE groups who operate in the Sahel. Thus, the presence of large numbers of individuals in vulnerable socio-economic conditions, and the weakness of state-provided services in southern Libya represents a serious concern for PVE.

Libya's state authorities and international development actors should launch dedicated development plans in southern Libya to fill the gap in quality and availability of public services with Northern Libya. These plans will help contain the sense of marginalization and neglect that is prevalent among Libyans living in the South. It will also help support the economic development in Southern Libya, where socioeconomic conditions are markedly worse compared to the Libyan average.

INSECURITY

Besides the insecurity linked to localized conflicts that often erupt across Libya, some cities, such as Sebha and Bani Walid struggle with chronic insecurity, which is markedly higher than in the rest of Libya. More than one third of our respondents indicated that armed groups in their area threaten their community with force. In addition, respondents indicated that armed robbers/bandits, drug traffickers, and terrorist groups also pose a security threat in their municipalities.

Protracted insecurity undermines the level of trust that citizens have in state authorities and institutions. Moreover, insecurity makes it difficult for CSOs to play their important role for the functioning of participatory governance. Civic and political activists cannot risk their lives to advocate for democratic governance and to demand transparency and accountability. Local conditions must offer a minimum level of security for civil society to play some of its most important role, such as human rights monitoring, advocacy, and government oversight.

Lastly, since security is a fundamental need, if the state is not able to provide it, individuals may turn towards non-state actors, whose illiberal and arbitrary practices may be accepted for the sake of their effectiveness. VE groups and organized crime often use this powerful mechanism to gain legitimacy and support among local populations.

Libya's state authorities should launch an immediate campaign to improve security and justice provision in key localities affected by insecurity, such as Sebha and Bani Walid. Furthermore, international development actors should help Libya's state authorities develop community policing to re-build the relationship between state security actors and citizens. In divided communities, community policing should be part of a broader dialogue and conflict prevention strategy.

LOCAL DIVISIONS, CONFLICT, AND DECENTRALIZATION

Many municipalities are marred in intractable divisions that have often resulted in inter-communal conflicts. Fighting produces death, destruction, and disenfranchisement that are a fertile ground for the development of violent extremism. Also, local divisions hamper good governance and often lead to the discrimination of minority groups.

Although decentralization offers a promising avenue for improving governance while central institutions are weak and divided, it may amplify tensions between local majority/minority groups. Devolving power to local authorities can potentially fuel local tensions and lead to conflict between opposing tribes or ethnic groups. Several municipalities, such as Sebha and Kufra are made of multiple ethnic and/or tribal communities. The majority group is naturally able to take control of the municipal council. If there are tensions and competition with other groups, the majority group is not likely to share its power, and to allocate resources equally, or at all. As a result, local minority groups may face discrimination in the access to services, and marginalization from the exercise of power.

However, while splitting municipalities may help diffuse immediate inter-communal tensions, it creates many new governance problems. Since the passing of Law (2012) 59 that frames local governance in Libya, pressures by divided communities have led successive governments in need of local support to split existing municipalities in multiple new ones (e.g. Kufra, Ghat). However, while these new administrative divisions may partially solve one problem, they create many new ones. First among them, newborn municipalities do not have the expertise nor the infrastructure to carry out their functions. Secondly, municipal boundaries, on which municipal budget allocations depend, are unclear and often disputed.

International development actors should encourage the Libyan government to host regular national consultations with mayors and ministries to agree on a decentralization roadmap. International development actors should help municipalities and the Ministry of Local Governance determine municipal boundaries and urban and rural areas in each municipality. Libya's state authorities should create governorates (muhafazat) in accordance with Law (2012) 59. Governorates would help address regional needs and conflicts and foster integrated local development.

Spotlight

.1 Local conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms

International development actors should develop and support local conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms in cooperation with local and national Libyan state and non-state authorities. The study of local governance in Libya since 2011 has highlighted that some municipalities have been able to prevent and/or solve inter- and intra-communal conflicts through effective and proactive dispute-settlement mechanisms. These mechanisms typically gather non-state actors, such as members of Tribal Councils, Councils of Wise Men, religious leaders, city notables, and civil society activists under a dispute-resolution committee that operates in coordination with, or under the supervision of the municipal council. Zliten and Zuwara offer two successful examples of these mechanisms, which can be replicated elsewhere.

Municipalities – particularly divided ones – should be encouraged to form inter- and intra-communal conflict resolution committees through peer-to-peer training and coaching from fellow Libyans from municipalities that have succeeded in creating them. [154]

But conflict prevention and resolution must also rest on a long-term dialogue, trust-building, and a committed reconciliation process, which can be supported by state's financial incentives for municipalities to form governorates, as already foreseen in the guiding local governance law.[155] Trust-building strategies can take place along multiple parallel tracks, such as:

- **Inter-communal dialogue:** start with ordinary citizens, youth, and women, and slowly include municipal authorities and elders
- **Business:** promote joint ventures and require joint proposals by companies belonging to different communities for public tenders
- **Arts:** organize multicultural events and sport events that include all social components of the municipality
- **Sports:** organize sport events that include all social components of the municipality

5.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS STATE AND SOCIETY

GENDER EQUALITY

Women and girls are far from enjoying equal access to education and to employment, equality in wages, a safe access to public life, and partake in decision-making roles in Libya. The level of support for gender equality varies greatly among Libyan cities. Typically, in smaller and landlocked towns, the prevailing social culture and mores are more conservative and less supportive of gender equality than in the rest of Libya. There, women and girls struggle to enjoy their rights, and to access responsibilities and opportunities.

The empowerment of women and their active participation and engagement in social, economic, and political life are crucial for democratic governance, economic growth, conflict prevention, and PVE.

[154] For an analysis of how successful municipalities have developed dispute-management and resolution mechanisms, see Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, et al. "Libyan Local Governance Case Studies." EU Delegation to Libya. July 2017. Available at http://docdro.id/ce1aKnu

[155] Law (2012) 59 called for the creation of a bi-level local governance system based on governorates (muhafazat) and municipalities (baladiyat). Due to difficulties in agreeing on the number and geographic scope of governorates, these administrative entities have not been created yet.

Libya's state authorities and international development actors should Integrate female economic and social leaders in PVE programs and provide them with protection. Libyan authorities should ensure that women and girls have equal access to education, and that gender discrimination is barred from education institutes. Libya's state authorities should address the discrimination of women in family and personal status laws.

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE

Libyans grant little trust to their state's governing bodies, although municipal councils enjoy a slightly higher level of trust that the government and the parliament. The level of civic participation and engagement (i.e. voting; showing interest in politics; signing petitions, conducting demonstrations; joining a civil society organization) appears to be decreasing year after year. Libyans seem to lose trust in formal politics due to the level of divisions among state institutions and government weakness. The 20-2019 conflict appears to have exacerbated this disillusionment.

Participation and engagement are key for the good functioning of democratic governance, and they are essential for the functioning of civil society. Their decrease constitutes a worrisome indication that there is an opening for anti-systemic narratives and for alternative models of governance, such as those proposed by VE groups.

Spotlight

2. Local CSOs and civic engagement

In early 2014 —only three years since voluntary associations were allowed to exist in Libya—at least 2000 voluntary associations were actively operating in Libya,[156] and more than 4,000 were officially registered with the Ministry of Culture. [157] Most of these organizations have disappeared, but new ones have emerged and have learned how to operate in Libya's extremely challenging environment. These CSOs are often composed of young, tech-savvy women and men, many of whom also know English. These CSOs are another important component to integrate youth in the social fabric, socialize them to civic values, and promote their participation in local governance.

156 Based on the author's estimates, after interviewing 1,022 active voluntary associations in six Libyan cities, whose inhabitants amount to half of the Libyan population. This represents a concentration of CSOs by number of inhabitants that is six times larger than that in Iraq in 2011. See Romanet Perroux (2015).

157 Data from the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society, Civil Society Organizations Support Center, March 2014.

Local CSOs should be assessed to gauge their effectiveness and contribution to civic engagement. Those who seem to be valuable partners according to these criteria should be supported to carry out civic education, and to involve youth in civic life. Actively involving CSOs in civic education effort builds their capacity and helps orient them to the important role they have to play in engaging with local government.

Moreover, there should be initiatives to develop dialogue and cooperation between effective and civic-minded local CSOs and local state and non-state authorities. The formation of inclusive Local Advisory Committees for the elaboration of municipal social cohesion strategies and action plans are one mechanism to promote state-society dialogue and cooperation.

Lastly, donors and their implementing partners should collaborate to create a database of CSOs active at a local level. Many of these organizations are not on the radar of national and international actors. Creating this directory would assist municipalities in conducting community outreach and would help international actors expand their civil society engagement in Libya.

5.3 ADISCRIMINATION AND MARGINALIZATION

DENIED CITIZENSHIP

In Libya, the National Number (i.e. National ID), is necessary to access employment, travel, and benefit from free services such as education and medical care. Thousands of Libyans are denied a National Number, particularly in Southern Libya. De facto, these Libyans, who are mostly Tebu and Touareg are denied citizenship.

This serious form of discrimination affects thousands of Libyans in the South. Discrimination, marginalization, and disenfranchisement are potent VE drivers.[158] Most of these vulnerable individuals live in the suburbs of Southern cities, such as Sebha and Obari. Their inability to enjoy public services, access education, and secure a stable employment exposes these individuals to the recruitment by VE groups.

[158] For more on the link between marginalization, discrimination, and VE see Allan et al. (2015); Van Bergen, et al (2015); Thiessen (2019), p.5; Denoeux and Carter (2009), p.34, and UNDP (2017), p. 4.

Spotlight

3. Participatory governance, discrimination, and marginalization

International development actors should help Local and national Libyan authorities foster participatory governance, and combat discrimination and marginalization. Marginalization is the structural and systemic deprivation of certain individuals of various rights, opportunities, and resources that are normally available to others. It can be entirely passive (also referred to as structural violence). The condition of many Libyans who do not possess a national ID number – most of whom are Tebu and Touareg - is a powerful example of marginalization because it singles out a group and deprives it of important services and opportunities. Discrimination is the active and deliberate unjust treatment of a group. For instance, while some Libyans who are denied citizenship still manage to access free healthcare and education in some localities, in others they are denied these same services and they are treated as foreigners. The latter is an example of active discrimination. Both marginalization and discrimination are very powerful meso-level drivers of violent extremism, because they generate a collective grievance among members of a group towards those who exercise power, either in society or within the state. Also, marginalization and discrimination frustrate the expectations of some individuals or groups and prevents them from accessing services and opportunities. VE groups can exploit these grievances by offering alternative ways to gain recognition, power, and wealth.

The issues of marginalization and discrimination are best tackled at the local level, because they are typically affecting individuals or groups at the city and neighborhood level. The first step is to identify forms of discrimination and marginalization through individual- and neighborhood-level governance assessments that gauge the quality and access to services, socio-economic conditions, and attitudes of individuals. Forms of discrimination and marginalization must be identified both in terms of geography and of population groups:

- Are some neighbourhoods disproportionately suffering from low access to services, security, and justice?
- Are some specific groups (ethnic, tribal, age, etc.) disproportionately suffering from low access to services, security, and justice?

In cooperation with international development actors, Libya should develop programs to empower marginalized and discriminated groups through vocational training, job creation, and improving their access to public services, but these measures can be very dangerous and even counterproductive. The rest of the community could resent them, especially if the locality offers difficult living conditions and few economic opportunities to everyone. Therefore, to counterbalance perceptions of favouritism of a single group, it is much more advisable to work with local communities as a whole to help them realize the liabilities and threats posed by the marginalization and discrimination of individuals or groups and convince them that it is in the best interest of the entire community to tackle them.

To this end, key local stakeholders – both state and non-state – should be made aware of the above-mentioned forms of marginalization and discrimination that affect their community. Local stakeholders should include the following:

- Civil society activists/organizations, particularly those delivering services in partnership with or in addition to local authorities; those working on transparency and accountability; those promoting civic engagement and participation, those proposing policy solutions.
- Traditional authorities: Member of Majlis Al-Hokama (aka Hokama wa al-Shura); Majlis Ijtimai; Majlis al-Kabail; and/or other traditional bodies
- Municipal Council members or active members of the Diwan Al-Baladiya
- Members of national Ministries' local offices (Makatib Al-Kita-at)
- Justice stakeholder: Either formal (e.g. prosecutor) or informal/traditional (e.g. Sheikh el Kabila)
- Security stakeholders (Police, militia, Army, etc.)
- Community Media (Journalists; media center; local radio)
- Local university professors focusing on social sciences and school administrators
- Local businesspeople supporting local governance or politics

Existing forms of discrimination and marginalization in the community should be discussed among these local stakeholders through inclusive and deliberative mechanisms to agree on strategies to minimize them. While it may appear ambitious and hard to enact, an inclusive, "whole of society" approach is key in combating marginalization and discrimination, which often result from institutionalized power dynamics among community members and groups. Authorities alone, which typically emanate from the dominant groups, are unlikely to redress the discrimination and marginalization of weaker and minority components of the community unless the entire community understands the threat that protracted marginalization and discrimination pose to its peace, stability, and economic development.

5.4 SOCIAL COHESION, PARTICIPATION, AND ENGAGEMENT

MEDIA

The accessibility and use of media play a key role in exchanging information, shaping public opinion, and creating opportunities for political engagement and participation. Libyans do not trust media, both national and foreign. They have developed a high level of mistrust towards Libyan channels after having lived for two generations in a country where no media could be trusted and having witnessed their increasing polarization since 2014[159] .

Data from the 2014 Arab Barometer indicate that Libyans are not using social media to counteract this polarization: 16% of Libyan respondents participate in interactive or dialogue-based groups on social networking websites compared to an average of 33% among the other North African countries. Quite the contrary, Libyan communities seem to be using social media to create information and discussion groups that reinforce group thinking, communal identity and competing narratives. [160]

The reliance of Libyans on social media, and the low level of media literacy in the country makes Libyans very vulnerable to fake news and manipulation, which are popular instruments used by VE groups.

Spotlight

4. Community media and media literacy

Local media channels operated by the community and ideally supported by local authorities, local businesspeople, and international donors are a key ingredient for social cohesion and stability. Community media can counteract VE narratives, foster community cohesion, promote civic engagement, and improve the quality of local governance by:

- Providing common and reliable sources of information
- Build state-society trust by allowing municipal councils to publicly communicate their objectives, challenges, constraints, action plans, and achievements to their constituencies
- Improving the responsiveness of local government to people's needs and preferences
- Increasing accountability of local officials.

[159] Human Rights Watch, Libya: Words to Deeds, 24 January 2006. Available from https://www.hrw.org/report/24/01/2006/ libya-words-deeds/urgent-need-human-rights-reform; and British Broadcasting Corporation, Media Environment Guide: Libya, February 2012. BBC Monitoring.

[160] For more on this, see Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux "The deep roots of Libya's Security Fragmentation", Middle Eastern Studies, 55:2, January 2019, pp 224-200. Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/00263206.2018.1538970/10.1080

Several municipalities have media owned and operated by civil society activists, private owners, and/or municipal councils. Community media outlets in Libya have often fostered a two-way dialogue between the citizenry and decision-makers through live shows in which the audience can call in and question public officials and civil servants. These radio programs can allow public discontent to surface in a peaceful manner, thereby publicly offering a model of pluralistic dialogue and public exchanges of ideas. They provide local citizens with an avenue to influence public policy and signal that participatory citizenship is welcome. Ultimately, community media have improved responsiveness, transparency and accountability in several municipalities. [161]

Community media can be strengthened by training and employing youth as community reporters, covering local governance and youth affairs for radio programs. [162]

Local state-society communication is also fostered by training municipal civil servants on public communication and helping municipalities develop their media office. Lastly, these local media channels can serve as effective means to contrast VE narratives.

In addition to the training of content producers and to the support of channels of public communication and information, it is important to educate the public on how to find information and analyse it. Libya's media landscape is highly polarized and manipulated. Hence, more than elsewhere, citizens must be able to distinguish reliable information from fake news to avoid the traps of VE narratives.

5.5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND HARDSHIP

INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS

Since 2011, dozens of localized conflicts all across Libya have pitted ethnic, tribal, and/or geographic communities against each other, displacing hundreds of thousands of Libyans, totaling as much as 14% of the entire Libyan population (see section 2.3 for further details). Entire communities have not been able to come back home for years, notably in Tawergha, Derna, Ein Zara, Ghadames, and Murzuq. Some of them are living in precarious informal settlements that fail to guarantee even the most basic services, such as security, healthcare, clean water, and education. These settlements are perfect recruitment grounds for VE groups.

[161] For more details on the role of community media and social media in improving local governance, see Romanet Perroux et al., "Libyan Local Governance Case Studies." EU Delegation to Libya. July 2017. Available at http://docdro.id/ce1aKnu

[162] Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, 'Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming', USAID, October 2009, p. 52

Libya's state authorities must ensure that IDPs and returnees have a reliable access to basic services (notably health and education) by launching both stop-gap initiatives and longer-term programs to rebuild destroyed houses and infrastructure. State authorities must also guarantee the physical, material, and legal safety of IDPs and returnees.

5.6 FIREARMS, ARMED GROUPS, AND VIOLENCE

CURRENT AND FORMER COMBATANTS

As explained in section 2.2 of this report, since 2011, Libya has been affected by 3 national-level conflicts and more than 30 localized ethnic, tribal, and/or geographic conflicts, many of which are still lingering. As a result, the estimated number of current or former combatants range between 200,000 and 300,000, several times more than the official members of the Libyan armed forces. When former combatants attempt to return to civilian life, they find themselves without the necessary skills and knowledge to find meaningful employment.

Many have dropped from school, and most do not have any higher education diploma. Even when the community acknowledges their service and the hardship they endured, their inability to find an active role in society makes them feel useless and neglected. The contrast between these feelings, the hardship they endured, and the high opinion of the service they provided to their community that many have breeds resentment towards both the state and society.

Furthermore, many of these current and former combatants have physical and/or mental wounds that are unaddressed by the Libyan healthcare system, which can fuel anger and resentment towards authorities and society writ large. These wounds further hamper their ability to be active members of society, and they are probably the leading cause for the widespread use of psychotropic drugs among young men.[163] Even more than the rest of Libyan youth, current and former combatants need a space and a mechanism to socialize with civilian youth and re-integrate society.

[163] Elamouri et al. (2018), op. cit.

Spotlight

5. Youth integration and socialization

Youth who do not have a place to socialize with each other and engage in activities that promote their self-expression and sense of efficacy, personal growth, and integration into society are vulnerable to alternative networks and opportunities for socialization, such as those offered by VE groups. This threat is particularly severe in contexts affected by a low quality of education, high unemployment, and economic hardship, such as many southern Libyan localities. [164]

To integrate youth in the social fabric, and socialize them to peace and civic values, youth must dispose of, and be encouraged to utilize youth centers, cultural and sports clubs, CSOs, training centers, co-working spaces, civil society and/or start-up incubators, and other physical spaces and activities through which they can join civic networks.

Free and publicly accessible youth centers can play a very effective role in the socialization and integration of youth, by offering a free and safe space where they can achieve:

- **Self-expression:** Meet other youth, engage in conversations (e.g. debates, competitions), participate in cultural, artistic, and/or sport activities
- **Personal growth:** Receive training and coaching, participate in conferences
- **Integration into society and governance:** Engage in roundtable discussions on key local policy issues; meet with local authorities and CSOs; promote volunteerism and advocacy

These centers must be free, easily accessible, equipped with internet and back-up electricity generators, be in a safe neighborhood, and have opening hours that extend beyond regular work hours and weekdays, because many youths who are studying or working may only be able to socialize during evenings and weekends.

The active integration of youth in society and civic life, their personal development and self-expression, and their socialization to civic values are potent antidotes against their disenfranchisement, marginalization, and alienation on which VE thrive.

These centers can also be utilized as hubs for vocational training, entrepreneurship promotion, career guidance, personal growth, and assistance to find employment opportunities, including cash-for-work.

164 Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, 'Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming', USAID, October 2009, p. 52

APPENDIX A
META-INDICATORS DESCRIPTION

The table below lists all meta-indicators and the indicators that compose them, specifying both the full question and the value assigned to the answers. Each sub-indicator question is weighed equally. All answers are normalized (i.e. re-scaled) on a scale from 0 to 1, with the least desirable answer at 0, and the most desirable at 1. The only exception is the "trend" meta-indicator, which is scaled from -1 to +1 to provide a more intuitive indication of positive and negative trends compared to the status quo represented by 0. Unless otherwise indicated, all values vary continuously and linearly from the minimum to the maximum. All values used for the indicators are based on valid answers, excluding "don't know", "refuse to Answer" and questions that were left blank.

Hardship

In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family faced the following hardship?

Q1. Not enough food to eat
Q2. No more money
Q3. No place where to live
Q4. Not enough clean water for home use.

Scores: **0 = Often**
0.33 = Sometimes
0.67 = Rarely
1 = Never

Socio-economic Condition

Q5 For how many years did you attend full time education?

Scores: 0 = 0-7 years
0.33 = 8-11 years
0.67 = 12-15 years
1 = 16 or more years

Q6. Compared to most families in your community, is your family better off, worse off, or about the same?

Scores: 0 = Worse off
0.5 = About the same
1 = Better off

Q7. Approximately, what is your average household family income per month?

Scores: 0 = LD 100 and below
~0.35 = LD 500
0.5 = LD 1,000
~0.65 = LD 2,000

NOTE: The meta-indicator value for reported monthly income was logged such that LD 100 and below = 0, LD 1,000 = 0.5, and LD 10,000 and above = 1. These benchmarks worked quite well with the survey data as only six responses had an average household family income per month of LD 10,000 or greater, the median income was LD 900 for a meta-indicator score of 0.48, and only 10 responses were below LD 100.

Quality of Service Provision

This meta-indicator is the only one composed of meta-indicators themselves to provide an indication of the overall quality of service provision in each neighborhood. It aggregates the overall values for six types of services:

1. Solid Waste
2. Electricity
3. Water
4. Health
5. Education
6. Infrastructure

Each of the six sub-indicators Solid Waste, Electricity, Water, Health, Education, and Infrastructure is weighted equally and averaged for a neighborhood-wide score.

Solid Waste

Q1. Which of the following best describes how frequently trash is collected?

Scores: 0 = Too irregularly to tell
0.33 = Monthly
0.67 = Weekly
1 = Multiple times per week

Q2. How does this household dispose of most of its garbage?

Scores: 0 = Throw in vacant lots
0 = Throw in river, stream, or ocean
0 = Burn and/or bury it
0.75 = Private garbage service
1 = Public garbage service

Q3. Do you follow any recycling procedures in your neighborhood?

Scores % responding yes

Electricity

Q1. According to your experience during the past six months, on average how many hours per day do power outages last in your neighborhood?

Scores # of hours divided by 8, with outages lasting more than an average of 8 hours given a score of 1. This number is then subtracted from 1 so that 8+ hours of outages scores a 0 and an average of 0 scores a 1.

Water

Q1. What are the channels through which you get your drinking water in your household?

Scores 0 = Water vendors come to the house or we go to them
0 = Own well
0 = Purchase from the market
0.5 = Connected to a neighbor's water supply
0.5 = Neighborhood source
1 = Directly connected to my house

Q2. When you [your child] last needed healthcare, where did you [your child] get care?

Scores 0 = Private healthcare facility abroad
0 = At home
0.5 = A healthcare facility run by an NGO
0.5 = A private healthcare facility
1 = A public healthcare facility

Q3. Have you/your child ever needed healthcare but did not get it?

Scores % responding no

Q4. How much do you trust the following institutions? - Public healthcare system.

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Education

Q1. Overall, how satisfied are you with the quality of public education that is available for your children?

Scores: 0 = Not satisfied at all
0.33 = Not very satisfied
0.67 = Somewhat satisfied
1 = Very satisfied

Q2. Have you encountered any of the following problems with school during the last school year?

Scores: % answering yes to any, then subtracted from 1

Q3. How many students are in the class with your youngest child or sibling?

Scores: 32 = 0 or more students
31-27 = 0.2 students
26-23 = 0.4 students
22-19 = 0.6 students
18-15 = 0.8 students
14-0 = 1 students

Q4. How much do you trust the following institutions? - Public education system.

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Infrastructure

Q1. How good are the roads in your neighborhood?

Scores0 = Not good at all
0.33 = Not very good
0.67 = Somewhat ok
1 = Good

Q2. Do the streets of this community have sufficient sewers and drains to handle excess water and prevent flooding when it rains?

Scores: % answering yes

Local Security

Q1. Compared to other neighborhoods in this city, is there more or less conflict in this neighborhood?

Scores 0 = Significantly more conflict
0.25 = Slightly more conflict
0.5 = The same amount of conflict
0.67 = Slightly less conflict
1 = Significantly less conflict

Q2. Could you tell me how secure you feel these days in your neighborhood?

Scores: 0 = Not at all secure
0.33 = Not very secure
0.67 Quite secure
1 = Very secure

Q3. Please tell me how much you agree/disagree with, "I feel secure in my neighborhood these days"?

Scores 0 = Strongly disagree
0.33 = Disagree
0.67 = Agree
1 = Strongly Agree

Q4. Please tell me how much you agree/disagree with, "I feel safe walking alone at night in my neighborhood"?

Scores: 0 = Strongly disagree
0.33 = Disagree
0.67 = Agree
1= Strongly Agree

Q5. How frequently do the following incidents happen in your neighborhood? Murder; Armed Robbery; Burglary; Fighting between armed groups; Kidnapping; Car theft and carjacking; Street aggression / Assault; Smuggling of people, drugs, or weapons; and Sexual assault.

Scores: 0 = Very frequently
0.25 = Frequently
0.5 = Occasionally
0.75 = Very rarely
1 = Never

Each value is averaged together for the 9 types of crime listed to create frequency of perceived crime.

Local Security

Q6 . Have you or a member of your family been the victim of the following incident in your neighborhood in the last year? Murder; Armed Robbery; Burglary; Fighting between armed groups; Kidnapping; Car theft and car-jacking; Street aggression / Assault; Smuggling of people, drugs, or weapons; and Sexual assault.

Scores: % responding yes to any, then subtracted from one. If a respondent reported yes to experiencing at least one of the 9 types of crime, it was recorded as an experienced crime

Q7. How well do you think the security providers prevent and control crime in your neighborhood?

Scores:0 = Very bad
0.33 = Somewhat bad
0.67 = Somewhat well
1 = Very well

Q8. When was the last time you are aware that a civilian in this community had to use a firearm to protect against another individual or group?

Scores: 0 = Less than 1 week ago
~0.16 = Less than a month ago
~0.42 = Less than 6 months ago
~0.52 = Less than a year ago
~0.68 = Less than 3 years ago
~0.75 = Less than 5 years ago
~0.85 = Earlier than that
1 = Never, not aware of any such instance

Q9. Are there any groups in the area that threaten this community with force?

Scores: % answering no

Justice

Q1 . If you or a member of your family were the victim of an assault/aggression in the street, who would you go to ask for help?

1.Police
2.Army
3.Prosecutor or Judge in the city Court
4.Prosecutor or Judge in a Nearby city Court
5.A non-state armed group that you know
6.Civil society organization
7.Religious Leader
8.My tribal sheikh
9.Municipal Council
10.My family members

Scores:
% answering yes to at least one state option (options 1, 2, 3, 4, 9)

Q2. If you were the victim of an aggression and you did not go to state authorities which of the following would you agree with?

1.Authorities would not be able to provide any solution
2.Authorities would not care
3.Authorities would not treat me correctly
4.Authorities would be very slow
5.Authorities would not be impartial

Scores: % of respondents who chose at least one of options 1, 2, or 4

Q3. Do you think that violence is acceptable to redress an injustice?

Scores: 0 = Yes, most of the time
0.33 = Yes, sometimes
0.67 = Yes, but rarely
1 = Never

Social Cohesion

Q1.I will read a series of statements on safety, security, and well-being. Please tell me how much you agree and disagree with them: “People in my neighborhood are willing to help their neighbors”

Scores:
0 = Strongly disagree
0.33 = Disagree
0.67 = Agree
1 = Strongly Agree

Q2. I will read a series of statements on safety, security, and well-being. Please tell me how much you agree and disagree with them: "My neighborhood is a place where people from different tribal, religious, ethnic, or national backgrounds get along well"

Scores: 0 = Strongly disagree
0.33 = Disagree
0.67 = Agree
1 = Strongly Agree

Q3. To what extent do you take pride in the way of life and culture of your city?

0 = Not at all
0.33 = Only slightly
0.67 = To a moderate extent
1 = To a great extent

Participation, and Engagement

Q1. Did you ever try to contact an administration official phone call, written petition, email?

Scores:% answering yes

Q2. When elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never? Please tell me separately for each of the following: **Local elections**

Scores: 0 = Never
0.5 = Usually
1 = Always

Q3. When elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never? Please tell me separately for each of the following: National elections

Scores: 0 = Never
0.5 = Usually
1 = Always

Q4. Have you participated in any public demonstration, march or sit-in in the last 6 months?

Scores: % answering yes to any of the options

National Identity

Q1. To what extent are you proud of being a Libyan?

Scores: 0 = Not at all proud
0.33 = Not very proud
0.67 = Somewhat proud
1= Very proud

Q2. NOTE: The second variable that goes into this meta-indicator is the relative strength of national identity compared to communal identity, which is obtained by subtracting the normalized score for local identity from the normalized score for national identity and then dividing the result in half and adding 0.5. As a result, someone who only feels local identity and no national identity scores a 0 [((0-1)/2)+0.5=0] and that someone who feels only national identity scores a 1 [((1-0)/2)+0.5=1].
The original questions are:

How strongly do you agree with the following statement: “I consider myself part of the Libyan nation”?

National Identity

Scores : 0 = Strongly disagree
0.2 = Disagree
0.4 = Somewhat disagree
0.6 = Somewhat agree
0.8 = Agree
1 = Strongly agree

How strongly do you agree with the following statement: “I consider myself part of my local community”?

Scores: 0 = Strongly disagree
0.2 = Disagree
0.4 = Somewhat disagree
0.6 = Somewhat agree
0.8 = Agree
1 = Strongly agree

Trust in Institutions

Q1. How much do you trust the following institutions? - GNA

Scores:0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q2. How much do you trust the following institutions? - HoR

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q3. How much do you trust the following institutions? - Judiciary

Scores:0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q4. How much do you trust the following institutions? - Majlis Baladia

0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Trust in Institutions

Q5. How much do you trust the following institutions? - Police

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q6. How much do you trust the following institutions? - Armed Forces

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Corruption

Q1. In your dealings with the municipal public sector, how important are personal contacts?

Scores: 0 = Very important
0.33 = Important
0.67 = Of little importance
1 = Not important at all

Q2. In your opinion, to what extent are municipal authorities working to crackdown on corruption and root out bribes?

Scores: 0 = Not at all
0.33 = To a small extent
0.67 = To a medium extent
1 = To a great extent

Q3. To what extent do you see the following institutions affected by corruption? - Judiciary, Police, Military

Scores: 0 = Completely
0.33 = Quite a bit
0.67 = Somewhat
1 = Not at all

Q4. To what extent do you see the following institutions affected by corruption? - Medical and health services, Business/Private sector, Education systems, Registry and permit services, Utilities department

Scores: 0 = Completely
0.33 = Quite a bit
0.67 = Somewhat
1 = Not at all

Community Discrimination

Q1. In the last 12 months did you feel that you were treated worse by health care providers for any of the following reasons: Gender; Age; Lack of money; Ethnicity; Tribal affiliation; Color 6; Political opinions; Religious opinions; Type of illness?

Scores% answering yes to any, then subtracted from 1

Q2. If you were the victim of an aggression and you did not go to state authorities which of the following would you agree with? – (D.4.3) Authorities would not treat me correctly or (D.4.5) Authorities would not be impartial.

Scores: % answering yes to either, then subtracted from 1

Q3. Following 2 [Have you experience discrimination because of your skin color, ethnic or tribal origin, religious opinion, city of origin, economic status, or gender over the last 12 months?], what are the reasons for discrimination?

Scores: % answering yes to any, then subtracted from 1

Q4. Would you say that your community is oppressed in this city?

Scores: % answering no

Marginalization

Q1. Do you currently have a valid passport or ID Card?

Scores: % answering yes

Q2. On average, how long does it take for your children to travel to their public primary school?

Scores: 0 = 46 or more minutes
0.25 = 36-45 minutes
0.5 = 26-35 minutes
0.75 = 16-25 minutes

Q3. Are people from your community well-represented in the security forces?

Scores: 0 = No, none or very few of them are local
0.5 = Yes, some of them are local
1 = Yes, most of them are local

Marginalization

Q4. I will read a series of statements on safety, security, and well-being. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with them. “I am able to have a real say on issues that are important to me in my neighborhood.”

Scores:0 = Strongly disagree
0.33 = Disagree
0.67 = Agree
1 = Strongly Agree

Q5. How just or unjust would you say that the world around you is?

Scores: 0 = Totally unjust
0.25 = Very unjust
0.5 = Quite unjust
0.75 = Quite just

Gender Equality

Q1. To what extent do you agree with this statement?: “If the wife earns more money than her husband most likely this will create problems”

Scores:0 = Strongly agree
0.33 = Agree
0.67 = Disagree
1 = Strongly disagree

Q2. To what extent do you agree with this statement?: “Housewife chores are just as fulfilling as a paid job.”

Scores: 0 = Strongly agree
0.33 = Agree
0.67 = Disagree
1 = Strongly disagree

Q3. Are there any women-led organizations in your community?

Scores: % answering yes

Interpersonal Trust

Q1.I would like to ask you to what extent do you trust people from various groups. For each group, can you tell me whether you trust it completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? - **People you know personally**

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q2.I would like to ask you to what extent do you trust people from various groups. For each group, can you tell me whether you trust it completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? **- People you meet for the first time**

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q3.I would like to ask you to what extent do you trust people from various groups. For each group, can you tell me whether you trust it completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? - **People from a different religion**

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q4. I would like to ask you to what extent do you trust people from various groups. For each group, can you tell me whether you trust it completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? **- People from different nationality**

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Tolerance

Q1. To what extent do you agree with the following statement - “The only acceptable religion is my religion”?

Scores: 0 = Agree completely
0.33 = Somewhat agree
0.67 = Somewhat disagree
1 = Disagree completely

Q2. To what extent do you agree with this statement? - “Religious minorities have the right to practice their religion freely”

Scores: 0 = Do not trust at all
0.33 = Do not trust very much
0.67 = Trust somewhat
1 = Trust completely

Q3. The following is a list of different groups of people. Please select groups you would NOT wish to have as neighbors. - People of a different race

Scores: % answering "not selected"

Q4. The following is a list of different groups of people. Please select groups you would NOT wish to have as neighbors. - People who speak a different language

Scores: % answering "not selected"

Q5. The following is a list of different groups of people. Please select groups you would NOT wish to have as neighbors. - Immigrants / foreign workers

Scores: % answering "not selected"

Religious Openness

Q1. Talking about religion, would you mind telling me which of the following most applies to you?

Scores: 0 = I take my guidance from a specific religious sheikh

0.33 = I follow a specific religious approach
0.67 = I choose from different religious interpretations
1 = I follow my own mind / reason = 1

Condoning Violence

Q1. Some people think that for the security forces to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that this kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion?

Scores: 0 = Sometimes justified
0.5 = It depends
1 = Never justified

Q2. Some people think that for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified, while others think that kind of violence is never justified. Which is your opinion? ely”

Scores: 0 = Sometimes justified
0.5 = It depends
1 = Never justified

Q3. Some people think that having firearms in this area is a necessity, others disagree. How about you?

Scores: 0 = Strongly agree
0.33 = Agree
0.67 = Disagree
1 = Strongly disagree

Trend

The trend meta-indicator seeks to capture respondents’ opinion about whether their condition and the reality around them is improving or worsening. In this case, the scale ranges from -1 (very much worsening) to 1 (very much improving, with 0 representing no change.

Q1. How has your household’s access to drinking water changed in the past 12 months?

Scores: -1 = Significantly worsened
-0.5 = Slightly worsened
0 = Stayed the same
0.5 = Slightly improved
1 = Significantly improved

Q2. Compared to the security situation in this town and neighborhood nowadays, do you think that the situation in one year will be more safe, less safe, or the same as today?

Scores:-1 = Less safe than today
0 = Same as today
1 = More safe than today

Trend

Q3. How is the security situation in your neighborhood now, compared to twelve months ago?

Scores : -1 = Less safe than it was
0 = Same as today
1 = More safe than it was

Q4. Over the past year, how has the level of corruption in this city changed?

Scores:-1 = Increased a lot
-0.5 = Increased a little
0 = Stayed the same
0.5 = Decreased a little
1 = Decreased a lot

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PREVENTION OF **VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

IN LIBYA NOVEMBER 2021